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The growth of the agricultural sector is crucial to reduce poverty in developing countries. 
Poverty is still a mainly rural phenomenon and more than two thirds of the world’s poor 
continue to live in rural areas, most of them relying on agriculture as the main income source. 
The enhanced participation of small-scale farmers in the growing global market for high-
value agricultural products, such as livestock products, fish and fresh fruit and vegetables is 
seen as one of the most promising ways to reduce poverty. In particular, the diversification 
into horticulture offers many opportunities for small-scale farmers. Compared to the 
production of staple crops, fruit and vegetables cultivation is labor intensive, generates higher 
levels of employment and higher net incomes per hectare. However, the market access of 
smallholders to high-value supply chains is increasingly threatened by a tightening and 
proliferation of public and private food safety and quality standards. While public standards 
have long been recognized as an important barrier to exports from developing to developed 
countries, private standards, although voluntary are becoming a requirement to access high-
value markets worldwide. 
In this study, we focus on the implications of the GlobalGAP standard for small-scale fruit 
and vegetable farmers in developing countries. GlobalGAP was developed by a group of 
European retailers in 1997 with the aim to harmonize retailers’ existing standards and today is 
the most widely used private certification scheme for good agricultural practices. The 
increasing importance of the GlobalGAP standard offers new challenges as well as new 
opportunities for smallholders in developing countries. On the one hand, several studies have 
shown that complying with GlobalGAP is especially difficult for small-scale farmers due to 
the high costs of compliance and the high technical and managerial requirements of the 
standard. On the other hand, the standard may have a positive impact on the livelihoods of 
farmers who are able to comply. Amongst others, GlobalGAP adoption is discussed to lead to 
higher and more stable incomes and thus to a reduction of poverty and vulnerability. 
However, besides the challenge to overcome the initial barriers to standard adoption, there is 
increasing evidence that continuously meeting the strict requirements and high costs 
associated with GlobalGAP is challenging for smallholders. In particular, several studies 
report that donor facilitated GlobalGAP adoption is often not sustainable and that farmers 





Given the potential challenges and opportunities associated with the GlobalGAP standard, this 
study aims to identify mechanisms that enable small-scale farmers to sustainably adopt the 
GlobalGAP standard and to benefit from certification. More specifically, the following three 
objectives are addressed in this study. First, we identify the factors that influence GlobalGAP 
adoption, taking into account the support by donors, public-private partnerships and exporters. 
Second, we analyze the impacts of GlobalGAP certification on producer prices and on 
farmers’ net household income. Third, the determinants of continued compliance with 
GlobalGAP following the withdrawal of donor support are investigated. 
The empirical analyses are based on a panel data set of Thai fruit and vegetable farmers which 
we collected in 2010 and 2011. For the purpose of our study, the relevant population of Thai 
fruit and vegetable farmers was stratified according to participation in a development program 
which aimed to enable small-scale farmers to adopt the GlobalGAP standard. The program 
was carried out between 2008 and 2010 and within the first half of 2010 several of the 
participants successfully obtained a GlobalGAP certificate. During the first survey in 2010, 
we interviewed 287 farm households, whereas 146 are program participants and 141 are non-
participants. To some extent sample attrition occurred in 2011 and 218 of the 287 households 
were interviewed a second time. 
In the first part of our analysis, we compare different institutional arrangements that can be 
formed under GlobalGAP group certification and analyze the factors influencing GlobalGAP 
adoption. The analysis is based on the cross-sectional data set that we collected in 2010 and 
thus corresponds to the period before GlobalGAP adoption for certified farmers in our 
sample. In our research area, the increasing demand for GlobalGAP has encouraged the 
formation of new institutional arrangements between donors, exporters and farmers. Farmers 
participating in a development program were organized in certification groups with either a 
donor-run, farmer-run or exporter-run Quality Management System. The results of our 
adoption analysis show that the support by donors, exporters and public-private partnerships 
is critical to enable small-scale farmers with limited human, social and physical capital to 
adopt the GlobalGAP standard. Furthermore, we find that GlobalGAP adoption is influenced 
by household and farm characteristics, such as education, the availability of family labor, the 
use of efficient irrigation systems, and previous experience in high-value supply chains. 
In addition, the impacts of GlobalGAP certification on fruit and vegetable producer prices and 
on farmers’ net household income are analyzed. The availability of panel data allows us to use 





households. Besides estimating average treatment effects of certification, we are interested in 
whether the impact of GlobalGAP certification differs between subgroups of adopters, i.e., 
between farmers certified in exporter-managed and producer-managed groups and between 
smaller and larger farmers. We find that, on the average, GlobalGAP certification has a large 
and significant positive effect on prices and on net household income. The high average 
effect, however, is mainly driven by large significant positive effects in the producer-managed 
groups, in which GlobalGAP certification resulted in on the average 62% higher prices and 
14,678 USD higher net household incomes. In the exporter-managed groups, in contrast, we 
cannot identify a significant impact of certification. Moreover, we find that larger farmers in 
producer-managed certification groups realize high net income gains while smaller farmers 
only benefit as long as they do not have to incur recurrent costs of compliance, i.e., as long as 
they receive financial support by a donor. 
The last part of our study deals with the sustainability of donor supported GlobalGAP 
adoption. A bivariate probit model is estimated to analyze the determinants of GlobalGAP re-
certification conditional on initial adoption of the standard. The results show that the support 
by an exporter in terms of financial, technical and managerial assistance is the most important 
determinant of continued compliance with GlobalGAP and increases the probability to 
become re-certified by 85%. This finding indicates that although farmers in producer-
managed certification groups on the average benefit from certification, they are usually not 
capable to become re-certified when donor support is not available. Moreover, we find that 
larger farmers and farmers with a higher share of the total land certified are more likely to 
obtain a renewal of the certificate. Hence, we can conclude that relatively small and less 
integrated farmers are the first to disadopt the GlobalGAP standard when donor support ends. 
These farmers, however, were most at risk to lose access to high-value markets as a 
consequence of increasing food safety and quality requirements and were therefore primarily 





Das Wachstum des Agrarsektors ist einer der entscheidenden Faktoren, um Armut in 
Entwicklungsländern zu verringern, da Armut auch heute noch ein vor allem ländliches 
Phänomen ist. Zwei Drittel der Armen weltweit leben auf dem Land und sind in der Mehrzahl 
direkt oder indirekt von der Landwirtschaft abhängig. Die verstärkte Teilnahme von 
Kleinbauern am wachsenden globalen Markt für hochwertige Nahrungsmittel wie tierische 
Erzeugnisse, Fisch, Obst und Gemüse wird als eine der vielversprechendsten Möglichkeiten 
gesehen, um Armut zu reduzieren. Insbesondere die Verbreitung des Obst- und 
Gemüseanbaus bietet eine Vielzahl von Chancen für Kleinbauern, da dieser im Vergleich zum 
Anbau von Grundnahrungsmitteln einen höheren Arbeitseinsatz erfordert sowie höhere 
Einkommen pro Hektar generiert. Die Ausschöpfung der sich eröffnenden Möglichkeiten 
kann jedoch durch die wachsende Bedeutung von privaten und öffentlichen 
Lebensmittelsicherheits- und Qualitätsstandards behindert werden. Während öffentliche 
Standards schon lange als ein Handelshemmnis für Exporte von Entwicklungsländern in 
Industrieländer gelten, werden private, vom Einzelhandel festgelegte Standards zunehmend zu 
einem Erfordernis, um Zugang zu Märkten weltweit zu erhalten. 
In dieser Studie befassen wir uns mit den Auswirkungen des GlobalGAP Standards auf Obst- 
und Gemüsekleinbauern in Entwicklungsländern. Der GlobalGAP Standard wurde 1997 
durch europäische Einzelhandelsunternehmen mit dem Ziel entwickelt, die sehr 
unterschiedlichen Qualitätsstandards der einzelnen Unternehmen zu harmonisieren, und gilt 
heute als der wichtigste Standard für gute Agrarpraxis weltweit. Während die steigende 
Bedeutung des GlobalGAP Standards Kleinbauern in Entwicklungsländern vor neue 
Herausforderungen stellt,  bietet diese gleichzeitig auch neue Chancen. Verschiedene Studien 
haben gezeigt, dass die Implementierung des GlobalGAP Standards für Kleinbauern aufgrund 
von hohen Investitionskosten sowie hohen technischen und administrativen Erfordernissen 
mit besonders großen Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Auf der anderen Seite wird diskutiert, 
dass eine erfolgreiche Annahme des Standards zu stabileren und höheren Einkommen führen 
kann und somit zu einer Verringerung von Armut und Vulnerabilität beitragen kann. Jedoch 
ist nicht nur die Implementierung des GlobalGAP Standards eine große Herausforderung für 
Kleinbauern in Entwicklungsländern, sondern die ständige Einhaltung des Standards gestaltet 
sich häufig aufgrund der hohen laufenden Kosten und der strengen Erfordernisse des 
Standards als ebenso schwierig. Verschiedene Studien haben gezeigt, dass insbesondere die 




Zertifikat erhalten haben, vielfach nicht dazu in der Lage sind, den Standard selbständig 
aufrechtzuhalten. 
Auf Grundlage der oben beschriebenen Chancen und Herausforderungen, die der GlobalGAP 
Standard mit sich bringt, ist es das Ziel dieser Studie, Mechanismen zu identifizieren, die 
Kleinbauern dazu in die Lage versetzen, den GlobalGAP Standard nachhaltig anzunehmen, 
um langfristig von einer Zertifizierung zu profitieren. Hierzu werden zunächst die Faktoren, 
die die Annahme des GlobalGAP Standards beeinflussen, identifiziert, wobei die 
Unterstützung von Gebern, öffentlich-privaten Partnerschaften und Exporteuren mit 
einbezogen wird. Darauf folgend analysieren wir die Auswirkungen der GlobalGAP 
Zertifizierung auf Produzentenpreise für Obst und Gemüse und auf das Netto-
Haushaltseinkommen der Landwirte. Zuletzt werden die Determinanten der GlobalGAP 
Rezertifizierung nach Ende der Unterstützung durch Entwicklungshilfsprogramme untersucht.  
Die empirische Analyse basiert auf einem umfangreichen Paneldatensatz von thailändischen 
Obst- und Gemüsebauern, der in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 erhoben wurde. Die 
Grundgesamtheit von Obst- und Gemüsebauern wurde nach der Teilnahme an einem 
Entwicklungshilfsprogramm stratifiziert, welches zum Ziel hatte, thailändische Kleinbauern 
in der Annahme des GlobalGAP Standards zu unterstützen. Das Programm wurde zwischen 
2008 und 2010 durchgeführt und zu Beginn des Jahres 2010 konnte eine Vielzahl von 
Programmteilnehmern erfolgreich das GlobalGAP Zertifikat erlangen. Während der ersten 
Befragungsrunde im Jahr 2010 wurden 287 Haushalte interviewt, davon sind 146 Teilnehmer 
des Entwicklungshilfsprogramms und 141 sind Nicht-Teilnehmer. Im Jahr 2011 konnten 218 
der 287 Haushalte ein zweites Mal interviewt werden. 
Im ersten Teil der Studie vergleichen wir verschiedene institutionelle Arrangements, die unter 
die GlobalGAP Gruppenzertifizierung fallen, und analysieren die Faktoren, die die Annahme 
des GlobalGAP Standards bedingen. Die Analyse basiert auf den im Jahr 2010 während der 
ersten Befragungsrunde erhobenen Querschnittsdaten, die die Situation der Haushalte vor der 
Zertifizierung widerspiegeln. In unserer Forschungsregion hat die vermehrte Nachfrage nach 
GlobalGAP zertifizierten Produkten zu der Bildung neuer institutioneller Arrangements 
zwischen Gebern, Exporteuren und Landwirten geführt. Teilnehmende Landwirte an einem 
Entwicklungshilfsprogramm wurden in verschiedenen Zertifizierungsgruppen organisiert, die 
sich im Hinblick auf das Management des internen Kontrollsystems unterscheiden. Dieses 
kann entweder durch Geber, Exporteure oder durch die Landwirte selbst geleitet werden. Die 




Entwicklungshilfsprogramme, Exporteure und öffentlich-private Partnerschaften entscheidend 
ist, um Kleinbauern mit einem geringen Human- und Sozialkapital sowie mit geringen 
finanziellen Ressourcen die Annahme des GlobalGAP Standards zu ermöglichen. Zudem wird 
die Annahme der GlobalGAP Standards durch Haushalts- und Betriebsmerkmale wie 
Bildung, die Verfügbarkeit von Arbeitskräften in der Familie, die Nutzung effizienter 
Bewässerungstechniken sowie vorherige Erfahrung in modernen Wertschöpfungsketten 
beeinflusst. 
Des Weiteren analysieren wir die Auswirkungen der GlobalGAP Zertifizierung auf Obst- und 
Gemüseproduzentenpreise sowie auf das Netto-Haushaltseinkommen von Landwirten. Die 
Analyse beruht auf den erhobenen Paneldaten, die es uns ermöglichen, das Fixed-Effects-
Modell anzuwenden, welches für einen Selektionsbias aufgrund von zeitkonstanter, 
unbeobachtbarer Heterogenität kontrolliert. Neben der Schätzung von durchschnittlichen 
Effekten der GlobalGAP Zertifizierung untersuchen wir die Frage, ob sich die Auswirkungen 
von GlobalGAP zwischen Untergruppen zertifizierter Landwirte unterscheiden. Für die Studie 
differenzieren wir zwischen zertifizierten Landwirten, die in von den Produzenten selbst oder 
in von Exporteuren geführten Gruppen organisiert sind, sowie zwischen Landwirten mit einer 
größeren oder kleineren zertifizierten Fläche. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine GlobalGAP 
Zertifizierung im Durchschnitt hohe positive Auswirkungen auf Produzentenpreise sowie auf 
das Netto-Haushaltseinkommen von Landwirten hat. Der hohe durchschnittliche Effekt wird 
jedoch vor allem durch hohe positive Auswirkungen in den von Produzenten geführten 
Gruppen gesteuert. In diesen hat die Annahme des GlobalGAP Standards im Durchschnitt zu 
62% höheren Preisen sowie zu 14,678 USD höheren Netto-Haushaltseinkommen geführt. In 
den von Exporteuren geleiteten Gruppen kann dagegen kein signifikanter Einfluss der 
Zertifizierung festgestellt werden. Des Weiteren stellen wir fest, dass die realisierten 
Einkommenseffekte in den von Produzenten geführten Gruppen von der Größe der 
zertifizierten Fläche abhängen. Während größere Betriebe sehr hohe Einkommensgewinne 
erzielen, können kleinere Betriebe nur solange einen signifikanten Effekt verzeichnen, wie sie 
die wiederkehrenden Kosten der Zertifizierung nicht selbst tragen müssen, d.h. solange sie 
finanzielle  Unterstützung durch einen Geber erhalten. 
Der letzte Teil unserer Studie befasst sich mit der Nachhaltigkeit der von 
Entwicklungshilfsprogrammen unterstützen GlobalGAP Zertifizierung von Kleinbauern. Wir 
schätzen ein bivariates Probit-Modell, um die Faktoren, die die nachhaltige Annahme des 




analysieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Unterstützung durch Exporteure der weitaus 
wichtigste Einflussfaktor der ständigen und nachhaltigen Einhaltung des GlobalGAP 
Standards ist. Im Vergleich zu Landwirten in von Produzenten geführten Gruppen haben 
Bauern, die in von Exporteuren geleiteten Gruppen organisiert sind, eine 85% höhere 
Wahrscheinlichkeit erneut zertifiziert zu werden. Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass die 
Mehrheit der zertifizierten Bauern in den von Produzenten geleiteten Gruppen nicht die 
Fähigkeiten besitzt, den GlobalGAP Standard ohne externe Unterstützung dauerhaft aufrecht 
zu erhalten, obwohl sie im Durchschnitt einen hohen Nutzen aus der Zertifizierung ziehen 
könnten. Des Weiteren zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass größere Betriebe mit einem höheren 
Anteil der zertifizierten Fläche an der Gesamtfläche häufiger erneut zertifiziert werden. Somit 
können wir feststellen, dass die relativ kleinen und weniger integrierten Bauern zu den ersten 
gehören, die nach dem Ende von Entwicklungshilfsprogrammen den GlobalGAP Standard 
ablegen. Diese bilden jedoch die primäre Zielgruppe von Entwicklungshilfsprogrammen, da 
sie am ehesten gefährdet sind, den Zugang zu Märkten aufgrund der steigenden Bedeutung 
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1. General introduction 
1.1. The role of high-value agriculture in rural poverty alleviation 
The growth of the agricultural sector is crucial to achieve a sustainable economic growth and 
poverty reduction in developing countries. More than two thirds of the poor in developing 
countries live in rural areas and most of them rely on agriculture as the main income source 
(World Bank, 2007). The growth of the small-scale farm sector has an especially high 
potential to contribute to poverty reduction. Small-scale agriculture continues to dominate the 
farm structure in most developing countries, and of the 2.5 billion people involved in 
agriculture in developing countries, 1.5 billion are estimated to live in smallholder households 
(World Bank, 2007). One of the key instruments to reduce rural poverty is to enhance the 
participation of small-scale farmers in the growing domestic and global markets for high-
value agricultural products, such as meat, dairy products, fruits, vegetables (World Bank, 
2007, Gulati et al., 2006, Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). 
In the last three decades, a transformation of the agricultural sector in developing countries 
has taken place. The relative importance of staple crops and traditional export commodities 
(coffee, cacao, tea, sugar spices, and nuts) in agricultural trade and production has declined 
and a shift towards high-value products can be observed (Reardon and Timmer, 2007, World 
Bank, 2007, Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). In developing countries, rapid economic 
growth, urbanization and globalization have induced changes in consumer diets away from 
staple foods towards an increased consumption of high-value products (World Bank, 2007, 
Gulati et al., 2006, Pingali, 2006). As a result, the domestic market for high-value products is 
one of the fastest growing agricultural markets in many developing countries, expanding by 6-
7% a year (World Bank, 2007). At the same time, the demand for specialty products and for a 
year-round supply of highly perishable fruit and vegetables has increased in industrialized 
countries, creating new exporting opportunities for many developing countries (World Bank, 
2007). By 2004, exports of high-value products already accounted for 43% of total agrofood 
exports from developing countries (World Bank, 2007). In comparison, traditional tropical 
products only accounted for 19% of food exports from developing countries in 2001 
(Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). 
The horticultural sector, as one of the fastest growing sectors in the high-value segment, is 
discussed to contribute to poverty alleviation. Compared to the production of staple crops, 




higher net incomes per hectare (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007, McCulloch and Ota, 2002). 
Moreover, due to the labor intensity fruit and vegetable cultivation is regarded to be 
especially suitable for small-scale family farms with a high ratio of available labor to arable 
land (Key and Runsten, 1999, Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). Global production of fruit 
and vegetables has more than doubled in the past thirty years, and an overwhelming share of 
the growth took place in developing countries (FAO, 2010). China experienced a nine-fold 
increase of its production between 1980 and 2010 and today is the largest producer of F&V 
worldwide, followed by India. The growth of the horticultural production in Asia (without 
China), Africa and Latin America was also high with the first two growing on average 4.7% 
per year and the latter 3.4% per year (FAO, 2010). Moreover, developing countries increased 
their exports of fruit and vegetables1
However, in recent years, meeting the market requirements in high-value markets has become 
more challenging (Gulati et al., 2006). In particular, high-value export and domestic supply 
chains in developing countries are increasingly governed by a plethora of public and private 
food safety and quality standards (Henson and Reardon, 2005, Balsevich et al., 2003). 
Developed countries’ public standards have long been criticized to act as non-tariff barriers to 
trade for exports from developing countries (Henson and Loader, 2001, Henson and Caswell, 
1999, Otsuki et al., 2001). Private standards, however, often exceed the requirements of 
public standards and, although voluntary, become mandatory to access high-value markets 
worldwide (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000, Berdegue et al., 2005, Farina and Reardon, 2000, 
Jaffee et al., 2005). There is growing concern among the development community that small-
scale farmers will lose access to high-value markets because of their inability to meet 
stringent private standards (Graffham et al., 2007b, Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006, Jaffee 
et al., 2011). First, adopting private standards usually entails high compliance and 
certification costs that disadvantage smallholders. Second, small-scale farmers often lack the 
technical ability to adapt their farming practices to the requirements of standards (Narrod et 
al., 2009, Jaffee et al., 2011). Yet, others argue that the challenge can also be turned into an 
 more rapidly than developed economies. Between 2001 
and 2011, developing countries’ F&V export value grew from 19.6 billion USD to 83.7 
billion USD (International Trade Centre, 2012). Furthermore, the share of horticultural 
products in total agricultural exports has been rising and is expected to continue to rise faster 
than other agricultural commodities (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007, Humphrey and 
Memedovic, 2006). 
                                                          




opportunity. Standards are discussed to encourage new forms of cooperation between 
producers and agribusinesses, to lead to the upgrading of supply chains and to facilitate access 
to new remunerative markets (Jaffee, 2003). Seen from this viewpoint, the adoption of 
standards can lead to higher and more stable incomes and thereby to a reduction of poverty 
and vulnerability among small-scale farmers. Given the potential opportunities and challenges 
of private food safety and quality standards, the aim of this study is to contribute to the 
understanding of the implications of standards for small-scale farmers, and to identify 
mechanisms that enable small-scale farmers to adopt standards and to benefit from standards 
in the long run. We do so by focusing on the GlobalGAP standard in the Thai horticultural 
sector. GlobalGAP is the most widely known standard for good agricultural practices and a 
requirement of major retailers worldwide. 
 
1.2. Public and private food safety and quality standards 
1.2.1. Understanding the rise of private food safety standards 
In order to understand the implications of standards for small-scale farmers in developing 
countries, it is important to examine the causes of changes in public regulatory requirements 
and the connected rise of private food safety and quality standards. 
In industrialized countries consumers are increasingly concerned over food safety and there is 
a rising awareness of the social and environmental impacts of food production. Over the last 
decades, a series of food safety scandals and disease outbreaks in a number of countries (for 
example, salmonella and E. coli outbreaks, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, dioxin in 
animal feed) has shaken consumer confidence in the prevailing food safety regulatory system 
(Jaffee et al., 2005, Henson and Reardon, 2005). Moreover, consumers’ desire for credence 
quality attributes of food products that are unobservable at the point of purchase is increasing. 
In particular, there is a broadening concern over contaminants in food (e.g., microbial 
pathogens, heavy metals and pesticide residues), and over how products were grown and 
processed (e.g., animal welfare concerns, organic production, social and environmental 
concerns) (Henson and Reardon, 2005, Jaffee et al., 2011). 
In response to these developments, governments, especially in the European Union, have 
tightened existing mandatory food safety standards, and a number of new standards have been 




2005). At the same time, it became more difficult to demonstrate compliance with food safety 
standards as a result of a shift from product to process standards (Humphrey and Memedovic, 
2006). While product standards define the characteristics of a product and are largely 
enforced through testing at borders, process standards are agreed criteria of how products are 
made and require the implementation and control of new procedures and management 
systems (FAO, 2003, Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). Food safety today is seen as a 
product of the whole value chain, from primary production to the consumer, implying that 
risks have to be managed at all points of the value chain (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). 
In parallel with these developments, the private sector introduced private standards for food 
safety and quality to meet consumers’ concerns over food safety, to differentiate products 
based on quality attributes, to mitigate commercial risks and to ensure compliance with public 
regulations (Henson and Reardon, 2005, Reardon et al., 2009). These standards are mostly 
employed by lead firms in the food chain, such as major retailers, processors and food service 
firms, who have the market power to impose compliance with standards onto their producers 
(Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). Initially, firms developed their own private standards 
(e.g., Tesco Nature’s Choice2, Carrefour Quality Lines3
Private standards, although voluntary, are becoming increasingly mandatory to supply high-
value markets worldwide, which also has consequences for producers in developing countries 
(Jaffee et al., 2011). In some cases, globally operating chains apply private standards from 
developed markets for suppliers in developing countries. One example is the GlobalGAP 
standard, a collective private standard for good agricultural practices, which was introduced 
by European retailers in 1997 with the aim to harmonize retailers’ existing standards. Today 
GlobalGAP is a de-facto mandatory requirement for producers of fresh products to access the 
European market (Henson and Reardon, 2005). The importance of private standards, 
however, is not only rising in developing countries’ export supply chains, but also in domestic 
market supply chains that are increasingly dominated by globally operating supermarket 
), but in recent years collective private 
standards that are developed by groups of firms or business associations have become even 
more important (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). For companies operating globally such 
standards reduce transaction costs and coordination costs by placing the responsibility that 
food is safe onto their suppliers (Humphrey, 2008). 
                                                          
2 Tesco Nature’s Choice is an integrated farm management scheme unique to Tesco. The standard was created in 
1992 to ensure that “fruit, vegetables and salad are grown to high safety, quality and environmental standards” 
(Tesco, 2005). 
3 In 1992, Carrefour initiated certification schemes for a range of different products, the Carrefour Quality Lines 
(CQL). The standards address a broad range of issues, such as food safety, environmental and animal welfare 




chains, such as Carrefour, Wal-Mart and Tesco (Reardon and Timmer, 2007). Starting in the 
1990s, supermarkets have expanded rapidly in many developing countries as a result of rising 
incomes, urbanization and a higher participation of women in the workforce, coupled with 
foreign direct investment by mainly European, U.S. and Japanese supermarket chains 
(Pingali, 2006, Reardon et al., 2003). The extent of supermarket penetration in developing 
countries varies and is highest in Latin America and Asia. By 2000 the share of supermarkets 
in Latin America had already reached 50-60% (Reardon et al., 2003). In East and Southeast 
Asian countries the share of supermarkets reached 30-50% by mid 2000 (Reardon et al., 
2012). According to Reardon et al. (2010), five main reasons can be identified for the 
increasing use of private standards by supermarkets in developing countries. First, they are 
implemented to substitute for inadequate or missing public standards. Second, urban 
consumers in developing countries are increasingly concerned over food safety as a result of 
recent food scandals and produce scares. Third, globally or regionally operating chains apply 
standards to produce sold via their regional or global procurement networks. These can be 
chain specific standards, such as Carrefour Quality Line or Tesco Nature’s Choice, or 
collective standards (e.g., GlobalGAP). Fourth, in local markets standards help to coordinate 
supply chains and to reduce wastage. Fifth, they can be a tool to differentiate products from 
those sold by traditional retailers (Reardon et al., 2010). Given these developments, it is 
expected that private standards will increasingly govern not only export supply chains in 
developing countries, but also domestic supply chains. 
 
1.2.2. The case of the GlobalGAP standard 
The GlobalGAP4 standard, which we focus on in this study, is the most widely 
implemented farm assurance program today. 
                                                          
4 GlobalGAP is jointly governed by retailers and producers. In 2012, 49 retailers and food services were 
members of GlobalGAP and 197 producers and suppliers. Of the latter, 32 came from developing countries 
(FoodPLUS, 2012c). 
GlobalGAP is a pre-farm gate standard that 
covers the process from farm inputs and all activities on the farm until the product leaves the 
farm (FoodPLUS, 2012c). The main focus of the standard is on food safety, but it also covers 
aspects of environmental protection, workers’ health, safety and welfare and traceability 
(FoodPLUS, 2012c). The standard is based on third party certification, and farmers are 




(Humphrey, 2008). Initially, GlobalGAP was developed by European retailers5 to ensure that 
the produce they sell complies with public food safety regulations in the EU, and in response 
to pressures by consumers and NGOs to address the environmental and social impacts of food 
production (Humphrey, 2008). While still being mainly a requirement of major supermarkets 
in the EU, the standard has gained global relevance6 in recent years with retailers and food 
service firms from the U.S., Japan, and South Africa becoming members of GlobalGAP and 
imposing compliance with the standard onto their suppliers7
GlobalGAP offers two certification options
 (FoodPLUS, 2012c, Humphrey, 
2008). The number of GlobalGAP certified producers grew from 18,000 in 2004 to 112,600 
in 2011 and today certified farmers can be found in 113 different countries. Europe continues 
to account for the majority of certificates (74% in 2011), but the share of certificates is 
growing in Asia and Latin America (FoodPLUS, 2011a). 
8
 
: individual certification (Option 1) and group 
certification (Option 2). Compared to individual certification, group certification can make 
compliance with GlobalGAP feasible for small-scale farmers by reducing the costs of 
compliance for the individual producers and by making it easier for external service providers 
to provide farmers with advice and trainings (Will, 2010). Two main group types exist under 
GlobalGAP Option 2. The first is a farmers’ association or cooperative where the group is 
managed by farmers, and the second is an outgrower scheme of a company, where the 
company organizes smallholders and manages the group (GTZ, 2010). In 2011, 70% of the 
GlobalGAP certified producers worldwide were certified in a group (FoodPLUS, 2011a). 
1.2.3. Implications of standards for small-scale farmers in developing countries 
There is considerable evidence that adopting private food safety and quality standards is 
especially challenging for small-scale farmers (Roy and Thorat, 2008, Ashraf et al., 2009, 
Graffham et al., 2007b). Compliance with standards entails high up-front investments into 
                                                          
5 GlobalGAP was named EUREPGAP until 2007. The name was changed to reflect the increasing global 
aspirations of the standard (FoodPLUS, 2012c). 
6 Moreover, GlobalGAP aims to globalize its standards by benchmarking them against other standards. For 
developing countries, the policy of GlobalGAP to promote the development and benchmarking of national 
standards is especially important. This allows for the development of standards which are adapted to national 
circumstances, while at the same time being recognized as equivalent to GlobalGAP (Humphrey, 2008). Among 
standards benchmarked against GlobalGAP are ChileGAP, KenyaGAP, ThaiGAP, ChinaGAP and 
MéxicoG.A.P. (FoodPLUS, 2012c). 
7 As of December 2012, 49 retailers and food service firms are members of GlobalGAP. Thereof, 41 are 
European, one is Japanese, two are South African, and five are from the United States (FoodPLUS, 2010c). 





farm facilities and equipment, which smallholder are often not able to incur, especially if they 
lack access to credit (Jaffee et al., 2005). In addition, the costs of compliance with standards 
are to a large extent fixed costs which disadvantage small-scale producers (Jaffee et al., 2005, 
Chemnitz, 2007). Besides, the technical and information requirements of standards are high. 
Farmers have to adopt more sophisticated farming practices and they require producers to be 
informed about changing requirements of standards. However, acquiring information is also 
subject to economies of scale (Roy and Thorat, 2008, Narrod et al., 2009). Poor education 
levels and a lack of access to extension services and training programs further hinder the 
implementation of food safety and quality standards by small-scale farmers (Markelova et al., 
2009). 
Moreover, the adoption of standards is constrained by the prevalence of unsafe farming 
practices in developing countries. In particular, microbial contamination of fruit and 
vegetables is a severe problem as a result of poor hygiene practices, the use of untreated 
manure and polluted irrigation water (Shepard, 2006). Furthermore, pesticide overuse is 
common among small-scale farmers because pesticides provide an effective way to manage 
risks. Pesticides are frequently applied as a preventive measure, following a monthly or 
weekly spraying calendar, and the doses applied are often higher than recommended on the 
label (Shepard, 2006, Plianbangchang et al., 2009, Okello and Swinton, 2007). This practice 
is encouraged by the fact that in traditional supply chains the physical appearance is still the 
major factor for the determination of the market price (Shepard, 2006). 
In response to the increasing demand for food safety and quality, changes in the structure of 
high-value export and domestic supply chains are taking place. In particular, there is a shift 
from open-market sourcing to integrated and coordinated procurement, which allows for a 
better monitoring of the production process on the farm (Jaffee et al., 2005, Gulati et al., 
2006, Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpoongse, 2008, Pingali, 2006). However, the transaction 
costs of contracting and of monitoring food safety are higher for smaller than for larger farms. 
As a result, exporters and supermarkets increase sourcing from large-scale growers, where 
food safety is well controlled, and increase the production on company-owned farms (Buurma 
and Saranak, 2006, Gulati et al., 2006, Reardon et al., 2012, Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).  
Nevertheless, in countries where the farming system is dominated by small-scale farmers and 
land is scarce, it is imperative to find innovative approaches to enable small-scale farmers to 
participate in high-value markets and to adopt food safety and quality standards (Gulati et al., 




Furthermore, small-scale farmers have a comparative advantage in the production of labor-
intensive crops, such as fruit and vegetables, which can outweigh the higher transaction costs 
associated with contracting small-scale farmers (Key and Runsten, 1999, Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000). Therefore, new forms of institutional arrangements are emerging which 
successfully integrate small-scale farmers into high-value chains. First, some companies use 
resource-providing contracts to enable small-scale farmers to fulfill the quality requirements 
in high-value supply chains and to adopt food safety and quality standards (Henson and 
Reardon, 2005, Buurma and Saranak, 2006, Manarungsan et al., 2005). Second, there are 
examples where collective action has enabled small-scale farmers to participate in high-value 
markets. By forming producer associations farmers can generate economies of scale, obtain 
information more easily and finance the investments associated with adopting standards (Roy 
and Thorat, 2008, Markelova et al., 2009, Narrod et al., 2009, Manarungsan et al., 2005).  
In the light of the above mentioned challenges, several donors, governments and NGOs have 
initiated development programs to facilitate the adoption of private standards by small-scale 
farmers. Most initiatives focused on the GlobalGAP standard which became increasingly 
mandatory to supply the European market in the mid 2000s and therewith threatened to 
exclude small-scale farmers from high-value markets (Humphrey, 2008, Will, 2010). These 
programs supported the creation of farmer groups and offered financial assistance, training 
and information to the groups to achieve certification (Humphrey, 2008). Moreover, public-
private partnerships were formed between donors and exporters to enable small-scale farmers 
to adopt the standard as part of exporter outgrower schemes (Narrod et al., 2009, Humphrey, 
2008). Furthermore, several initiatives supported the development of national benchmarked 
standards, such as KenyaGAP and ThaiGAP, with the aim to adapt the GlobalGAP standard 
to national circumstances, and to make compliance easier for small-scale farmers. In addition, 
the development of local certification bodies such as AfriCert was supported to reduce 
certification costs, and the private sector was strengthened to provide support services needed 
to adopt private standards (Humphrey, 2008). 
 
1.2.4. The role of standards in the Thai fruit and vegetable sector 
This study focuses on the implication of food safety and quality standards for small-scale 
farmers in the Thai fruit and vegetable sector. Thailand is one of the largest producers and 




countries most affected by increasing standards (Jaffee et al., 2005, Manarungsan et al., 
2005). Moreover, super- and hypermarkets in Thailand9
The case of Thailand is also relevant from a development perspective. Thailand, similar to 
many other emerging economies in Asia, experienced rapid economic growth in the last 
decades, which has led to falling poverty rates since the 1980s. However, economic growth 
was unequal. Although poverty rates have fallen to 8% by 2009, poverty remains widespread 
in rural areas. Of the 5.4 million poor in Thailand, 88% live in rural areas (World Bank, 
2012). Thus, the agricultural sector, as the biggest employment
 capture an increasing share of fresh 
produce sales, which contributes to a growing relevance of standards in the F&V domestic 
supply chains (Pingali, 2006, Reardon et al., 2012, Wiboonpongse and Sriboonchitta, 2004, 
Buurma and Saranak, 2006). In 2002, it was estimated that super- and hypermarkets already 
accounted for 40% of fruit sales and 30% of vegetables sales in the Bangkok area, while the 
share was still lower but increasing in other areas (Shepherd, 2005). 
10
Thailand was the 17th largest producer of fruits and the 27th largest producers of vegetables in 
2010 (FAO, 2010). Moreover, the country is a significant player in fruit and vegetable 
exports. In 2011, the country’s F&V exports amounted to 2.3 billion USD, making Thailand 
the 10th biggest exporter of vegetables (HS 07) and 22nd biggest exporter of fruits (HS 08) 
(International Trade Centre, 2012). Exports mainly go to Asian markets and in 2011, 46% of 
fruit exports (HS 08) in value terms went to China, 19% to countries in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 16% to Hong Kong. Only 4% are exported to the U.S. 
and 3% to Europe (International Trade Centre, 2012). For vegetables (HS 0701-0713)
 and income generator for the 
rural population, plays a critical role to alleviate poverty (Wipplinger et al., 2006, Asian 
Development Bank, 2012). Diversification into horticultural production offers the opportunity 
for Thailand’s large population of smallholders to increase their incomes (Chainuvati and 
Athipanan, 2001). The average farm size in Thailand is 3.6 ha and more than a quarter of the 
approximately 5.7 million farms in Thailand are smaller or equal to 1.6 ha (Pongsrihadulchai, 
2009). 
11
                                                          
9 In Thailand, super- and hypermarket expansion started in the mid 1990s and in the early 2000, the share of 
supermarket sales of processed and packages food was already estimated to be at 33% (Reardon et al., 2003). 
Since then, food retailers continued to grow at 16% annually between 2001 and 2009 (Reardon et al., 2012).  
, the 
European and North American markets are of relatively more importance, with a 14% and 9% 
10 In 2010, the agricultural sector provided 39% of the employment although it only accounted for 11% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (Asian Development Bank, 2012). 
11 HS 0714 (Manioc, arrowroot salem etc.) is excluded from the analysis because almost the total production of 





market share in 2011 respectively. Nevertheless, the biggest proportion of vegetables 
exported went to regional markets; 37% were exported to Japan and 19% to ASEAN 
(International Trade Centre, 2012). Moreover, Thailand’s vegetable exports to Europe have 
fallen steadily from 62.1 Million USD in 2007 to 42.3 Million USD in 2011 (International 
Trade Centre, 2012), which can partly be attributed to difficulties in meeting the increasingly 
strict standards in the European Union (EU). Only recently, the Thai government voluntarily 
imposed a temporary ban on exports of sixteen kinds of vegetables to the EU due to 
quarantine issues in order to avoid a formal ban by the EU (Ussavasodhi, 2011). 
The Thai public and private sectors have responded actively to the increasingly stringent 
standards in the EU, North America and Japan in order to prevent the loss of market access 
(Jaffee et al., 2005, Manarungsan et al., 2005, Sardsud, 2007). In 2004, the Thai government 
passed the ‘Road Map of Food Safety’ with the aim to implement effective food safety 
controls at all levels of the value chain (Sardsud, 2007, Ministry of Public Health, 2004). As 
part of the initiative and to improve the level of food safety at farm level, a national voluntary 
standard for good agricultural practices, the Q-GAP standard, was established in 2004. The 
standard is a requirement of several domestic retailers, and plays an important role in the 
export sector (Wannamolee, 2008, Sardsud, 2007). The private sector, however, assesses the 
Q-GAP standard as insufficient12 and in response initiated the development of ThaiGAP13, a 
private voluntary standard that was recognized as equivalent to GlobalGAP in 2010. The 
standard is adapted to the circumstances of Thailand and thus expected to be easier and less 
costly to comply with than GlobalGAP (Keeratipipatpong, 2010). Furthermore, there are 
initiatives14
 
 under way by leading supermarket chains in Thailand to develop “intermediate” 
private standards that ensure a higher level of food safety than the Q-GAP standard, but are 
less challenging to comply with than the GlobalGAP/ThaiGAP standard (Wattanavaekin, 
2011). 
                                                          
12 The standard is criticized for lacking credibility because both certification and accreditation are in the hands of 
the government and the agencies responsible for certifying farmers lack adequate financing (Sardsud, 2007). 
13 The ThaiGAP standard is an outcome of a public-private partnership between the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce, Kasetsart University, the National Food Institute, the National Metrology Institute of Germany, and 
the German Technical Co-operation (Keeratipipatpong, 2010). 
14 One example is the ThaiGAP standard level 2 for the domestic market that was pilot tested with suppliers of 




1.3. Problem statement 
The increasing relevance of private standards in high-value supply chains offers new 
challenges as well as new opportunities for small-scale farmers in developing countries. In the 
focus of the current debate on the implications of standards for smallholders stands the 
GlobalGAP standard. A growing body of literature deals with the determinants of GlobalGAP 
adoption, the associated costs of compliance and with the financial, environmental and social 
benefits of compliance (Ouma, 2010, Asfaw et al., 2010, Asfaw et al., 2009a, Asfaw et al., 
2009b, Kariuki et al., 2012, Chemnitz, 2007, Graffham et al., 2007b, Mausch et al., 2009). 
Existing studies find that small-scale farmers are disadvantaged in the compliance process 
with GlobalGAP, and that adoption is further influenced by the educational attainment of 
households, household wealth, group membership, vertical integration and by access to 
extension services and credits (Asfaw et al., 2009b, Okello, 2005, Kleinwechter and Grethe, 
2006, Chemnitz, 2007). However, these studies neglect the role of support by donors, public-
private partnerships and exporters in the compliance process. GlobalGAP adoption by small-
scale farmers has in many cases been facilitated through financial, managerial and technical 
support by donors and exporters (Humphrey, 2008, Will, 2010, Jaffee et al., 2011, Graffham 
et al., 2007b), leading to our hypothesis that support is critical to enable small-scale farmers to 
adopt the standard. 
Moreover, concerning the financial benefits of GlobalGAP certification, previous studies have 
so far been inconclusive and many open questions remain. While some argue that GlobalGAP 
is a quasi-mandatory minimum standard and does not lead to price premiums and higher 
incomes (Ouma, 2010, Graffham et al., 2007b, Subervie and Vagneron, 2012), others identify 
positive effects on producer prices, farm level productivity and net income from export 
vegetable production (Asfaw et al., 2009a, Asfaw et al., 2009b, Kariuki et al., 2012). These 
studies provide important indications through which channels GlobalGAP certification may 
impact farmers’ net household income. Yet, to our knowledge there are no existing studies 
which specifically analyze the impact of GlobalGAP certification on net household income. 
Solely focusing on income from export crop production may lead to biased results because 
farmers who adopt GlobalGAP may allocate resources away from other activities to increase 
their export crop production. 
Furthermore, previous studies have investigated the average treatment effects of GlobalGAP 




Vagneron, 2012). This, however, may disregard important heterogeneous effects of 
certification. The majority of small-scale farmers in developing countries are certified in 
farmer groups and certification can be producer-driven or buyer-driven. We hypothesize that 
the impacts of GlobalGAP certification differ depending on whether farmers are certified in 
exporter-managed groups or producer-managed groups. Likewise, the costs of compliance 
associated with GlobalGAP certification are to a large extent fixed costs and therefore we 
expect certification to be more profitable for larger than for smaller farmers. 
In addition, previous empirical studies on the impacts of GlobalGAP adoption relied on cross 
sectional data sets. We improve upon these approaches by using a panel data set of Thai fruit 
and vegetable farmers for our analyses, which we collected in 2010 and 2011. The availability 
of panel data allows us to control for non-random selection of farmers into GlobalGAP 
certification that is based on unobservable time-invariant characteristics. 
Besides the challenge to overcome the barriers to standard adoption, there is increasing 
evidence that continued compliance with standards often represents a major challenge to 
small-scale farmers. After initial adoption, many small-scale farmers disadopt the standard in 
later years because they are unable to continuously meet the strict requirements and high costs 
associated with food safety standards. In particular, several studies report that donor 
facilitated GlobalGAP adoption was not sustainable and farmers abandoned the standard 
following the withdrawal of donors (Graffham et al., 2007a, Bignebat and Vagneron, 2011, 
Humphrey, 2008, Graffham et al., 2007b). Given that sustainable effects on poverty reduction 
can only be achieved if small-scale farmers are able to comply with standards in the long run, 
identifying the factors that influence continued compliance is critical. 
 
1.4. Objectives of the study 
This study aims to analyze the implications of the GlobalGAP standard for small-scale 
farmers by focusing on the Thai fruit and vegetable sector. In particular, we aim to contribute 
to the existing literature by identifying new institutional arrangements which enable small-
scale farmers to adopt the GlobalGAP standard and to benefit from adoption in the long run. 





- To identify the factors that influence GlobalGAP adoption, taking into account the 
support by donors, public-private partnerships and exporters 
- To assess the average and subgroup-specific mean impacts of GlobalGAP certification 
on producer prices and on farmers’ net household income 
- To analyze the determinants of continued compliance with GlobalGAP following the 
withdrawal of donor support 
 
1.5. Data collection 
To address our research questions, we carried out a two-year panel data survey among Thai 
fruit and vegetable farmers. To date, the number of GlobalGAP certified producers in 
Thailand is relatively low and before the start of the first survey in 2009 only 923 producers 
were certified with the GlobalGAP standard (FoodPLUS, 2009b). Therefore, to have a 
sufficiently high number of GlobalGAP adopters in our sample, we stratified the relevant 
population of fruit and vegetable farmers according to participation in a development 
program15
The first round of data collection was conducted between March and May 2010 and the 
second between March and May 2011. Both surveys cover a one-year interval from March to 
the end of February and thus the first survey corresponds to the period before GlobalGAP 
certification for adopters in our sample
 which aimed to enable small-scale farmers to adopt the GlobalGAP standard. The 
program was carried out between 2008 and 2010, and within the first half of 2010, several of 
the participants successfully obtained a GlobalGAP certificate. 
16 and the second to the time period following 
certification. Our survey area (see Figure 1) covers thirty districts17 in fourteen provinces18
                                                          
15 The development program was implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ). 
 of 
Northern, Southern, Central and Eastern Thailand. Of these, twenty districts are program 
regions and ten districts were selected as external control areas. 
16 None of the sampled non-participants was GlobalGAP certified or obtained a certificate during the period. 
17 See appendix I for a complete list of the districts. 
18 Interviews were carried out in the following provinces: Kanchanaburi, Ayuttayah, Nakhon Pathom, 
Ratchaburi, Samut Sakhorn, Saraburi (Central Thailand), Sa Kaew, Chachoengsao, Prachin Buri (Eastern 




For the interviews, a structured questionnaire19
During the first survey in 2010, we interviewed 287 households. Thereof, 146 are program 
participants, 84 are non-participants within program regions and 57 are non-participants 
outside program regions. The following year, we were able to interview 218 of the 287 
households a second time. 
 was used and information on a wide range of 
topics was collected including socio-economic and farm characteristics, agricultural 
production and input use, marketing, group membership, compliance with standards, access to 
information, trainings and extension services. The questionnaire was translated into Thai and 
pre-tested in the field to identify potential mistakes and to further improve the questionnaire. 
We recruited master students from a local agricultural university as enumerators who showed 
a good knowledge of horticultural production systems. Before the start of the data collection, 
the selected students received a one-week training in the classroom and in the field. 
                                                          
19 An English version of the questionnaire can be found in the appendix. The questionnaire used in 2011 is 





Figure 1: Research area 
 
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia, 2012 
 
1.6. Outline of the study 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 addresses the first objective of this study and 
analyzes the factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption, assuming that donor support is 




provides background on GlobalGAP group certification and explores the costs and perceived 
benefits of complying with GlobalGAP for farmers and exporters. 
Chapter 3 gives an overview on business models that can enable small-scale farmers to adopt 
the GlobalGAP standard and analyzes the impacts of GlobalGAP certification on producer 
prices and farmers’ net household income. In addition to estimating the average effects of 
certification, the chapter explores mean treatment effects for subgroups of farmers certified in 
exporter-managed and producer-managed groups. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the third objective of this study and analyzes the determinants of 
continued compliance with GlobalGAP.  Since the decision to become re-certified is likely to 
depend on whether farmers are rewarded for compliance, the chapter also explores the costs 
and benefits of certification. In particular, the impact of certification on farmers’ net 
household income is analyzed, taking into account the annually occurring recurrent costs of 
compliance. 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the results of the study and provides policy 
recommendations. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are discussed and suggestions for 





2. New institutional arrangements and standard adoption: Evidence from small-scale 
fruit and vegetable farmers in Thailand20
Abstract 
 
GlobalGAP is the most important private standard for producers in the Thai horticultural 
sector concerning access to high-value markets, especially to Europe. This chapter presents an 
analysis of GlobalGAP adoption by small-scale fruit and vegetable farmers in Thailand 
focusing on GlobalGAP group certification, the costs and perceived benefits of GlobalGAP 
adoption, and the factors influencing standard adoption. In our research area, GlobalGAP 
group certification has encouraged the formation of new institutional arrangements between 
farmers, exporters and donors. Farmers participating in a development program were 
organized in certification groups where the Quality Management System (QMS) was either 
run by the donor, by the exporter, or by farmers themselves. Results of our adoption model 
suggest that support by donors, exporters and public-private partnerships are vital to enable 
small-scale farmers to adopt the standard. Furthermore, farmers are more likely to adopt if 
they are better educated and more experienced, and if they have access to female family labor, 
improved farming technology, and information and extension services.  
Keywords: Private standards; food safety; GlobalGAP adoption; new institutional 
arrangements; small-scale farmers 
 
  
                                                          
20 This chapter was published as a journal article in Food Policy 37 (2012) 452-462. The co-author of this article 






Diversification into horticultural production is generally regarded to contribute to poverty 
alleviation. Horticultural crops are labor intensive and studies from South and Southeast Asia 
show that the per capita incomes of fruit and vegetable producers are often higher than those 
of cereal producers (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007). However, the opportunities the 
horticultural sector opens up for farmers in developing countries can be impeded by the 
proliferation of public and private food safety standards (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). The 
fresh fruit and vegetables (FFVs) sector is an increasingly buyer-driven chain (Gereffi, 1994) 
in which large firms, especially supermarkets, determine the conditions such as scale, volume 
of procurement, consistency and compliance with standards (Jaffee and Masakure, 2005, 
Boselie and Kop, 2005, Henson and Reardon, 2005). 
In Thailand, exporters, especially those with markets in the European Union (EU) and Japan, 
are shifting away from open-market sourcing to integrated and coordinated procurement in 
order to meet increasing food safety and traceability requirements (Jaffee et al., 2005, 
Sardsud, 2007). Meeting private standards, first and formemost the GlobalGAP standard, is 
one of the major challenges Thai fruit and vegetable producers and exporters face today to 
upgrade their production. GlobalGAP is a pre-farm gate21 standard for good agricultural 
practices that concerns aspects of food safety, environmental protection, workers’ health, 
safety and welfare, and traceability (FoodPLUS and GTZ, 2008). It has been initiated in 1997 
by a group of European retailers with the objective of harmonizing their own, often divergent 
standards and establishing one single standard applicable to all agricultural products 
worldwide. GlobalGAP offers two certification options, individual certification under Option 
1 and group certification under Option 2.22
                                                          
21 A pre-farm gate standard means that the certificate “covers all on-farm processes from inputs through farming 
until the product leaves the farm” (Will, 2010). 
 The latter is especially important in a developing 
country context since it can make certification feasible for smallholders. In recent years, 
GlobalGAP has gained global relevance and the standard is especially important for exporters 
supplying the European market (Will, 2010, Henson et al., 2011). Against the background of 
a recent temporary ban on exports of 16 kinds of vegetables from Thailand to the EU, 
compliance with GlobalGAP becomes even more important in order to prevent the loss of 
market access to the EU (Ussavasodhi, 2011).  
22 There are two additional certification options. Under Options 3 and 4, growers are certified as meeting an 




Complying with standards such as GlobalGAP can be associated with high implementation 
costs and there is an ongoing debate on whether or not the proliferation of food safety and 
quality standards is overall beneficial for exporters and producers in developing countries 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009, Reardon et al., 2009). On the one hand, standards are 
discussed to exclude certain types of producers from supply chains and thus worsen inequality 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). On the other hand, standards might facilitate access to new 
markets, enhance product quality, add value and encourage new or enhanced forms of 
cooperation between producers and agribusinesses (Jaffee, 2003). Here, we primarily focus on 
identifying the circumstances under which smallholders are able to comply with standards.  
The adoption of a standard such as GlobalGAP usually requires substantial investments in 
technological change and upgrading at the producer level. Resource-poor farmers might not 
be able to finance these investments, if they do not have access to credit or other sources of 
liquidity. Moreover, farmers in developing countries often lack access to information and 
extension services and have only insufficient human capital and organizational skills to 
comply with standards (Boselie and Kop, 2005, Narrod et al., 2009, Vorley and Fox, 2004). 
Previous empirical studies on the factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption have shown that 
farmers are less likely to adopt the standard if they possess smaller farms, are less integrated 
and less organized, have less physical, social and human capital and lack access to credits 
(Asfaw et al., 2009b, Chemnitz, 2007, Okello, 2005).  
Up until now, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have explicitly addressed the role of 
donor assistance, public-private partnerships, and support by exporters in the compliance 
process with standards. This study extends the existing literature by analyzing the factors 
influencing GlobalGAP adoption conditional on donor support assuming that it is necessary 
for small-scale farmers in order to adopt the standard. Moreover, the costs and perceived 
benefits of GlobalGAP adoption for farmers and exporters will be discussed. Survey data of 
231 households in the Thai horticultural sector is used of which 146 households have 
participated in a development program named ‘Food Safety in Fresh Fruit and Vegetables’ 
(Food Safety in FFV) which aimed to increase the access of Thai small-scale farmers to the 
GlobalGAP standard. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the background to the study and 
the survey design. Then, the farmers’ and exporters’ perceived benefits of GlobalGAP 
adoption and the costs of compliance with the standard are presented. Afterwards, the 




discussed. The last section concludes with a summary of the main results of the study 
presented in this chapter and derives policy implications. 
 
2.2. Background to the study and data 
2.2.1. GlobalGAP group certification 
There are two main group types that can apply for group certification. The first type is a 
farmer group or cooperative that is managed by the growers themselves or by a donor. The 
second type is an outgrower scheme of a company, i.e., the company organizes and manages a 
group of smallholders for certification (GTZ, 2010).  
GlobalGAP group certification has many advantages but also some disadvantages for 
smallholders. When farmers are linked together in a group, they can benefit from economies 
of scale by sharing necessary facilities for GlobalGAP adoption, such as a pesticide store and 
toilets and by centralizing some of the requirements (e.g. record keeping). In addition, a group 
structure reduces transaction costs of providing farmers with advice and trainings (Narrod et 
al., 2009, Will, 2010). Furthermore, the costs for the external audit are lower for each 
individual farmer because under Option 2, the certification body does not inspect all members 
of the group, but only the square root of the total number of group members. However, to 
guarantee that the sample of members represents the group as a whole, the groups have to run 
a Quality Management System (QMS). The QMS is a quality assurance system that specifies 
the rules of production for the group members and ensures that there is a mechanism in place 
that monitors and controls the compliance of group members with the GlobalGAP 
requirements. Depending on the type of group, the QMS is centrally managed either by the 
group members themselves, by a donor or by a buyer.  
Setting-up and running the QMS is especially difficult for farmer-managed groups because 
their members are often time constrained and have low educational levels. For some of the 
QMS team positions, GlobalGAP sets high qualification requirements. A QMS team’s 
Internal Inspector and Internal Auditor are required to have a post-high school degree in 
horticulture, to be trained in HACCP, food hygiene, GAP, and to have participated in a 2-day 
internal QMS auditor training course. Smallholder groups in developing countries often rely 
on external support to implement and run the QMS. In practice, farmers are only rarely 




In addition to the administrative challenges, the costs of implementing and running the QMS 
have to be considered, such as the costs for the QMS development, the monitoring of group 
members, internal audits and wages of QMS staff. Due to the high costs of the QMS, group 
certification is not economically viable for small groups with a low production volume. Also, 
for exporters a certain size threshold of their outgrower schemes is critical, given that the 
costs of monitoring and providing technical support are particularly high when individual 
farms are small and members dispersed (Ouma, 2007, GTZ, 2010, Battisti et al., 2009). 
Therefore, for very small groups, certification under Option 1 as a multi-site operation23
 
 
without QMS may be more feasible. Under this certification option, one organization or 
individual producer is the owner of several production locations or management units that do 
not act as separate legal entities (FoodPLUS, 2009a). Farmers can, e.g., rent out plots to a 
company and de facto act as farm managers for the company. While this certification option 
might be preferable for exporters under certain circumstances, since the costs for the QMS are 
saved, it also means that farmers have to abandon full control over their farms. 
2.2.2. New institutional arrangements and standards in the Thai FFV sector  
The rising importance of standards has led to considerable changes in the structure of the Thai 
FFV supply chain. The development of new institutional arrangements has been vital in order 
to deal with the challenge of complying with stringent food safety and quality standards. To 
ensure that their produce meets the required standards, exporters supplying high-value 
markets have pursued three strategies: to increase production on own farms, to source from 
large-scale farms where the production process is well controlled and to intensify contractual 
relations with smallholders, often through farmer groups. The third option is especially 
relevant in the Thai context due to the fact that land is scarce and large areas of suitable land 
are hard to find (Jaffee et al., 2005). Concerning GlobalGAP adoption, the usual strategy of 
exporters is to first gain a certificate for their company farms. When the demand for certified 
produce increases, exporters often organize their suppliers in farmer groups and offer them 
technical and financial support to achieve GlobalGAP compliance.  
If the exporter runs the QMS for the group, the relationship between the company and the 
farmers becomes especially close. To ensure that all members comply with the standard, the 
                                                          
23 Alternatively, farmers may choose to obtain individual certification under Option 1, but this is only feasible if 




company’s QMS team usually exercises full control over the farmers’ production process. 
Often, companies send own sprayer teams to the farms and manage record keeping for the 
farmers. For farmers, this can have positive and negative implications. On the one hand, 
farmers lose autonomy of their farms and they might be forced by contract to sell to the 
company who operates the QMS and owns the GlobalGAP certificate. On the other hand, they 
receive technical and financial assistance, and they might have a guaranteed market and even 
gain price premiums (GTZ, 2010).  
However, not all exporters in Thailand have the same capacity to deal with the rising demand 
for standards. While larger exporters are likely to benefit from the new market developments 
and increase their market share, smaller exporters might lose access to high-value markets in 
the long run, if they are not able to comply with rising standards. It is important to note that 
the access of small-scale farmers to higher standards hinges on the compliance decision of 
exporters. If exporters are not able to comply with standards or do not assess compliance as 
being profitable, this also has negative implications for producers up the value chain (Henson 
et al., 2011). 
In response to the challenges imposed by increasing standards, several food safety initiatives 
have been launched by the Thai public and private sectors and by donor agencies. One such 
example is the donor-led program ‘Food Safety in FFV’,24 which addresses the need for 
assistance by exporters and producers in adopting the GlobalGAP standard. Since the 
program’s primary aim was to increase the access of smallholders to higher standards, it 
focused on group certification and followed three approaches. Firstly, it helped farmers to 
organize themselves and supported them in adopting the GlobalGAP standard. Farmers in 
these groups had to run the QMS on their own. Secondly, the donor linked farmers in a group 
and ran the QMS for the farmers.25
                                                          
24 The program was funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) and implemented by the German International Cooperation (GIZ). 
 Thirdly, it formed public-private partnerships with six 
exporters who wished to obtain a GlobalGAP certificate, but needed assistance in doing so. 
The exporters supported the formation of certification groups, overtook the major share of the 
investment costs and also ran the QMS. All certification groups, farmers, and exporters 
received consultancy services and trainings on the GlobalGAP requirements to facilitate the 
implementation process. The intensity of donor support, however, differed between the group 
25 According to GlobalGAP rules, the holder of the certificate has to be a legal entity. In this case, the farmer 





types. While the group with the donor-run QMS received the highest support, the exporter-
managed groups received the least support from the donor.  
 
2.2.3. Data 
Data collection for the study took place between March and May 2010 in four of the six agro-
ecological regions of Thailand.26
For the sampling, we divided the population into three strata: (1) program participants who 
adopted GlobalGAP (N=118), (2) program participants who did not adopt GlobalGAP 
(N=237), and (3) non-participants (N= approx. 710). Farmers are classified as GlobalGAP 
adopters if they are certified with the standard or are in the adoption process and expect to 
achieve certification by 2011 or before. We also included farmers who were certified before 
the survey, but already decided to disadopt the standard, in the category of adopters. Sampling 
of program participants was based on a complete list of farmers provided by the ‘Food Safety 
in FFV’ program including complete names of the farmers, location and adoption status. To 
obtain a sufficiently large sample of adopters, we selected all GlobalGAP adopters for 
interviews. Of the 118 households listed, 97 were available for interviews. For the second 
strata, we selected 49 households randomly from the list of non-adopters. 
 Our population consists of fruit and vegetable farmers 
located in the area where the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ program was implemented. In total, 231 
producers were interviewed of which 146 farmers are participants in the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ 
initiative (97 GlobalGAP adopters and 49 non-adopters) and 85 are non-participants.   
For households not participating in the program, lists were not available. Non-participants 
were therefore selected through a random walk and chosen based on two criteria. First, they 
were required to live in the same village as the program participants and second, they had to 
produce the products27
                                                          
26 Interviews were carried out in the following provinces: Kanchanaburi, Ayuttayah, Nakhon Pathom, 
Ratchaburi, Samut Sakhorn, Saraburi (Central Thailand), Sa Kaew, Chachoengsao, Prachin Buri (Eastern 
Thailand), Chumporn (Southern Thailand), Phayao, Phichit (Northern Thailand). 
 that were considered for GlobalGAP certification by the participants in 
the respective village. The total number of eligible non-participant households was estimated 
previous to the survey through discussions with stakeholders of the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ 
program and through own observations during visits in the villages where the development 
27 The following products were considered for GlobalGAP certification: lychee, durian, mangosteen, papaya, 
dragon fruit, cantaloupe, mango, asparagus, green okra, spring onion, yard long bean, different kinds of herbs 




program was active. In addition to the quantitative household survey, we conducted 
qualitative interviews with six exporters involved in the program in order to find out more 
about their motivation to adopt GlobalGAP and their costs and benefits of complying with the 
standard.  
 
2.3. Perceived benefits and costs of GlobalGAP adoption 
The decision of farmers and exporters to adopt GlobalGAP depends on (1) the expected 
benefits of adoption, (2) the costs of compliance and (3) the capacity to implement the 
standard. The capacity of farmers and exporters is influenced by firm or farm size, asset 
ownership, human capital, access to information and services, and access to NGO, donor or 
company assistance (Reardon et al., 2009, Henson et al., 2011).  
Qualitative interviews conducted with exporters involved in the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ 
program revealed their main motivations and challenges faced with respect to GlobalGAP 
implementation. Targeting markets of Japan and the EU, the exporters were mainly interested 
in securing and enhancing access to these demanding markets and building trust with their 
buyers. One exporter emphasized that adoption of the GlobalGAP standard “makes it easier to 
sell to more lucrative marketing channels, such as supermarkets, where prices are more stable 
and quantities are fixed”. While this reflects exporters’ motivation to actively improve their 
access to remunerative and reliable marketing channels, often the incentive came from within 
the current marketing relationship: many exporters stated that buyers have started to require 
the GlobalGAP standard and that they perceived GlobalGAP adoption as a measure to 
increase their buyers’ trust.  
On the other hand, the exporters identified the costs of implementation, the lack of qualified 
staff for the management of the QMS, and time constraints of the QMS members as the major 
constraints to GlobalGAP adoption. Moreover, exporters stated that there is a lack of 
knowledge about GlobalGAP on the growers’ side and that it is very difficult to persuade 
farmers that compliance with standards is a necessity because they can still sell on the local 
market where prices are usually lower, but food safety requirements are basically absent.  
Data on the farmers’ perceived benefits and challenges of GlobalGAP adoption is available as 
qualitative information from our household survey. The adopters’ perceptions of the benefits 




for farmers to adopt the standard that was stated by 93% of the adopters is to increase the 
quality of the produce. Closely related to the issue of quality are enhanced management 
practices that 83% of the adopters see as a benefit of GlobalGAP. Enhanced management 
practices can result from working according to the standard guidelines and might contribute to 
quality increases. 
Health also seems to be a major issue for farmers and 85% of the farmers think that 
GlobalGAP compliance will lead to improvements in the family’s and farm workers’ health. 
Pesticide poisoning is a major problem in Thailand. Farmers tend to overuse chemicals and 
many farmers continue to use banned chemicals which are extremely hazardous. In addition, 
workers applying pesticides usually do not wear adequate protective clothing (Chunyanuwat, 
2005, Roitner-Schobesberger et al., 2008, Shepard, 2006). A study on the impact of 
GlobalGAP adoption on farmers’ health in Kenya has shown that adoption of the standard can 
decrease the costs for illnesses by 50-60% (Asfaw et al., 2010). Another important motivation 
for farmers to adopt GlobalGAP that was stated by 81% of the adopters is the expected 
benefit of reduced expenditures on chemicals. This is questionable, however, since the 
chemicals that adopters are allowed to use are usually more expensive than ordinary 
chemicals (Asfaw et al., 2009a). GlobalGAP certified producers are only allowed to use 
chemicals that are registered in the country of use for the target crop (FoodPLUS, 2011b). 
Other perceived benefits are mostly related to marketing issues, e.g. to make it easier to find a 
buyer, to improve access to high-value markets and to increase bargaining power. About 54% 
of the GlobalGAP adopters state that their buyer requires GlobalGAP. In some cases, farmers 
are offered a purchase guarantee (68%) and/or a price premium (47%) if they succeed to 
adopt the standard. The exporters involved in the program stated that the GlobalGAP adopters 
will not gain immediate benefits from compliance, but will receive long-term benefits. 
Farmers were promised that exporters would purchase higher volumes from them. In addition, 
through quality increases they might be able to obtain better prices and thus further increase 




Table 1: Adopters perception of the benefits of GlobalGAP 
Farmers’ motivation to adopt GlobalGAP Number of farmers 
% 
Increase the quality of the produce 55 93 
Enhance family’s and farm workers’ health 50 84 
Make finding buyers easier 49 83 
Enhance management practices 49 83 
Decrease costs for chemicals 48 81 
Increase access to high-value markets 44 75 
Buyer offered a purchase guarantee 40 68 
Buyer required GlobalGAP 32 54 
Enhance reputation 31 53 
Buyer offered a price premium 28 47 
Enhance bargaining power 28 47 
 N=59, multiple options possible 
Source: Own data 
It has to be noted, however, that within the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative, only 33% of 
farmers who initially participated in the program successfully adopted GlobalGAP. The 
farmers’ reasons for their failure to adopt are presented in Table 2. More than 50% of farmers 
stated that the investment costs were too high, while 35% complained that there is no price 
premium for certified produce and that they did not understand the standard requirements. 
The additional workload was a problem for 18% of the non-adopters while 12% said they 
were not able to implement the standard on time. 
Table 2: Farmers' reasons for failed GlobalGAP implementation 
Reasons for not adopting GlobalGAP Number of farmers 
% 
The investment costs were too high 9 53 
Absence of a price premium for certified produce 6 35 
I didn’t understand the standard requirements  6 35 
The additional workload was too high 3 18 
I was not able to implement the standard on time 2 12 
Record keeping was too difficult 1 6 
My buyer decided that I was not ready yet 1 6 
There was not enough support available 1 6 
I changed my mind and decided not to implement the standard 1 6 
N = 17, multiple options possible 
Source: Own data 
The costs of compliance with GlobalGAP can be divided into non-recurrent and recurrent 
costs. Non-recurrent costs are initial investment costs that are incurred in order to achieve 
compliance, such as the costs for physical upgrading, initial trainings and the development 
and establishment of new procedures and management systems. Recurrent costs, in contrast, 
are costs that have to be incurred on a regular basis and include the additional costs for 
laboratory analyses, management and annual certification costs. While the non-recurrent costs 




when looking at the sustainability of standard adoption (Chemnitz et al., 2007, Jaffee et al., 
2005). 
In the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ development program, training and consultancy costs were to a 
large part taken over by the donor while exporters and farmers had to incur the remaining 
costs. In the exporter-managed groups, most investments were covered by the companies. The 
exporters’ perception is that farmers are not willing to adopt if they have to invest in the 
standard. In the farmer- and donor-managed groups, all farm-level investments had to be 
incurred by the farmers themselves. 
We present a case study of an exporter-managed asparagus farmer group with 22 members to 
demonstrate how the non-recurrent and recurrent costs of compliance are shared between a 
donor, an exporter, a collector and farmers. The group adopted GlobalGAP in 2007 within the 
‘Food Safety in FFV’ program and is led by a collector who acts as an intermediary between 
the exporter and the farmers. All members of the group can be classified as small-scale 
farmers; the average certified area per farmer is only 0.3 ha. Table 3 shows in detail which 
investments had to be made in order to adopt GlobalGAP and who incurred the costs. The 
initial investment costs in the exporter-managed asparagus group can be divided into three 
broad categories: (1) costs for trainings and training materials, (2) costs for farmer and QMS 
team identification, provision of documents to farmers, on-farm trainings and monitoring, and 
(3) costs for farm equipment and farm infrastructure. In total, the non-recurrent costs that had 
to be covered by the group were USD 27,12028
                                                          
28 The exchange rate at time of data collection from March to May 2008 was approx. 31.25 Thai Baht/ 1 USD. 
 resulting in an average amount of USD 1233 
per farmer. The exporter incurred with 56% the largest share of the investment costs followed 
by the donor with 33%. The collector covered a considerable 7% of the non-recurrent costs, 
mostly for farm infrastructure and farm equipment. Farmers only had to cover the remaining 




Table 3: Distribution of non-recurrent costs of compliance with GlobalGAP 
- Case study of an exporter-managed asparagus farmer group in Thailand - 
Investment items GlobalGAP investment costs in USD Share  in % Donor Exporter Collector Farmers Total 
Trainings & training materials 
(total costs) 2,790 8,192 176 0 11,158 41.1 
Trainings (train-the-trainer seminars, 
QMS team & farmer trainings) 0 7,712 0 0 7,712 28.4 
Development of training materials, 
translations, administration 2,790 480 0 0 3,270 12.0 
Transportation costs (trainings) 0 0 176 0 176 0.6 
On-farm trainings & monitoring, 
documents, farmer/QMS team 
identification (total costs) 
6,196 1,808 0 0 8,003 29.5 
Assistance with monitoring and 
improving the performance of the 
farmers group 
6,196 192 0 0 6,388 23.6 
Preparation and provision of 
documents, forms and a general file 
for each farmer 
0 1,408 0 0 1,408 5.2 
Identifying the farmers in the 
group/initial farmer survey, 
identifying QMS members 
0 208 0 0 208 0.8 
Farm infrastructure & farm 
equipment (total costs) 0 5,040 1,838 1,080 7,958 29.3 
Preparation of farm infrastructure, 
provision of protective clothing 0 5,040 0 0 5,040 18.6 
Collecting houses, fire extinguisher 0 0 1,312 0 1,312 4.8 
Toilets and hand washing facilities 0 0 157 693 850 3.1 
Farm equipment (containers to store 
chemicals and protective clothing, 
chemical mixing area,  plastic sheets 
for produce handling areas) 
0 0 106 387 493 1.8 
First aid kits,  waste bins, plot 
markers 0 0 264 0 264 1.0 
Total investment costs 8,986 15,040 2,014 1,080 27,120  
Share of investment costs 33.1% 55.5% 7.4% 4% 100%  
Source: Own data 
The recurrent costs of compliance in the asparagus group were almost as high as the non-
recurrent costs and amounted to USD 13,254 during the first year of certification (see Table 
4). The exporter incurred 88% of the recurrent costs while the collector took over 8% and 
farmers only had to pay the remaining 5%. The major share of costs had to be incurred for the 
external audit, followed by the costs for laboratory analyses, internal inspections, internal 
audits and the operation of the QMS. Farmers only had to pay USD 29 per capita for the 
replacement of protective clothing, first aid kits, disinfectants and soap.  
The total recurrent costs of USD 602 per farmer are substantial and were assessed as 
economically not feasible by the exporter. Transferring additional costs to farmers was also 




to these high recurrent costs, the exporter decided to discontinue GlobalGAP certification in 
this group. This case study is thus an example of a group where a certain size threshold was 
not met and the costs outweighed the benefits of adoption. However, since 2008 the costs for 
the external audit in Thailand have approximately been halved,29
Table 4: Annual recurrent costs of compliance with GlobalGAP 
 so that under current 
circumstances continued certification might have been viable for the group. 
- Case study of an exporter-managed asparagus farmer group in Thailand - 
Cost factor Recurrent costs for GlobalGAP in USD Share in % Exporter Collector Farmers Total 
Certification and external audit 4,992 0 0 4,992 37.7 
Annual refresher trainings  
(farmers and QMS) 2,528 0 0 2,528 19.1 
Laboratory analyses  
(pesticide residue, water and soil analyses) 2,472 0 0 2,472 18.7 
Internal inspections & audits  
(farmers, QMS, produce handling sites) 832 0 0 832 6.3 
Operation  of the QMS 800 0 0 800 6.0 
Transportation (farmers to trainings, farm 
advice, inspections/audits) 0 768 0 768 5.8 
Replacement of protective clothing 0 0 324 324 2.4 
Refill first aid kits, disinfectant and soap 0 0 317 317 2.4 
Health checks for staff working with pesticides 0 117 0 117 0.9 
Record keeping forms,  
replacement of posters & signs 0 104 0 104 0.8 
Total recurrent costs 









Source: Own data 
 
2.4. Explaining GlobalGAP adoption 
GlobalGAP adoption in this study is only observed for farmers who have participated in the 
development program ‘Food Safety in FFV’. Hence, farmers have to make two subsequent 
decisions: whether or not to participate in the development program, and if they do so, 
whether or not to obtain a GlobalGAP certificate. We assume that a farmer will choose to 
participate in the development program and/or adopt the standard if the expected benefits are 
greater than the expected costs. The two decisions, to participate in the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ 
program and to adopt the GlobalGAP standard, are expected to be determined by similar 
variables because the program supports farmers in achieving GlobalGAP certification. Non-
participant farmers were sampled in the villages were the development program was active 
                                                          
29 The German International Cooperation (GIZ) estimates that currently the cost for GlobalGAP Option 2 
certification in Thailand for a group of 10 farmers (with a total of 10 hectares of land to be certified) is 




and hence each interviewed farmer had an equal chance to participate in the initiative. Factors 
that might influence the decisions can be divided into three broad categories: household 
characteristics (age, education and experience, labor availability, household wealth), farm 
characteristics (land tenure, farm size, access to irrigation), and access related variables 
(access to information and extension services, membership in farmer groups, distance to the 
next larger city, support by donors and downstream actors). The conceptual framework for the 
empirical model is presented in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Conceptual framework  







Source: Own illustration 
Since GlobalGAP adoption in this study is an outcome of participation in the development 
program ‘Food Safety in FFV’, an econometric model has to be specified that takes into 
account a possible sample selection bias. Those farmers might join a development program on 
GlobalGAP certification, who have a greater chance to successfully adopt the standard than 
randomly selected farmers (Maddala, 1983). As a result, the same unobservable factors that 
influence program participation might also influence GlobalGAP adoption. In order to control 
for potential selection bias, we employ a bivariate probit model with sample selection (van de 
Ven and van Praag, 1981). The bivariate probit model with sample selection allows for two 
separate probit models with correlated error terms. If error terms are significantly correlated, 
this indicates the existence of a self-selection bias. In the probit model, we assume that there 
is an underlying relationship between an unobserved, latent variable and the observed 
outcome. The specification of the bivariate probit model with sample selection, adapted from 
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Selection equation:  𝑦𝑖1∗ =  𝜷1 ′ 𝒙𝑖1 +∈𝑖1,𝑦𝑖1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖1∗ > 0,𝑦𝑖1 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖1∗ < 0 
Outcome equation:  𝑦𝑖2∗ =  𝜷1 ′ 𝒙𝑖2 +∈𝑖2,𝑦𝑖2 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖2∗ > 0,𝑦𝑖2 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖2∗ < 0  
     ∈𝑖1,∈𝑖2 ~ BVN (0, 0, 1, 1,𝜌), Var [∈𝑖1] = Var [∈𝑖2] = 1, 
Cov [∈𝑖1,∈𝑖2] = 𝜌 
(𝑦𝑖2,𝒙𝑖2 is observed only when 𝑦𝑖1 = 1), 
where 𝑦𝑖∗are unobserved or latent variables, 𝜷𝑗′  are parameter vectors and 𝒙𝑖 are vectors of 
exogenous independent variables. The error terms ∈𝑖1,∈𝑖2 have a bivariate normal distribution 
with zero mean, unit variance and correlation 𝜌. The 𝑦𝑖 are dichotomous outcome variables 
and in the GlobalGAP adoption model, 
𝑦𝑖1 = 1 if the farmer i participates in the development program, 0 otherwise 
𝑦𝑖2 = 1 if the farmer i adopts GlobalGAP, 0 otherwise.  
In the selection equation, 𝑦𝑖1∗  represents the utility that the i
th farmer receives from taking part 
in the development program, and in the outcome equation, 𝑦𝑖2∗  represents the utility from 
GlobalGAP adoption. We assume that if 𝑦𝑖∗ > 0, the observed outcome will be program 
participation/GlobalGAP adoption (𝑦𝑖 = 1). However, 𝑦𝑖2, 𝒙𝑖2 can only be observed if the 
selection condition, participation in the development program, is met (Greene, 2008).  
We use probability weights in the estimation to correct for the overrepresentation of ‘Food 
Safety in FFV’ program participants in our sample. The weight is calculated as the inverse of 
the sampling fraction, i.e. the total number of households in the relevant population divided 
by the number of sampled households drawn from that population.  
We draw on the existing literature on the adoption of standards (Asfaw et al., 2009b, Okello, 
2005) and on the adoption of agricultural innovations (e.g. Feder et al., 1985, Ghadim and 
Pannell, 1999) to derive hypotheses about the expected effects of the independent variables on 
GlobalGAP adoption. Regarding household characteristics, previous studies have found 
education to be positively related to standard adoption (Asfaw et al., 2009b, Okello, 2005). 
The implementation of GlobalGAP requires a high willingness to learn because a thorough 
knowledge of good agricultural practices has to be acquired. Complying with the record 
keeping requirements and running the QMS is likely to be especially difficult for less 




dummy variable in the model that equals one if at least one member of the household has 
graduated from college. In addition, we include a variable on the years of experience in the 
production of fruit and vegetables (F&V),30 as well as two dummy variables on whether the 
farmer owns a Q-GAP31
The requirements of the GlobalGAP standard are not only complex, but they are also time 
intensive. Several trainings are necessary to acquire the knowledge for GlobalGAP adoption 
and farm infrastructure and processes have to be upgraded to meet standard requirements. 
Hence, the availability of family labor is expected to be positively related to GlobalGAP 
adoption. On the other hand, the number of dependants in the household and the number of 
family members participating in off-farm work are hypothesized to have a negative influence 
on adoption given that family labor is absorbed by other activities.  
 certificate and whether he sold to an exporter or supermarket prior to 
participation in the development program. These variables capture our expectation that 
farmers with more experience in relevant areas face fewer difficulties in understanding 
GlobalGAP requirements. We therefore expect these experience-related variables to have a 
positive impact on the adoption of standards. Moreover, we expect that younger farmers are 
more innovative and therefore more likely to adopt the standard. 
Furthermore, we expect household wealth to have a positive impact on standard adoption. 
Wealthier farmers are more likely to have access to credits and to be able to finance the costs 
of compliance with GlobalGAP. To capture the effects of household wealth we include 
variables on the number of household assets and vehicles owned, as well as on livestock 
ownership. In addition we include a variable on the ownership of a land title, which reduces 
the uncertainty of investments and is therefore also expected to have a positive effect on 
standard adoption. For some of the investments associated with GlobalGAP there is likely to 
be significant economies of scale. For example, the costs for the external audit are relatively 
higher for smaller and less productive farms than for larger farms, given that these are fixed 
costs (Jaffee et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect that farm size, the share of the cultivated area 
on which F&V are grown, and the share of the area under F&V that is irrigated by means of 
sprinkler or drip irrigation (irrigation intensity) increase the likelihood of adoption (Okello, 
2005, Hernandez et al., 2007).  
                                                          
30 The variable only includes the products considered for GlobalGAP certification. 
31 Q-GAP is a voluntary standard for good agricultural practices developed by the Thai government in 2004, 
which is required by several high-end domestic retailers and also plays a role in the export sector. However, the 




Finally, we expect that support by donors and exporters positively influences the likelihood of 
standard adoption. We account for this by including a variable on the number of agricultural 
trainings subjects attended by the farmer. In addition, we include two dummy variables that 
capture whether the QMS is managed by the donor or by the exporter, respectively. In both 
cases we expect that farmers receiving this managerial support will be more likely to achieve 
standard compliance. Moreover, we include a number of control variables related to access to 
information, such as membership in groups (number),32
In the program participation equation, we additionally include the variable previous contact to 
training staff of the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative. Those farmers who have already been in 
contact with important stakeholders of the development program are expected to be more 
likely to participate in the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative. However, since previous projects 
did not focus on GlobalGAP implementation, we do not expect this variable to have a direct 
influence on standard adoption. In contrast, the variables ‘exporter-managed QMS’ and 
‘donor-managed QMS’ are excluded from the program participation equation because they 
are an outcome of the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative. 
 access to public extension services, 
mobile phone ownership, and distance to the provincial capital, which are expected to be 
crucial for the adoption decision. Finally, we add a dummy variable for specialization in 
vegetable cultivation to account for structural differences between fruit and vegetable farmers.  
 
2.4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
In Table 5, using the student t-test and the Pearson’s chi square test, we compare participants 
in the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ program to non-participants, and within the group of the program 
participants, we compare adopters to non-adopters. Furthermore, to find out how group means 
differ between adopters in the farmer-managed, donor-managed and exporter-managed groups 
we use Bonferroni and chi square tests.  
Comparing program participants to non-participants, we observe that participants are 
significantly younger and better educated. Moreover, they irrigate a significantly higher share 
of their land under F&V with drip and sprinkler irrigation systems. As expected, participants 
are members in a higher number of groups reflecting their propensity to cooperate and join 
group activities. In addition, the share of farmers who sold to an exporter or supermarket 
                                                          





before program participation, the share of farmers owning a Q-GAP certificate and the share 
of farmers with previous contact to training staff of the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative is 
significantly higher among participants. Contrary to our expectations, the share of cultivated 
land on which F&V are produced and the number of training subjects attended33
The comparison between adopters and non-adopters also yields interesting results. Adopters 
are significantly better educated. While 45% of the adopters have at least one college graduate 
in the household, only 27% of non-adopter households do so. In addition, adopters are 
endowed with significantly more female adults in the household, have fewer dependants in 
the family, and own more household assets. While farm size does not differ significantly 
between adopters and non-adopters, adopters irrigate a significantly higher share of their land 
under F&V with drip and sprinkler irrigation systems and more often possess a land title. 
Concerning experience-related variables, the descriptive results show that the share of farmers 
owning a Q-GAP certificate and the share of farmers who sold to an exporter or supermarket 
before program participation is significantly higher among GlobalGAP adopters than among 
non-adopters. Moreover, adopters have better access to information: they live closer to the 
next provincial capital and they have participated in a significantly higher number of training 
subjects
 are 
significantly lower among participants.  
34
Finally, we compare the differences between adopters in groups with a farmer-, donor- and 
exporter-managed QMS. Of the interviewed adopters, 19% were organized in groups with a 
farmer-managed QMS, 46% in groups with a donor-run QMS and 35% were organized in 
outgrower schemes where the QMS was run by an exporter. There are significant differences 
in particular with respect to education, wealth, and farm size between adopters in groups with 
a farmer-managed QMS on the one hand and adopters with either a donor-run or an exporter-
run QMS on the other hand. Concerning education, our results suggest that farmers must be 
highly educated to run the QMS by themselves. While 72% of adopters in groups where the 
QMS is farmer-managed have a college degree, only 44% of households in the exporter-
managed groups and 36% in the donor-managed group do so. Moreover, adopters in the 
 than non-adopters. The result that adopters are members in significantly fewer 
groups might indicate that farmers who are members in several groups are time constrained 
and/or have other priorities, i.e. they do not fully commit to GlobalGAP adoption.   
                                                          
33 The variable captures all agricultural training subjects a farmer has attended excluding those that were carried 
out by the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative. 
34 The variable captures all agricultural training subjects a farmer has attended including those that were carried 




farmer-managed groups are wealthier than adopters in the other two group types; they own 
both significantly more household assets and significantly more vehicles. In line with this, we 
find that farm size is significantly larger among adopters in farmer-managed groups. While 
adopters in the farmer-managed groups are on average endowed with 11.9 ha of land, 
adopters in the donor-managed group have 2.7 ha and in the exporter-managed groups 3.0 ha 
of land. This is likely to be related to the higher investment costs that have to be covered by 
farmers in farmer-managed groups, which makes certification feasible only for farms that 
exceed a certain size threshold. In the following analysis we estimate the effect of managerial 
support from the donor and from the exporter in running the QMS on standard adoption while 





Table 5: Descriptive statistics 


























College graduate in the 
household (Y/N) in % 39.04** 24.71 45.36** 26.53 72.22
a***b* 35.56a*** 44.12b* 













No. of female household 
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No. of dependants (age 
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No. of vehicles owned 















Land title (Y/N) in % 67.81 63.53 73.20** 58.14 61.11a* 82.22a* 67.65 













Share of total cultivated  















Share of area under F&V 















Years of experience in  















Livestock (Y/N) in % 10.96 16.47 10.31 12.24 27.78a*** 2.22a***c* 11.76c* 
Vegetables (Y/N) in % 29.45** 43.53 39.18*** 10.20 55.56a***b** 0.00a***c*** 82.35b**c*** 
Q-GAP (Y/N) in % 80.14*** 27.06 89.69*** 61.22 72.22a**b*** 91.11a** 97.06b*** 
Exporter/supermarket 
supplier (Y/N) in % 39.73** 24.71 48.45*** 22.45 38.89
b**b*** 15.56a**c*** 97.06b***c*** 
Public extension (Y/N) in % 20.55 15.29 19.59 22.45 27.78a*** 2.22a***c*** 38.24c*** 
















Mobile phone (Y/N) in % 95.89 94.12 97.96 94.85 100 95.56 91.18 
Distance to the next 















Training subjects attended 




(3.94) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Training subjects attended 











QMS farmer-run in % n/a n/a 18.56** 34.69 n/a n/a n/a 
QMS donor-run in % n/a n/a 46.39 34.69 n/a n/a n/a 
QMS exporter-run in % n/a n/a 35.05 30.61 n/a n/a n/a 
Previous contact to training 
staff (Y/N) in % 37.67*** 9.41 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Notes: Mean values are shown. For continuous variables, standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
a Difference statistically significant between adopters in the farmer-run groups and donor-run groups. 
b Difference statistically significant between adopters in the farmer-run groups and the exporter-run groups. 
c Difference statistically significant between adopters in the donor-run groups and the exporter-run groups. 
d Refrigerators, washing machines, microwaves, TVs, air cons, satellite dishes, CD/DVD Players.  




2.4.2. Results of the adoption model and discussion 
Table 6 shows the results of the bivariate probit model. The coefficients show the direction of 
the impact of the explanatory variables on program participation and GlobalGAP adoption.  
Table 6: Bivariate probit model estimates 






 Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
College graduate (dummy) 0.814** 0.338 2.217*** 0.584 
Age of the household head -0.010 0.012 -0.065*** 0.021 
No. female household members -0.224 0.176 0.436 0.271 
No. male household members -0.088 0.141 -0.407 0.273 
Number of dependants -0.018 0.122 -0.668*** 0.260 
No. of members off-farm work -0.029 0.139 -0.809*** 0.260 
Number of household assets  -0.092 0.059 0.385*** 0.107 
Number of vehicles -0.237* 0.128 0.379* 0.216 
Land title (dummy) -0.658*** 0.262 0.111 0.361 
Farm size (hectare) -0.006 0.028 0.088* 0.046 
Share of area under F&V (lagged) -0.004 0.005 -0.004 0.007 
Irrigation intensity F&V (lagged) 0.575* 0.302 1.808*** 0.569 
Years of experience in F&V production 0.004 0.016 -0.037 0.029 
Livestock ownership (dummy) -0.113 0.330 0.223 0.560 
Specialization in vegetables (dummy) -1.802*** 0.425 0.514 0.752 
Q-GAP certificate (dummy) 1.343*** 0.295 -0.296 0.492 
Exporter/supermarket supplier (dummy) 0.716** 0.320 2.731** 0.679 
Public extension (dummy) -0.005 0.328 -0.538 0.423 
Membership in number of groups 0.089 0.278 -0.767*** 0.302 
Mobile phone ownership (dummy) -0.001 0.515 0.430*** 0.755 
Distance to provincial capital (km) -0.004 0.005 -0.026*** 0.010 
Training subjects attended excluding 
those by the development program -0.061 0.042   
Training subjects attended including  
those by the development program   0.117*** 0.031 
Previous contact to training staff (dummy) 1.713*** 0.339   
QMS donor-managed (dummy)   3.362*** 1.100 QMS exporter-managed (dummy)   1.634** 0.772 Log likelihood = - 475.1126 
  
  
Correlation rho (ρ) = 0.84 
  
  
Note: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
Source: Own data 
The results show that ceteris paribus the probability to participate in the development 
program increases if at least one household member has graduated from college, if a larger 
share of the area under fruit and vegetables is irrigated by means of sprinkler or drip irrigation 
systems,35
                                                          
35 The area cultivated with fruit and vegetables that is irrigated by means of sprinkler or drip irrigation systems 
refers to the area before participation in the development program.  
 if the household owns a Q-GAP certificate, if the household sells to an exporter or 




training staff of the ‘Food Safety in FFV’ initiative. The number of vehicles owned and 
possession of a land title are negatively significant which reflects the aim of the initiative to 
also include poorer farmers into the program. Given that we do not find evidence for a 
selection bias in our model presented in Table 6, we can calculate a univariate probit model to 
estimate GlobalGAP adoption including only the sample of the program participants. Results 
of the univariate probit model, which are presented in Table 7, do not deviate much from the 
results of the outcome regression of the bivariate probit model with sample selection (Table 6) 
supporting the robustness of our estimation results. 
Table 7: Probit model estimates  
– The determinants of GlobalGAP adoption – 







College graduate (dummy) 2.131*** 0.602 0.633*** 0.151 0.328 
Age of the household head -0.064*** 0.022 -0.016*** 0.005 47.657 
No. female household members 0.471* 0.278 0.119* 0.069 1.390 
No. male household members -0.356 0.274 -0.090 0.068 1.526 
Number of dependants -0.687*** 0.255 -0.173*** 0.061 1.180 
No. of members off-farm work -0.869*** 0.258 -0.218*** 0.076 0.689 
Number of household assets  0.407*** 0.101 0.102*** 0.027 4.507 
Number of vehicles 0.425** 0.215 0.107** 0.052 1.195 
Land title (dummy) 0.227 0.355 0.056 0.086 0.625 
Farm size (hectare) 0.094** 0.047 0.024** 0.011 4.099 
Share of area under F&V (lagged) -0.002 0.007 -0.001 0.002 74.502 
Irrigation intensity F&V (lagged) 1.691*** 0.549 0.425*** 0.141 0.763 
Years of experience in F&V production -0.040 0.029 -0.010 0.007 14.343 
Livestock ownership (dummy) 0.198 0.580 0.053 0.167 0.116 
Specialization in vegetables (dummy) 0.792 0.732 0.240 0.260 0.198 
Q-GAP certificate (dummy) -0.488 0.458 -0.134 0.140 0.707 
Exporter/supermarket supplier (dummy) 2.698*** 0.681 0.780*** 0.125 0.311 
Public extension (dummy) -0.558 0.430 -0.119 0.082 0.215 
Membership in number of groups -0.799*** 0.314 -0.201** 0.087 1.058 
Mobile phone ownership (dummy) 0.436 0.788 0.088 0.124 0.969 
Distance to provincial capital (km) -0.027*** 0.010 -0.007*** 0.003 42.110 
Training subjects attended including 
those by the development program 0.116*** 0.032 0.029*** 0.008 10.105 
QMS donor-managed (dummy) 3.530*** 1.074 0.876*** 0.126 0.386 
QMS exporter-managed (dummy) 1.606** 0.828 0.482** 0.242 0.321 
Number of observations: 146 
Wald chi2(23)   =      82.28 
Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 




Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. The marginal effects are calculated 
at the means of the variables. For dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated for a discrete change from 0 
to 1. 
Source: Own data 
Judging from the size of the marginal effects, we find that support from donors and exporters, 




involvement in high-value supply chains are the most important determinants of GlobalGAP 
adoption. 
In particular the support that farmers receive is crucial for standard adoption. A donor-
managed QMS increases the probability to adopt by 88 percentage points while support and 
QMS management by an exporter raise the likelihood of GlobalGAP adoption by 48 
percentage points. In the donor-managed groups almost all responsibility for GlobalGAP 
implementation was taken over by the donor. In the exporter-managed groups, the companies 
reduce the complexity of the GlobalGAP standard for farmers by offering advice and services, 
financial support and access to credits. In addition, they run the QMS for the farmers and 
monitor the farmers’ compliance with GlobalGAP requirements. Hence, we can conclude that 
exporter and donor support is crucial for standard adoption and can help small-scale farmers 
with limited human, social and physical capital to adopt the standard. 
Education is also a very important factor; a college degree in the household increases the 
probability of GlobalGAP adoption by 63 percentage points which confirms our hypothesis 
that less educated farmers have great difficulties in understanding and implementing the 
GlobalGAP requirements. Concerning the impact of age on the adoption decision, we can 
conclude that younger farmers are more likely to adopt GlobalGAP. They are usually more 
innovative, less risk averse and more flexible in adapting their farms to new requirements. 
The availability of family labor, female family labor in particular, is especially important. One 
additional female adult in the household increases the likelihood of adoption by 12 percentage 
points while one additional dependant and one additional household member participating in 
off-farm work decrease the probability to adopt by 17 and 22 percentage points, respectively. 
Women in the Thai horticultural sector usually take over the more labor intensive tasks such 
as harvesting and weeding (FAO and UNDP, 2003). GlobalGAP adoption is labor intensive 
and requires the implementation of Integrated Pest Management and record keeping, tasks 
that are frequently taken over by women in Thailand. 
As expected, household wealth is another deciding factor. The ownership of one additional 
household asset increases the probability of GlobalGAP adoption by 10 percentage points and 
the ownership of one additional vehicle by 11 percentage points. Wealthier households have 
better access to liquidity and are better able to absorb risks, and may thus be more willing to 




Furthermore, it is often argued that the high fixed costs share of the costs of compliance with 
GlobalGAP gives large-scale farmers a competitive edge over small-scale farmers. In our 
study, the effect of farm size is significant but small. A one hectare increase in farm size, 
which is large in this context since the average farm size in our sample is only 3.8 ha, only 
increases the likelihood of GlobalGAP adoption by two percentage points. In addition, the 
share of land cultivated with fruit and vegetables36
 
 does not significantly influence 
GlobalGAP adoption. The intensity of irrigation, however, has a significantly positive effect 
indicating that more technologically advanced and more productive farmers are more likely to 
adopt GlobalGAP. A 10% rise in the share of area under fruit and vegetables with sprinkler or 
drip irrigation leads to an increase in the likelihood of adoption by four percentage points. 
Finally, experience in high-value supply chains is important for standard adoption. Farmers 
who supplied an exporter or supermarket already before program participation have a 78 
percentage points higher probability of adopting GlobalGAP. 
2.5. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
For the case of the Thai fruit and vegetable sector, we analyzed the costs and perceived 
benefits of GlobalGAP adoption for exporters and farmers, compared different institutional 
arrangements that can be formed under the GlobalGAP group certification option, namely a 
farmer-run, donor-run and an exporter-run QMS, and identified their effects on GlobalGAP 
adoption. Complying with the GlobalGAP standard is one of the major challenges for the 
Thai FFV export sector today to upgrade production. Exporters and producers alike often rely 
on technical and financial support by donors or other external agents during GlobalGAP 
implementation. 
Exporters and farmers have different motivations to adopt GlobalGAP. Exporters state that 
their buyers have already requested the GlobalGAP certificate and that they aim to enhance 
their market access and increase buyers’ trust. Farmers perceive quality increases, the 
enhancement of their families’ and farm workers’ health, as well as better marketing 
opportunities, more secure markets and higher prices as the major benefits of GlobalGAP 
adoption. Still, the costs of adoption are often assessed as higher than the benefits. While the 
non-recurrent costs are one of the main barriers to standard adoption, the recurrent costs can 
                                                          





threaten the sustainability of adoption. In a case study of an exporter-managed asparagus 
farmer group, we found that the major share of both the initial investment costs and the 
recurrent costs was taken over by the company and that the costs the farmers had to incur 
were only about 5%. Similarly, other exporters involved in the development program stated 
that they take over the major share of compliance costs for farmers because they feel that 
otherwise their suppliers are reluctant to adopt the standard. 
The analysis of the determinants of GlobalGAP adoption at the farm level showed that 
support by donors and exporters in terms of trainings, financial and managerial support is 
critical to enable farmers to upgrade their production and implement the requirements of 
international food safety and quality standards. Furthermore, household and farm 
characteristics, such as education, the availability of family labor, access to irrigation, and 
previous experience in high-value supply chains are among the most important factors 
influencing standard adoption.  
Based on these results, we suggest that increased support by donors and policy-makers is 
necessary in order to make higher food safety and quality standards accessible to a greater 
share of Thai farmers.37
                                                          
37 We adopt a micro-economic perspective on financial support by donors for standard implementation. While it 
would go beyond the scope of this study, a macro-economic approach might be useful to gain further insights 
into this issue. 
 Furthermore, although our analysis shows that ceteris paribus 
farmers in donor-managed groups are 40 percentage points more likely to adopt GlobalGAP 
than farmers in exporter-managed groups, public-private partnerships with exporters are 
likely to be the preferable way to enable small-scale farmers to participate in GlobalGAP 
certification schemes in the long run. The sustainability of standard adoption is expected to be 
much higher for farmers who are linked to exporters than for farmers who have adopted the 
standard without buyer support. Donors usually only offer support until the certificate has 
been obtained, while exporters have a continued interest in the GlobalGAP certificate and 
therefore offer long term support to farmers. Anecdotal evidence from our research region 
suggests that most farmers organized in donor-managed groups dropped out of certification 
after donor support was discontinued, while in many exporter-managed groups farmers were 
supported to renew their certificate. Further research based on repeated panel surveys is 
needed to look into these long-term effects of different institutional arrangements on standard 




Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that not only farmers, but also small and medium-
scale exporters need assistance by donors to be able to adopt GlobalGAP. Given that small 
and medium-scale exporters frequently collaborate with small and medium-sized suppliers, 
their lack of compliance with standards is likely to have detrimental effects for producers 





3. Innovative business models in the Thai horticultural sector: A panel data analysis of 




In recent years, compliance with international food safety and quality standards, such as 
GlobalGAP, has become increasingly important for farmers in developing countries supplying 
high-value markets. Adoption of the GlobalGAP standard is challenging and external support 
by exporters, donors or other support agencies is often necessary to enable small-scale 
farmers to adopt. While the factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption have been analyzed in 
several studies, the impacts of the standard remain less clear. This study for the first time 
presents a panel data analysis of the effects of GlobalGAP certification on net household 
income and producer prices, using a sample of 214 farmers in the Thai horticultural sector. 
We find that the impacts of GlobalGAP certification differ depending on whether farmers are 
organized in producer-managed or exporter-managed certification groups. In the producer-
managed groups, GlobalGAP certification has led to significantly higher prices and to 
significantly higher net household incomes. In the exporter-managed certification groups, 
however, the effect of GlobalGAP certification on both prices and net household income is 
insignificant. Our results suggest that monetary benefits of GlobalGAP adoption do exist, but 
in cases where exporters finance GlobalGAP certification, those benefits are not passed on to 
farmers. 
Keywords: business models, food safety standards, household income, producer prices, small-
scale farmers, Thailand 
  
                                                          
38 This chapter is forthcoming as a book chapter in a book entitled "Inclusive Agro-Enterprise Development" by 






In recent years, food safety and quality standards have become increasingly important in 
developing countries’ value chains that target high-value export markets in Europe, North 
America and Japan, and increasingly also domestic supermarket channels (Boselie et al., 
2003, Henson and Loader, 2001, Henson and Reardon, 2005). Some standards, like 
GlobalGAP, are discussed to have become quasi-mandatory to access these high-value 
markets, particularly in the case of horticultural crops. The implications for small-scale 
farmers are controversially debated among development experts. While evidence exists that 
the proliferation of standards has led to the exclusion of small-scale farmers (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000, Graffham et al., 2007b, Vagneron et al., 2009), there are several studies 
claiming that if smallholders are able to comply, standards can have positive impacts on 
farmers’ livelihoods (Asfaw et al., 2009a, Asfaw et al., 2009b, Asfaw et al., 2010, Narrod et 
al., 2009). To successfully integrate small-scale farmers into high-value chains where 
standards are required, the development of new innovative business models, such as 
smallholder collective action, public-private partnerships and contract farming systems, is one 
of the key factors (Okello et al., 2011, Narrod et al., 2009, Henson et al., 2005). The present 
study focuses on a public-private partnership between Thai small and medium-scale export 
companies, the German International Cooperation (GIZ), Thai universities and local farmer 
groups. The main objective of the partnership was to increase GlobalGAP adoption among 
small-scale fruit and vegetable (F&V) producers. For the purpose of certification, farmers 
were organized in groups and a Quality Management System (QMS) was implemented at the 
group level. The different business models introduced by the project varied with respect to the 
institutional arrangement for the QMS, which was either run by exporters or by the farmers 
themselves with assistance by the development project. 
The main aim of the study presented in this chapter is to evaluate the impacts of GlobalGAP 
certification on producer prices for fruit and vegetables (F&V) and on farmers’ net household 
income. While previous studies have looked at the aggregate effects of GlobalGAP adoption, 
we will take a more differentiated look and analyze whether the effects of GlobalGAP differ 
between certified farmers who are organized in producer-managed groups and those who are 
organized in exporter-managed groups. Our analysis is based on a panel data set collected in 
2010 and 2011 among 218 farm households, of which 124 are program participants and 90 are 
non-participants. Of the interviewed participants, 72 farmers were successfully certified in 




the time periods before and after certification for the GlobalGAP adopters in our sample. To 
assess the impact of certification we apply the fixed effects approach, which controls for 
unobservable differences between treatment and control group. 
Most existing studies on the impacts of GlobalGAP adoption have taken a qualitative 
approach and findings are still inconclusive (Ouma, 2010, Graffham et al., 2007b, Asfaw et 
al., 2009a, Asfaw et al., 2009b). Graffham et al. (2007) in a qualitative analysis of the impacts 
of GlobalGAP on small-scale farmers in Kenya state that the costs incurred by farmers for 
complying with GlobalGAP were not offset by higher prices, resulting in many smallholders 
dropping out of certification schemes. Similarly, Ouma (2010) concludes that out of twelve 
Kenyan exporters interviewed only two rewarded farmers for attaining GlobalGAP 
certification with higher price premiums. In contrast, Kariuki et al. (2012) using a sample of 
249 Kenyan French bean suppliers show that GlobalGAP adoption leads to an average price 
increase of 9.5% and to a reduced price decline over the season. Nevertheless, they argue that 
the price increase is small compared to price premiums generated by supply contracts and 
direct procurement by exporters. Moreover, the price increase may be overestimated in their 
study because they are not controlling for potential selection bias among GlobalGAP 
adopters. It is also important to look at whether exporters benefit from GlobalGAP adoption 
because benefits they receive might be partly passed on to producers as incentives to comply 
with the standard. Ouma (2010) reports that all exporters interviewed for his study criticized 
that GlobalGAP certification has not led to higher prices although the implementation of the 
standard has increased costs considerably. However, price premiums are only one of the 
potential benefits of GlobalGAP adoption. Exporters and farmers might also gain from 
certification through enhanced market access that contributes to higher revenues. Henson et 
al. (2011) find that GlobalGAP adoption has a large significant impact on export sales of 
exporting enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa. At farm level, Asfaw et al. (2009a; 2009b; 2010), 
using a cross-sectional sample of small-scale Kenyan vegetable producers identified a positive 
impact of the standard on net income from export vegetable production, farm level 
productivity and farmers’ health. However, if the analysis of income effects exclusively 
focuses on the income from export crop production, this may lead to biased results, as those 
farmers who successfully adopted the GlobalGAP standard may allocate resources away from 
other activities to increase their export crop production. To control for this effect, we will look 




The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we will provide information on the background to the 
study, including an overview of business models that enable small-scale farmers to adopt 
GlobalGAP and a short description of the development project and the groups participating in 
the project. Next, we describe the survey design of our study. In section 3.3., we will present 
the econometric model used and introduce our hypotheses. Section 3.4. presents descriptive 
statistics and discusses our model results. Finally, we conclude with the main findings of the 
study presented in this chapter. 
 
3.2. Background and data 
3.2.1. Inclusive business models and food safety standards 
External support by exporting enterprises and donors has been identified as one of the major 
factors influencing standard adoption by small-scale farmers in developing countries 
(Graffham et al., 2007b, Humphrey, 2008, Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006, Kersting and 
Wollni, 2012, Henson et al., 2005). Certification against the GlobalGAP standard not only 
requires high investments in farm facilities and equipment, such as pesticide and fertilizer 
storages, toilets and protective clothing, but it also entails high information, administration 
and organizational costs. Smallholders in developing countries alone are not able to overcome 
these challenges because they are often disadvantaged in terms of access to credits and 
information and lack the human, physical and social capital to comply with the standard 
(Narrod et al., 2009). Different business models have been proposed, which successfully 
include small-scale farmers in GlobalGAP certification schemes. In most cases, such models 
focus on the GlobalGAP group certification option, Option 239
                                                          
39 More recently, some smallholder farmer certification schemes have focused on GlobalGAP Option 1 
(individual certification) as a multisite operation. These schemes are forms of vertical integration or contract 
farming where an exporter rents land from several small-scale farmers. The different production locations are 
managed and certified as one farm under Option 1. 
, which allows small-scale 
farmers to benefit from economies of scale and hence reduces the compliance costs for 
individual producers. Moreover, a group structure lowers transaction costs for exporters who 
support farmers in complying with the GlobalGAP standard. In particular, the costs of 
providing farmers with information, technical assistance and training are reduced (Will, 
2010). There are two main group types under GlobalGAP group certification: producer-
managed groups and exporter-managed groups (GTZ, 2010). In many cases NGOs, donors, 




smallholders (Humphrey, 2008, Graffham et al., 2007b). In a previous study, Kersting and 
Wollni (2012) find that Thai small-scale F&V farmers are significantly more likely to adopt 
the GlobalGAP standard if they are supported by donors or exporters. While there is growing 
evidence on how smallholders can best be included in GlobalGAP certification schemes, the 
benefits that farmers derive from being included are less clear. In particular, there is little 
evidence on the heterogeneous effects of standard compliance that may result from 
certification through different business models. We address this knowledge gap in our study 
by explicitly taking into account whether farmers are organized in producer-managed or 
exporter-managed certification groups. For the general case of farmer organizations, 
Markelova et al. (2009) show that downstream commercial agents in the value-chain, such as 
exporters, may support the organization of smallholders in order to maximize their own 
profits, which may result in conflicts over the distribution of value added between farmers and 
the supporting actor. However, they also argue that public sector facilitators or NGOs can 
sometimes be over-supportive potentially leading to unsustainable business models. 
 
3.2.2. Certification groups in the GlobalGAP Option 2 project 
The GlobalGAP Option 2 development project40
                                                          
40 The project described is a scaling-up project that was preceded by a pilot-project exploring the possibilities of 
GlobalGAP Option 2 certification for Thailand. 
 started in 2008 with the aim to increase the 
access of small commercial farmers to higher food safety, environmental and social standards. 
Besides directly supporting farmer groups and exporters in the GlobalGAP adoption process, 
the program trained farm advisors to provide consulting services to farmers and exporters and 
to disseminate information about GlobalGAP through seminars. At the start, the program 
included 355 producers, who were organized in four producer-managed groups and six 
exporter-managed groups for certification. In the course of the program, five groups and the 
majority of farmers dropped out of the project, so that in the end only 28 farmers were 
certified in three exporter-managed groups and 54 farmers were certified in three farmer-
managed groups. In the exporter-managed groups, the majority of non-recurrent and recurrent 
costs associated with GlobalGAP compliance was paid for by the exporters. The exporters 
financed new farm facilities and farm equipment for their growers, such as pesticide storages, 
chemical disposal sites, plot markers, first aid kits, protective clothing and grading sheds. 
Moreover, they also covered the majority of recurrent costs, such as the costs for the external 




Management System (QMS). The implementation of a QMS is a requirement of GlobalGAP 
group certification because in the external audit not each individual farmer, but only the 
square root of the group members is inspected which reduces the certification costs for the 
individual producer. Hence, the task of the QMS is to make sure that all group members 
comply with the GlobalGAP regulations and that those farmers sampled in the external audit 
are representative for the group as a whole. For exporters, the management of the QMS 
implies providing farm assistance and trainings to farmers, as well as monitoring their 
compliance on a weekly or monthly basis, and keeping records on the compliance of all group 
members.  
In the producer-managed groups, the lack of support by downstream actors and the lack of 
secure market linkages was one of the main difficulties faced by the project. Farmers 
organized in these groups had to cover the major share of investment costs by themselves 
while the costs of the external audit and laboratory analyses were covered by the program.  
The three producer-managed groups certified differ with respect to their level of market 
integration. The first group is led by a collector with very strong connections to a variety of 
exporters, supermarkets, restaurants and wholesalers. The second group is equally well 
integrated, selling directly to a variety of domestic supermarkets. The third and largest group, 
however, lacked linkages to high-value markets, and prior to certification members sold their 
produce separately, usually to middlemen at the farm gate. With GlobalGAP certification in 
reach, the development program accomplished to link the group to high-value markets as 
well. Farmers were contracted by a packaging house that collected, washed and packed the 
produce.  The major share was sold as fresh produce to a domestic supermarket, a smaller 
share was frozen and then exported, and a very small part was sold as dried produce to 
various channels. At the packaging house, a team of farm advisors was employed that was 
paid by the development program. They took over the main responsibilities in the 





3.2.3. Sampling and survey design 
In order to assess the impacts of GlobalGAP certification, we carried out a panel data survey 
of fruit and vegetable farmers in Northern, Eastern, Southern and Central Thailand41
For the sampling frame, we divided the relevant population into four strata: (1) program 
participants who are likely to adopt GlobalGAP (N=118), (2) program participants who are 
not likely to achieve GlobalGAP certification (N=237), (3) non-participants in program 
regions (N=approx. 710), and (4) non-participants outside program regions (N=approx. 415). 
Sampling of program participants was based on a complete list of participants provided by the 
development program including complete names of participants, location and adoption 
status
. The first 
round of data collection took place between March and May 2010 and the second round was 
conducted between March and May 2011. In the surveys, covering a one-year recall period 
from March to the end of February, we collected quantitative and qualitative information on 
socio-economic and farm characteristics, agricultural production and input use, marketing 
decisions, compliance with standards, group membership and training participation. In the 
following analysis, the first survey interval will be referred to as the year 2009 and the second 
survey interval as the year 2010. 
42. To obtain a sufficiently large sample of adopters we selected all households for 
interviews that were categorized as prospective adopters at the time of the first survey. Of the 
11843 households listed as prospective adopters, 97 were available for interviews in the first 
survey round. For the second strata, we randomly selected 49 households from the list to be 
included in the sample. Non-participants within and outside program regions were sampled 
through random walks, provided that they produce at least one of the products that were 
considered for GlobalGAP certification44
                                                          
41 Interviews were carried out in the following provinces: Kanchanaburi, Ayuttayah, Nakhon Pathom, 
Ratchaburi, Samut Sakhorn, Saraburi (Central Thailand), Sa Kaew, Chachoengsao, Prachin Buri (Eastern 
Thailand), Chumporn (Southern Thailand), Phayao, Phichit, Chiang Mai (Northern Thailand). 
. Our internal control group, consisting of non-
participant households within program regions, was sampled in villages where the 
development program was active. Hence, this group was exposed to the activities of the 
42 During the preparation phase of the first survey in the beginning of 2010, 118 households were listed as 
prospective adopters by the development project. At this stage, farmers were classified as likely adopters if they 
were in the adoption process and expected to achieve certification by mid of 2010, i.e. within the duration of the 
development project. In addition, six households are included in the category of prospective adopters who were 
certified before the survey and took part in the development project because they needed assistance to become 
re-certified. 
43 Only 82 of the households initially classified as prospective adopters became certified. 
44 The following products were considered for GlobalGAP certification: lychee, durian, mangosteen, papaya, 
dragon fruit, cantaloupe, mango, asparagus, green okra, spring onion, yard long bean, different kinds of herbs 




development program and is potentially affected by spillover effects. Therefore, to have a 
more robust control group, we additionally sampled non-participants outside program regions. 
Ten districts were identified as external control areas through consultations with agricultural 
professors in Thailand and stakeholders of the development program. The selected districts 
have similar agro-ecological conditions to districts within program regions and are known as 
major production areas of the crops considered for GlobalGAP certification by program 
participants. In total, 287 farmers were interviewed in 2010 of which 146 are program 
participants, 84 are non-participants within program regions and 57 are non-participants 
outside program regions. 
To some extent sample attrition occurred in 2011, so that we were able to interview 218 of the 
287 households a second time. Of the 218 households interviewed in the second survey, 124 
are program participants, 57 are non-participants in program regions and 37 are non-
participants outside program regions. There are different reasons for why some farmers were 
not included in the second survey. First, for some of the households the contact information 
given was incorrect or they had moved away, and second, some households were not 
available for interviews. In the following analysis, we will only use 214 of the 218 households 
because four households stopped growing fruit and vegetables completely. 
 
3.3. Econometric analysis 
The main objective of our study is to analyze the impact of GlobalGAP certification on (1) 
producer prices for F&V and on (2) net household income. In addition to average treatment 
effects, we are interested in whether the effect of GlobalGAP depends on the type of business 
model used, namely producer-managed groups or exporter-managed groups for certification. 
For this purpose, we formulate different specifications of a panel data model estimating mean 
F&V producer prices and net household income. In a first specification for both income and 
price analysis, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if a farmer is GlobalGAP 
certified in 201045
                                                          
45 For the purpose of our estimation, we define the six farmers who were certified in both survey periods as non-
adopters in 2009 because we expect that not only initial certification, but also the renewal of the certificate has a 
positive influence on prices and net household income. If they are classified as adopters in both time periods, 
they are counted as non-certified farmers in the fixed effects model because there is no change in certification 
status between the years. 
, zero otherwise. In a second specification, we include two dummy 




and the second one being equal to one if a farmer is certified in a producer-managed group. 
Furthermore, since scale economies are likely to be important in the adoption of the 
GlobalGAP standard, the income effect of certification may vary depending on farm size. We 
therefore include variables on the size of the area that is certified, the certified area in 
producer-managed and in exporter-managed groups in additional specifications of our model. 
The adoption of the GlobalGAP standard is likely to be correlated with unobservable 
characteristics that also influence producer prices and net household income46
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖𝑡𝜷 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡, 
. In particular, 
farmers who are more motivated and progressive are more likely to achieve certification with 
GlobalGAP, which is a complex and knowledge-intensive standard. These personal 
characteristics and attitudes, however, are also likely to positively affect the ability of the 
household to obtain higher prices and incomes. As we cannot control for these unobserved 
variables, a simple ex-post comparison of prices and incomes between adopters and non-
adopters would most likely lead to biased estimates. Given that we have data before and after 
certification for both adopters and non-adopters, we use a fixed effects model to control for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across households. The fixed effects model is 
specified as follows: 
where  𝑡 denotes the time period, 𝑖 indicates the individual, and 𝒙𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observable 
variables that change across both time 𝑡 and individuals 𝑖, across 𝑖, but not 𝑡 and variables that 
change over time but not across individuals. The error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a composite error term  
(𝑣𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) that consists of the unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖, which captures features of 
individuals that do not change over time, such as ability and motivation, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 which is the 
idiosyncratic error that changes over t as well as across 𝑖. The unobserved effect 𝑐𝑖, is allowed 
to be correlated with the explanatory variables47
                                                          
46 This may also refer to several other variables included on the right-hand-side of our model. 
. Hence, once we include time-variant 
explanatory variables along with time-invariant unobserved effects in our model, the value of 
the time-variant variables in previous years has no effect on the outcome variable in the 
current year. The fixed effects estimator uses the variation over time within each cross-
sectional observation and is based on time-demeaned data. Explanatory variables that are 
constant over time are removed by the time-demeaning and hence cannot be estimated with 
the fixed effects approach (Wooldridge, 2010). 
47 Here we assume that the managerial ability and other unobserved effects are roughly constant over time. The 
shortcoming of our model is that we cannot control for unobserved effects that are time-variant and correlated 




We will use two weights in the estimation procedure, sampling weights48 to account for the 
overrepresentation of development program participants in our sample and inverse probability 
weights to correct for sample attrition that is based on observable characteristics. To test 
whether sample attrition is random or not, we carried out attrition probit tests (Fitzgerald et 
al., 1998) and pooled tests (Becketti et al., 1988). The results of both tests show that attrition 
is nonrandom in our sample. More specifically, we find that participation in the development 
project, age of the household head and location of the household significantly influence 
attrition. Hence, we calculate inverse probability weights which give more weight to 
households that are similar to households who are likely to attrit than to households that are 
more comparable to non-attritors. Weights are calculated as follows. First, the predicted 
probabilities of the unrestricted retention probit model are estimated using explanatory 
variables that are observable for both attritor and non-attritor households, and that might be 
correlated with the likelihood of attrition. Then the model is re-estimated as a restricted model 
including only those explanatory variables that are not significantly associated with attrition. 
The inverse probability weights are then calculated as the ratio of the restricted to the 
unrestricted probabilities (Baulch and Quisumbing, 2011)49
 
. 
3.3.1. Impact of GlobalGAP certification on producer prices 
To estimate the impact of GlobalGAP certification on producer prices we estimate a model 
with the log transformed mean weighted price per kg of F&V50
                                                          
48 Sampling weights are calculated as the inverse of the sampling fraction, i.e. the total number of households in 
each population divided by the number of samples drawn from that population. 
 as a dependent variable. To 
measure the effects of GlobalGAP certification, we include a dummy variable measuring 
GlobalGAP certification in 2010 in a first specification and two dummies for certification in 
exporter-managed groups and producer-managed groups in a second specification. As 
additional explanatory variables, we include the total quantity of F&V sold, the share of F&V 
sold to high-value markets, the share of F&V sold that is graded, three variables related to 
contracts and resource provision by buyers, a range of variables capturing the share of 
49 Results of the attrition tests and the calculation of inverse probability weights are provided by the authors on 
request. 
50 For each farmer, the mean weighted price per kg of products 𝑛 = 1 …N in grades 𝑖 = 1 … In is calculated as 
follows: p� = ∑ ∑ �𝑞𝑛𝑖𝑛
𝑄
� ∗ 𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑛=1𝑁𝑛=1 , where Q = total quantity of F&V sold, 𝑞𝑛𝑖𝑛 = quantity of product 𝑛 in 




different crops in the total quantity of F&V sold51
Regarding our first research question, i.e., the impact of GlobalGAP certification on producer 
prices for fruit and vegetables, we hypothesize that there are significant price premiums 
associated with GlobalGAP certified produce. The GlobalGAP standard adds value to the 
product by assuring buyers that desired but unobservable product attributes, such as adherence 
to maximum residue levels or the use of safe irrigation water, are fulfilled. In the absence of a 
certificate, product attributes unobservable to the buyer do not entail price premiums, unless 
there are reputation effects that enable the producer to credibly assure the customer that the 
product possesses the desired characteristics (Fafchamps et al., 2008). Our second hypothesis, 
which will be tested in a second model, refers to the heterogeneous impact of GlobalGAP 
certification on prices, depending on the type of business model used. We expect that certified 
farmers in producer-managed groups benefit from higher price premiums as compared to 
famers in exporter-managed groups. While in the producer-managed groups, the costs of 
compliance were covered by adopters themselves and the development program, in the 
exporter-managed groups both non-recurrent and recurrent costs for GlobalGAP adoption 
were mainly covered by the exporters. We therefore expect that exporters implicitly deduct 
the costs incurred for GlobalGAP certification from producer prices, hence resulting in 
significantly reduced price premiums. On the other hand, exporters may decide to pay price 
premiums to reward farmers for complying with the GlobalGAP standard. Exporters have 
undertaken large transaction-specific investments to support farmers in the GlobalGAP 
adoption process, leaving them at risk of farmers’ opportunistic behavior. Therefore, they may 
choose to set prices high enough to discourage side-selling of farmers at times when market 
prices are higher than the prices agreed upon in the contract (Minten et al., 2009).  
, and a year dummy variable measuring time 
fixed effects. 
With respect to the other explanatory variables included in the models, we expect a positive 
influence of the total quantity sold on prices because farmers selling larger amounts are 
expected to have a higher bargaining power. In addition, the per unit costs of price and 
contract negotiations for buyers are lower for larger than for smaller transactions, which may 
be reflected in higher prices paid to larger farmers. In line with this, Mausch et al. (2009) find 
that small-scale GlobalGAP certified farmers receive 16% lower prices than large-scale 
certified farmers, which they attribute to lower bargaining power and higher monitoring and 
                                                          
51 We use the share of different crops in the total quantity of F&V sold instead of crop dummies because the 




enforcement costs associated with smaller farmers. The variable “share of F&V sold to high-
value markets” includes the share sold to exporters and supermarkets either directly or 
through specialized suppliers. We expect a positive influence of the variable since high-value 
markets demand the consistent delivery of high quality products, which is usually rewarded 
by price premiums. The share of F&V sold that is graded is also expected to have a positive 
influence on prices. Through grading, observable variation in product quality is accounted for 
by price differentials. Furthermore, we hypothesize that production under contract can have a 
significant influence on product prices. For the analysis, we classify contracts in two main 
categories: market-specification52 contracts and production-management53
                                                          
52 We classify a contract as a market-specification contract if the farmer has a written or oral agreement with the 
buyer, and at least one of the following is specified in the contract: pricing of the product, product grades, timing 
of delivery, amount of delivery, but no requirements are specified in terms of production methods or input use. 
Farm assistance is also not provided. 
 contracts (Minot, 
1986). Market-specification contracts are negotiated prior to the harvest and usually include 
details on prices, quality and timing of delivery. Market-specification contracts might have a 
positive or negative influence on prices. On the one hand, their impact might be negative if 
small-scale farmers are risk averse and therefore willing to accept guaranteed future prices 
which are below the expected market price (Key and Runsten, 1999). On the other hand, 
marketing contracts might include a premium for higher quality and firms might set prices 
that are high enough to prevent contracted producers from side-selling to other buyers at times 
of high market demand (Minten et al., 2009). Production-management contracts, in addition 
to the above mentioned specifications, define a particular production method or input regime 
to be followed by the farmer. Frequently, buyers provide farmers with market information and 
technical assistance to overcome missing markets for information (Minot, 1986), which is 
especially relevant in the context of supplying high-value export markets that demand 
stringent food safety and quality standards (Key and Runsten, 1999). The impact of 
production-management contracts on producer prices is also not clear a priori. On the one 
hand, the impact may be positive if farmers’ efforts to follow strict guidelines laid out in the 
contract are rewarded by higher prices. On the other hand, buyers might implicitly charge 
farmers for the services provided resulting in lower producer prices (Minot, 1986). Finally, 
we hypothesize that input and credit provision by buyers has a negative influence on prices. 
53 We classify a contract as a production-management contract if the farmer has a written or oral agreement with 
the buyer, and at least one of the following is specified in the contract: use of only those crop protection products 
that are approved by the buyer, record keeping requirements, production according to the regulations of the Q-
GAP standard. The contract is also classified as a production-management contract if the buyer provides farm 





Credits and inputs are often provided to farmers at subsidized rates and the costs of these 
subsidies are then subtracted from product prices (Minot, 1986).  
The GlobalGAP standard, however, is not only expected to influence producer prices directly, 
but may also influence several of the marketing-related factors that are included as 
explanatory variables in our models, and thus have an indirect effect on producer prices. In 
particular, GlobalGAP certification may be positively associated with larger shares sold to 
high-value markets and larger shares sold as graded produce. Certification can serve as a 
signal to buyers that producers adhered to the strict food safety and quality rules of the 
standard thus improving their access to high-value markets. Since in high-value markets 
product grades for observable attributes such as size, color and variety are used more 
frequently (Jaffee et al., 2011), greater participation in such markets will also lead to an 
increase in the share of produce that is graded. Furthermore, GlobalGAP certification is often 
associated with tighter buyer-producer relations and increased resource provision by buyers. 
As a result, producers and buyers may engage in contractual agreements that also influence 
the prices received by producers. To account for these potential correlations between 
GlobalGAP certification and other explanatory variables, we show two specifications of the 
panel data model on mean F&V producer prices. The first specification excludes the 
marketing-related variables, such as participation in high-value markets, grading, contracts 
and resource provision by buyers, to capture the full effect of GlobalGAP certification on 
producer prices. The second specification controls for all potential factors attempting to 
disentangle the effect of different marketing strategies. 
 
3.3.2. Impact of GlobalGAP on net household income 
Our second research objective relates to the impact of GlobalGAP certification on net 
household income. We calculate net household income (NHI) as follows54
NHI = (TFR – VC) + OFE + NSE,  
:  
where TFR = total farm revenue, VC = variable costs, OFE = wages and salaries from off-
farm employment, and NSE = net returns from self-employment. 
                                                          
54 Unfortunately, we do not have information on the amount of remittances received by households and therefore 




Different model specifications are formulated to estimate the average and subgroup-specific 
mean impact as well as the per hectare effect of GlobalGAP certification on farmers’ net 
household income. In a first specification, we include a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
a farmer is certified in 2010, zero otherwise, which measures the average effect of 
certification. In a second specification, we include two dummies for certification in exporter-
managed groups and producer-managed groups to look at heterogeneous treatment effects 
between subgroups of adopters. Furthermore, to measure the per hectare effect of GlobalGAP 
certification, we include the size of the GlobalGAP certified area in ha, the certified area in 
producer-managed and exporter-managed groups as explanatory variables in further 
specifications. 
As additional control variables, we include the cultivated area with F&V measured in ha, the 
cultivated area with other crops, the number of household members working off-farm, the 
total number of household members as a proxy for access to family labor, a range of variables 
capturing the share of the area cultivated with different products separately for fruit and 
vegetables and for other crops, and a dummy variable which is equal to one if the household 
has experienced a drought. One of the project regions was affected by a severe drought in 
2010 which has led to large harvest losses. We do not include a year dummy in the model 
because it is highly correlated with the dummy for drought in 2010. 
Since GlobalGAP certified farmers are likely to increase their share of F&V sold to high-
value markets and to receive higher product prices, we also expect a positive effect of 
certification on net household income. On the other hand, premium prices for GlobalGAP 
adoption do not necessarily imply higher net incomes because the GlobalGAP standard is 
associated with significant compliance and adjustment costs that might diminish the positive 
income effect generated by higher prices. While the recurrent costs of compliance, like 
certification fees, soil analyses and health checks, did not have to be paid by farmers in our 
sample, because during the first year of certification they were covered by the development 
program and by exporters, adjustment costs may still be substantial. Certified farmers may for 
example have to incur higher variable costs that are indirectly related to standard adoption, 
such as higher labor costs due to labor-intensive record keeping and weeding practices that 
are required under the GlobalGAP standard. Similarly, GlobalGAP regulations stipulate that 
only those chemicals can be used that are registered in the country of use for the target crop 
(FoodPLUS, 2011b), which are often more expensive, and thus may result in higher pesticide 




different types of certification groups, given that farmers in producer-managed and exporter-
managed groups received different levels of support and financial assistance. As argued in the 
previous section, farmers in exporter-managed groups are likely to receive lower price 
premiums, because exporters made substantial investments in farm-level upgrading. This may 
then also result in lower overall impacts of the GlobalGAP standard on the net household 
income of adopters in exporter-managed groups compared to adopters in producer-managed 
groups. 
 
3.4. Results and discussion 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
3.4.1.1. Marketing of F&V 
In the following section, we descriptively analyze changes in F&V product prices, market 
access and contracts following GlobalGAP certification. Table 8 shows an overview of the 
marketing performance of farmers in our sample. We first compare whether the marketing 
performance differed between certified and non-certified producers before GlobalGAP 
certification, and then look at the changes from 2009 (before certification) to 2010 (after 
certification). In addition, we compare the marketing performance between certified farmers 
organized in producer-managed certification groups and those organized in exporter-managed 
certification groups. 
Comparing prices and marketing performance between certified and non-certified producers 
in 2009, we find that mean prices were not significantly different between the two groups 
before certification. However, certified farmers sold a significantly higher share of their 
produce to high-value markets already in 2009 than non-certified farmers. Moreover, we find 
significant differences between the two groups with respect to the types of contractual 
arrangements used and the quantity of fruit and vegetables sold. Compared to non-certified 
producers, certified farmers sold less fruit and vegetables and were less often engaged in 
market-specification contracts. 
Next, we compare changes from 2009 to 2010 between certified and non-certified producers. 
We find that certified producers increased their mean price by 0.48 USD on the average, 




difference is statistically significant suggesting that there are considerable price premiums 
associated with the GlobalGAP standard. Furthermore, certified producers already delivering 
higher shares of their produce to high-value markets before certification were able to further 
increase their access to these markets. While in the case of certified farmers the share of F&V 
sold to high-value markets increased by 36% between 2009 and 2010, it stayed almost 
constant in the case of non-certified farmers. Finally, certified farmers were able to expand 
the share of F&V sold under production-management contracts by 32%. This change is 
significantly different from the change experienced by non-certified farmers, whose 
contractual arrangements remained largely constant over the study period. This finding 
confirms that GlobalGAP adoption often goes hand in hand with more intensive farm 
assistance and closer monitoring by buyers, for which production management contracts can 
provide a safeguard. 
Comparing the two groups of certified farmers, we find evidence for our hypothesis that there 
are heterogeneous effects of the GlobalGAP standard depending on whether certification is 
buyer-driven or producer-driven. We find that before GlobalGAP certification in 2009, 
farmers in producer-managed groups were less integrated into high-value supply chains than 
those organized in exporter-managed groups. They sold a significantly lower share of their 
produce to high-value markets, a lower share under production-management contracts, and 
less often received inputs or credits from buyers as compared to farmers in exporter-managed 
groups. 
Following certification, however, farmers in producer-managed groups were able to catch-up. 
The results for price changes following certification are particularly striking. For certified 
farmers in producer-managed groups, prices have nearly doubled, from 0.86 USD in 2009 to 
1.55 USD in 2010. In contrast, the prices in exporter-managed groups have remained stable. 
Similarly, the share sold to high-value markets and the share sold under production-
management contracts has increased significantly for members of the producer-managed 
certification groups, while there has been almost no change for farmers in exporter-managed 
groups. This can be attributed to the fact that farmers organized and certified in exporter-
managed groups had the contracting exporter as their main buyer before and after 
certification, whereas farmers in producer-managed groups gained access to new markets as a 





Table 8: Differences in marketing of F&V: prices, quantities, marketing channels and 
contracts 
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Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** imply the mean value in 2009 / the change from 
2009 to 2010 is statistically different between certified and non-certified farmers/farmers certified in producer-
managed groups and famers certified in exporter-managed groups at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own data 
 
3.4.1.2. Costs, revenues and household income 
Table 9 shows differences in per hectare costs and revenue of F&V production for certified 
and non-certified producers in 2009, i.e., before certification, and compares changes from 
2009 to 2010. In 2009, there are no significant differences with respect to the gross revenue 
per hectare, total variable costs per hectare, and net revenue per hectare between certified and 
non-certified farmers. Comparing changes from 2009 to 2010, we find that notwithstanding 
the high price increase among certified farmers following certification, their gross revenue per 
hectare did not increase over the same period. This can be explained by an average decline in 
per hectare yields of 21% for certified famers. Regarding production costs, certified farmers 
experienced an increase in seed costs and other variable costs per hectare that is significantly 
different from the change among non-certified farmers. The category ‘other variable costs’ 
includes amongst others the costs for irrigation, fuel, tractor rental, electricity and packaging 





Next, we compare differences and changes in costs and revenues of certified farmers in 
producer-managed and exporter-managed groups. We find that before certification in 2009, 
farmers in producer-managed groups have both significantly lower gross revenues per hectare 
as well as significantly lower total variable costs per hectare than farmers in exporter-
managed groups. The large differences in gross revenues can mainly be explained by yield 
differences since the yield of members in producer-managed groups is significantly lower 
than that of farmers in exporter-managed groups. Moreover, yield changes from 2009 to 2010 
are significantly different between the two groups. While the average yield per hectare of 
certified farmers in producer-managed groups decreased by more than 40%55
  
, certified 
farmers in exporter-managed groups experienced a slight increase in per hectare yield. 
Despite the considerable decline in yields, the gross revenues of certified farmers in producer-
managed groups decreased only slightly and the change is not significantly different from that 
of farmers certified in exporter-managed groups. This can be attributed to the significantly 
higher prices obtained by farmers certified in producer-managed groups after certification that 
helped to compensate the negative yield effects. 
                                                          





Table 9: Costs and revenue of F&V production per ha 


































































































































































































































Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** imply the mean value in 2009 / the change from 
2009 to 2010 is statistically different between certified and non-certified farmers/farmers certified in producer-
managed groups and famers certified in exporter-managed groups at the  
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own data 
Table 10 shows differences and changes in annual net household income by activity. For the 
year 2009, we do not find significant differences in income levels between certified and non-
certified producers for all income categories indicating that their income structures are 
relatively similar. Comparing income changes, we find that although certified producers on 
the average experienced an increase in net household income and net F&V income, whereas 
non-certified farmers experienced a decrease, these differences are not statistically significant. 
Similarly, comparing the net household income between certified farmers in exporter-
managed groups and certified farmers in producer-managed groups, we do not find significant 
differences between the income levels of the two groups in 2009, nor do we find significant 





Table 10: Annual net household income in US Dollars by activity 
























































































































Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** imply the mean value in 2009 / the change from 
2009 to 2010 is statistically different between certified and non-certified farmers/farmers certified in producer-
managed groups and famers certified in exporter-managed groups at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own data 
 
3.4.2. Impact of GlobalGAP on producer prices 
In this section, we present the estimation results of the fixed effects model explaining F&V 
producer prices56 Table 11 (see ). The first and the second specifications estimate the 
aggregate effect of GlobalGAP certification on F&V producer prices and the third and fourth 
specifications analyze mean treatment effects for the subgroups of farmers certified in 
producer-managed and exporter-managed groups, respectively. Due to a potential correlation 
between the explanatory variables, specifications (1) and (3) only include a subset of the 
independent variables while specifications (2) and (4) control for all potential explanatory 
factors. 
                                                          
56 To test whether the unobserved effect is correlated with the explanatory variables in our models, we employed 
the Hausman test. In specifications (1) to (3) in Table 11, the null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected at the 
5% level, while in specification (4) in Table 11, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level. Hence, we 




Table 11: Determinants of F&V producer prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GlobalGAP certified (0/1)a 0.36***  (0.12) 
0.20 
(0.12) - - 
GlobalGAP certified  





GlobalGAP certified  





















Share of F&V sold that is graded - 0.45** (0.21) - 
0.45** 
(0.21) 
Share of F&V sold under a  





Share of F&V sold under a  





Share of F&V sold for which resources 



















Number of observations 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.55 
Notes: The dependent variable is log mean F&V price. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Variables 
capturing the share of different F&V in the total quantity sold are included, but not shown due to space 
restrictions. The full model results are shown in Appendix III. 
a The reference group is non-certified farmers. 
b
Source: Own data 
 The reference year is 2009. 
The results shown in column (1) of Table 11 confirm our expectation that GlobalGAP 
certification has a positive impact on prices. On the average, certification increases prices by 
43%57
                                                          
57 The exact percentage difference in the predicted price was calculated as follows for all explanatory variables: 
100 ∗ [exp�β�∆x� − 1] 
. Hence, the price increase we find is much larger than the price premium of 9.5% 
identified by Kariuki et al. (2012) in their study on the Kenyan French bean sector. Adding 
further explanatory variables on the marketing relationship to the model (see column 2), the 
coefficient for GlobalGAP certification decreases in size and becomes insignificant. This can 
be attributed to the correlation between GlobalGAP certification and several marketing-
related variables. As was shown in the descriptive statistics, farmers were able to increase 
their sales to high-value markets as a result of GlobalGAP certification. Results in column (2) 
reveal that the share of fruit and vegetables sold to high-value markets and the share of F&V 
sold that is graded have a large and significant positive impact on producer prices. Thus, our 




improved access to high value segments through which higher prices can be obtained. 
Furthermore, the type of contractual agreement has an influence on the prices received by 
farmers. Our results show that a 10% increase in the share of F&V sold under a market-
specification contract leads to an average price increase of 3%.  
Looking at subgroup-specific average treatment effects (column 3 of Table 11), we find that 
the observed increase in average prices resulting from GlobalGAP certification is mainly 
driven by significant price increases in the producer-managed groups. GlobalGAP 
certification in producer-managed groups has led to an average price increase of 68%, while 
in exporter-managed groups there is no significant impact on prices. The coefficient for 
GlobalGAP certification in producer-managed groups remains marginally significant if 
further explanatory variables are added to the model (column 4 of Table 11), but the 
magnitude of the effect drops by more than half to 34%. 
The finding that there is no significant price increase for farmers certified in exporter-
managed groups is in line with observations of qualitative studies, which show that exporters 
are usually not willing to pay price premiums for GlobalGAP-certified produce to farmers 
(Graffham et al., 2007b, Ouma, 2010). This suggests that, if costs of compliance are mainly 
paid for by buyers, these costs are implicitly deducted from product prices. Our results are 
also confirmed by the information collected in qualitative interviews with exporters involved 
in the development project in our study area. None of the exporters claimed to offer price 
premiums to farmers after successful certification, but rather continued to pay the same prices 
to certified and non-certified suppliers. According to the exporters, the main short-term 
benefits that farmers can derive from being included in the certification groups are knowledge 
gains as well as the advantages of being a preferred supplier. 
 
3.4.3. Impact of GlobalGAP on net household income 
Table 12 shows the results of the fixed effects model estimating farmers’ net household 
income58
                                                          
58 To test whether the unobserved effect is correlated with the explanatory variables in our models, we employed 
the Hausman test. In all specifications shown in 
. Specifications (1) and (2) measure the average total effect of GlobalGAP 
Table 12, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation and random effects and fixed effects estimates are very similar. However, we do believe that 
GlobalGAP certification as well as certification in exporter-managed and producer-managed groups might be 
correlated with unobservable characteristics that also effect net household income, and hence decide to use the 




certification and the subgroup-specific mean effects of the standard on farmers certified in 
exporter-managed and producer-managed groups, respectively. In specifications (3) and (4) 
we additionally look at the per hectare effect of GlobalGAP certification. 
Table 12: Determinants of net household income (USD) 
 Total effect of GlobalGAP certification 
 Per hectare effect of 
GlobalGAP certification 








(exporter group) (0/1)a - 
373 
(5071) 
 - 2343  (3311) 
GlobalGAP certified 
(producer group) (0/1)a - 
14,678*** 
(5247) 
 - 3792*** (1460) 










































Number of observations 428 428  428 428 
R-squared 0.16 0.16  0.17 0.17 
Notes: The dependent variable is net household income in USD. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables capturing the share of area cultivated with different products are 
included, but not shown due to space restrictions. The full model results are shown in Appendix III. 
Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
a
Our results show that GlobalGAP certification is a promising option for Thai fruit and 
vegetable farmers. On the average, GlobalGAP certification has increased farmers’ annual net 
household income by 10,039 USD (column 1 of 
 The reference group is non-certified farmers. 
Table 12). Looking at per hectare effects in 
column 3, we find that one additional hectare of certified land leads to an average increase in 
net household income of 3762 USD. The results of the remaining explanatory variables are as 
expected. Off-farm employment generates particularly high returns: one additional household 
member working off-farm contributes to an average annual income increase of 8971 USD. 
This reflects the status of Thailand as an emerging market, where remunerative opportunities 
for off-farm activities are increasingly available and represent an important income source for 
rural households (Rigg and Nattapoolwat, 2001, Rigg, 2005). The coefficient for the 
cultivated area with F&V is also positive and significant indicating that one additional hectare 




by the drought in 2010 have experienced large significant income losses of 4873 USD on the 
average. 
Looking at heterogeneous impacts across certification groups (columns 2 and 4 of Table 12), 
we find that there are indeed differential effects for households certified in exporter-managed 
and producer-managed groups. While GlobalGAP certification in exporter-managed groups 
does not have a significant impact, GlobalGAP adoption in producer-managed groups has a 
positive and significant effect on farmers’ net household income. On the average, GlobalGAP 
certification in producer-managed groups leads to 14,678 USD higher net household incomes 
and to an income increase of 3792 USD per hectare of land that is certified. These results are 
similar to our findings that price effects are positive and significant for farmers certified in 
producer-managed groups, but not for farmers certified in exporter-managed groups. 
The large positive impact of GlobalGAP on the household income of farmers certified in 
producer-managed groups suggests that GlobalGAP certification can be profitable for small-
scale farmers. However, it needs to be kept in mind that in the producer-managed groups in 
our sample, during the first year of adoption the recurrent costs of compliance, i.e., the costs 
for the external audit, for laboratory analyses and for running the QMS, were covered by the 
development program. Hence, if farmers renew the GlobalGAP certificate in the following 
years, these recurrent costs have to be deducted from their income. Without the continued 
support of the development program it is questionable whether farmers organized in producer-
managed groups will take the risk to incur the costs of re-certification. Long-term links with 
downstream actors operating in high-value markets that provide a secure market outlet and 
premium prices are important incentives for farmers to continually comply with the 
GlobalGAP standard. 
In the exporter-managed certification groups, the implementation of GlobalGAP certification 
has not induced many significant changes in outcome variables. Group members do not 
receive higher prices and have not been able to increase their sales to high-value markets. At 
the same time, variable costs per hectare have not risen significantly. In line with this, we do 
not find a significant effect of certification on net household incomes of producers certified in 
exporter-managed groups. 
One shortcoming of our results is that they represent short-term effects only. In exporter-
managed groups, where certification is mostly driven by buyers, farmers might experience 




production methods that are implemented in the context of GlobalGAP adoption might have a 
positive effect on product quality, which may only become visible after several growing 
periods. In addition, in the long run certified farmers might also benefit from increased and 
more stable demand for their products, allowing them to cultivate larger areas or to increase 
the number of production cycles. One of the exporter-managed groups, for example, grows 
green okra for export to Japan during the off-season when demand in Japan exceeds supply. 
With the GlobalGAP certificate, the exporter expects that okra can be sold year-round, even 
during the peak season when domestic production can almost satisfy consumer demand in 
Japan.  
At the moment, while GlobalGAP is certainly an advantage, it is not an indispensable 
requirement to sell to lucrative markets in Thailand. The adoption of the standard is not very 
wide-spread yet, so that exporters are forced to also source from non-certified producers. All 
the exporters involved in the survey source produce from a large number of smallholders, but 
only a very small share of their suppliers is included in GlobalGAP certification schemes. As 
of mid 2010, all over Thailand only 776 F&V producers were certified under GlobalGAP 
Option 2, and 31 farms, mostly exporter-owned and large-scale, were certified individually 
under Option 1 (FoodPLUS, 2010a). Our findings raise the question whether farmers in 
exporter-managed certification groups will continue to comply with GlobalGAP, if they do 
not receive any monetary benefits from certification in the short term. For Kenya, Graffham et 
al. (2007) report that a high share of smallholder farmers dropped out of exporter-managed 




For the case of small-scale fruit and vegetable farmers in Thailand, we have analyzed the 
impact of GlobalGAP certification on F&V product prices and farmers’ net household 
income. While previous studies have only looked at the aggregate impacts of the standard, we 
find that the impact of GlobalGAP differs depending on whether certified farmers are 
organized in exporter-managed or producer-managed groups.  
At the aggregate level, we can conclude that GlobalGAP has a significant impact on F&V 
producer prices, leading to an average price increase of 43%. However, whether GlobalGAP 




on the support received from downstream actors. Certified farmers in exporter-managed 
groups do not receive significant price premiums, whereas farmers in producer-managed 
groups were able to increase prices by 68% as a result of GlobalGAP certification. This can 
be explained by the fact that exporters covered the majority of compliance costs with 
GlobalGAP on behalf of their suppliers and hence were not willing to additionally reward 
farmers with higher prices. Our quantitative findings are supported by qualitative interviews 
with the exporters involved in the development program, who stated that they did indeed not 
pay price premiums specifically for GlobalGAP certification. Moreover, our results are in line 
with previous qualitative studies on the impacts of GlobalGAP adoption, which show that 
farmers identify the lack of price premiums as one of the major hurdles to the sustainable 
implementation of the GlobalGAP standard (Graffham et al., 2007b, Ouma, 2010). 
Concerning the impacts of GlobalGAP on net household income, we find that while certified 
farmers in producer-managed groups have realized large net income gains, adopters in 
exporter-managed groups have not benefited from certification in terms of higher household 
incomes. This raises the question whether certification of smallholders in exporter-managed 
groups is economically viable for small-scale farmers. Currently, incentives for obtaining or 
sustaining GlobalGAP certification are small, especially because up until now, non-certified 
producers in Thailand are also able to sell their produce to high-value market outlets. One 
limitation of our study is, however, that we are only able to look at short-term effects. In the 
long run, farmers in exporter-managed groups might be able to realize positive income gains, 
e.g., through increased demand for their produce. 
However, we can also conclude that under certain circumstances GlobalGAP certification can 
be profitable for smallholder farmers. In the producer-managed groups, certified farmers sold 
their produce to supermarkets, which paid substantial price premiums for GlobalGAP 
certified produce translating into significantly higher net incomes for farmers. The large 
income gains, however, were only possible because a major share of the recurrent costs of 
compliance were covered by the development project. After the end of the development 
project, it is questionable whether farmers will take the risk of incurring the high costs of 
certification in the absence of a safe market outlet. In this context, it is critical also for farmer-
managed groups to have long-term contracts with exporters or supermarkets that reward 
GlobalGAP certified produce with price premiums. Furthermore, to make GlobalGAP 




the changing requirements of food safety and quality standards is necessary beyond the 








This chapter presents a panel data analysis of the impacts of donor supported GlobalGAP 
certification on farmers’ net household income and estimates the factors influencing 
continued compliance with the standard after the withdrawal of donor support. We find that 
adopters in exporter-managed certification groups and smaller farmers do not benefit from 
certification, whereas there is a large positive impact on farmers certified in producer-
managed groups. Concerning the determinants of continued compliance, we conclude that 
adopters in producer-managed groups are less likely to become re-certified, while the support 
by exporters is the most important determinant influencing GlobalGAP re-certification. 
 







In recent years, donors have increasingly focused on promoting high-value agriculture as a 
means to foster economic growth and to reduce poverty in rural areas (Gulati et al., 2006, 
Altenburg, 2006). The growing market for high-value agricultural products, such as fruits and 
vegetables, fish, meat and dairy products in both developed and developing countries creates 
new off-farm employment opportunities for low skilled laborers and offers the chance for 
small-scale farmers to increase their incomes (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007, Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009, Gulati et al., 2006). However, there is mounting evidence that smallholders 
and in particular poorer farmers are excluded from supply chains because they cannot meet 
the increasingly stringent private standards for food safety and quality that are becoming 
mandatory to access high-value markets worldwide (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000, Farina and 
Reardon, 2000). Private standards were first imposed by major retailers and supermarket 
chains in industrialized countries in response to tightening public standards and to growing 
consumer concerns about food safety and quality (Henson and Reardon, 2005). More recently, 
compliance with private standards is also becoming a requirement for suppliers of domestic 
markets in developing countries. Supermarkets that already capture a large share of retail 
trade in many middle and low income countries increasingly use private standards as a 
competitive tool to differentiate their products from those offered in traditional markets 
(Henson and Reardon, 2005, Berdegue et al., 2005).  
One of the most important private standards for primary producers is the GlobalGAP59
                                                          
59 Until 2007 the GlobalGAP standard was named EUREPGAP. In 2007 the name was changed to GlobalGAP to 
acknowledge the growing global significance of the standard (FoodPLUS, 2012b). 
 
standard. GlobalGAP is a pre-farm gate standard for good agricultural practices and covers 
different aspects of food safety, environmental protection, traceability, workers’ health and 
safety, and animal welfare (FoodPLUS, 2012a). The standard was developed by a coalition of 
European retailers in 1997 with the aim to harmonize retailers’ existing minimum standards 
and today is the most widely implemented farm certification scheme (Will, 2010, Humphrey, 
2008, FoodPLUS, 2012b). Several studies have shown that GlobalGAP adoption is 
particularly challenging for small-scale farmers and influenced by factors such as farm size, 
wealth, education, access to credits, extension services and trainings (Okello, 2005, Graffham 
et al., 2007b, Asfaw et al., 2009b, Kersting and Wollni, 2012). At the same time, however, 




lead to increased farm level productivity, better health and higher prices (Asfaw et al., 2009a, 
Asfaw et al., 2010, Kariuki et al., 2012).  
Fearing the exclusion of smallholders from high-value supply chains as GlobalGAP became 
increasingly mandatory, several donors (e.g., DfID, GIZ, USAID) initiated development 
programs, which enabled many small-scale farmers and small and medium exporters to adopt 
the GlobalGAP standard. Donor support programs mainly focused on sub-Saharan Africa, but 
also on exporting countries in Latin America and Asia (Humphrey, 2008, Will, 2010). There 
is, however, increasing evidence that donor support may not always be sustainable and 
farmers often disadopt the GlobalGAP standard after donors withdraw their support 
(Graffham et al., 2007a, Bignebat and Vagneron, 2011). Although several studies provide 
such anecdotal evidence on the disadoption of the GlobalGAP standard, to the best of our 
knowledge no empirical analysis of the factors influencing continued compliance with 
GlobalGAP has yet been carried out. 
This study aims to address this research gap by analyzing whether donor-assisted standard 
implementation among small-scale farmers is sustainable, i.e., whether farmers succeed to 
renew their certification after donor support ends. Our analysis is based on a unique panel 
data set of 218 Thai fruit and vegetable farmers that was collected in 2010 and 2011. In our 
sample, 72 farmers adopted the GlobalGAP standard with the support of a development 
program in 2010. However, only 18 of the 72 farmers were able to renew the certification one 
year later after donor support ended. Since the continued compliance with the GlobalGAP 
standard is likely to hinge upon the rewards that adopters derive from certification, we also 
focus on the costs and benefits of GlobalGAP adoption. First, we examine the annually 
recurring costs of compliance, second, we explore farmers’ ex-ante and ex-post perceptions of 
the benefits of GlobalGAP adoption (i.e., before and after initial certification), and third, we 
estimate the impact of certification on farmers’ net household income. In addition to the 
average treatment effects of GlobalGAP certification, we estimate subgroup-specific mean 
treatment effects, as the impact of the standard is likely to vary with farm size and across 
different certification models. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the implications of the 
GlobalGAP standard for small-scale farmers and the sustainability of donor interventions that 
support the certification of smallholders. Section 4.3. presents the sampling and survey design 
used for the study. Section 4.4. analyzes the costs, perceived benefits, and impacts of 




continued compliance with GlobalGAP. Section 4.6. derives policy implications and 
summarizes the main conclusions of this chapter. 
 
4.2. The GlobalGAP standard, small-scale farmers and donor support 
In 2005, several retailers in the European Union (EU) made compliance with the GlobalGAP 
standard a mandatory requirement for their suppliers. For small-scale farmers in developing 
countries this poses a threat of exclusion from lucrative export horticulture supply chains 
(Humphrey, 2008). Obtaining GlobalGAP certification can be very challenging for farmers in 
developing countries. Depending on their initial situation, it may require adjustments in farm 
management and production and oftentimes large investments in farm infrastructure and 
equipment, such as pesticide storage, sanitary facilities, chemical sprayer equipment and 
pesticide disposal pits (Asfaw et al., 2009b, Mausch et al., 2009, Chemnitz et al., 2007). For 
small-scale farmers, the financial burden of adopting GlobalGAP is particularly high, since 
the costs of compliance are to a large extent fixed costs. In addition, smallholders often have 
only limited access to liquidity or credit to finance these high initial investments (Asfaw et al., 
2009b, Narrod et al., 2009, Okello, 2005, Mausch et al., 2009). Furthermore, GlobalGAP 
requires the implementation of practices such as integrated pest management, traceability and 
record keeping. These practices are often not known or not yet applied by small-scale farmers 
and the access to extension services that provide information and trainings on these topics is 
limited in most developing countries (Humphrey, 2008). 
Recognizing these barriers to adoption several donors have implemented development 
programs supporting small-scale farmers to adopt the GlobalGAP standard. Donor 
interventions usually focus on GlobalGAP group certification, which can make certification 
feasible for smallholders. In particular, group certification exploits scale economies by 
centralizing requirements (e.g., establishing joint pesticide storage) and reduces individual 
certification fees, as only the square root of group members is checked during the external 
audit. Furthermore, a group structure reduces the transaction costs of dealing with large 
numbers of dispersed smallholders and thus also makes the provision of advice and trainings 
more viable (Will, 2010). However, obtaining GlobalGAP group certification is by no means 
less challenging than compliance at the individual level. Farmer groups must implement a 
Quality Management System (QMS) that guarantees that all members comply with the 




during the external audit. Implementing and running the QMS is a costly, time consuming and 
administratively challenging task that usually cannot be undertaken by smallholders alone 
(Humphrey, 2008, Will, 2010). In practice, different group certification models that vary with 
respect to the institutional arrangement for the QMS have been implemented and supported by 
donors (Humphrey, 2008, Will, 2010, Graffham et al., 2007b). One model often applied is a 
producer-managed group, where a cooperative or farmers’ association runs the QMS (in some 
cases with the support of a donor) and owns the GlobalGAP certificate. An alternative model 
is an outgrower-scheme of an exporter, where the exporter manages the farmer group and 
owns the certificate (GTZ, 2010). Donor support usually extends to the formation of farmer 
groups, the implementation of GlobalGAP requirements at the farm level, and the 
development and operation of the QMS. Besides financial support that partially covers 
compliance and certification costs, donors often offer technical assistance and training 
programs to both farmers and exporters (Will, 2010, Humphrey, 2008, Graffham et al., 
2007b). 
Even if barriers to initial adoption can be successfully addressed through these support 
programs, the question remains in how far donor-assisted standard adoption is sustainable in 
the long run. Recent evidence suggests that donor subsidies of the initial costs of GlobalGAP 
adoption may well enable disadvantaged farmers and exporters to achieve certification, but 
they may still not be able to maintain the standard without continued support. Graffham, 
Karehu & MacGregor (2007), e.g., describe eleven case studies of exporter outgrower 
schemes in Kenya that achieved GlobalGAP adoption with the support of donors. However, 
of the eleven certification groups only two were running sustainably and these were managed 
by the two largest exporters in Kenya. Similarly, for the case of Madagascar, Bignebat & 
Vagneron (2011) report that of 1198 lychee producers that were certified at the height of 
GlobalGAP related donor interventions in 2007/2008 only 120 remained certified after the 
withdrawal of donors in 2009. Several reasons are discussed that may explain the limited 
sustainability of donor-assisted GlobalGAP certification. A key concern is whether farmers 
indeed derive monetary benefits from certification that make the renewal of the certification 
worthwhile. An important aspect may be the fact that there are high recurrent costs of 
compliance, such as the costs of the external audit and the operation of the QMS, that have to 
be incurred annually. Even though these are usually lower than the initial investment costs, 
they can still amount to a substantial share of farmers’ revenues and thus represent a barrier to 
the renewal of the certification once donor support ends. Another potential reason for the 




support phase the focus lies exclusively on upgrading farm-level processes, an important 
opportunity may be missed to build long-term partnerships that facilitate farmers’ access to 
high-value export markets. Last but not least, if quality management systems are not 
sufficiently developed and QMS staff is not adequately qualified at the time of donor 
withdrawal, groups are likely to lack the capacities to run the QMS in the absence of external 
support (Graffham et al., 2007b, Humphrey, 2008). 
 
4.3. Sampling and survey design 
To analyze the impact of certification on farmers’ incomes and to identify the determinants of 
sustainable implementation of the GlobalGAP standard we carried out a panel data survey of 
Thai fruit and vegetable farmers in 2010 and 2011. The survey collected comprehensive 
quantitative and qualitative information on a wide range of topics, including socio-economic 
and farm characteristics, agricultural production and input use, marketing decisions, 
compliance with standards, group membership and participation in trainings. The first survey 
covers a one-year interval from March 2009 to the end of February 2010 and represents the 
time period before GlobalGAP certification for adopters in our sample. GlobalGAP 
certification took place in the first half of 2010, and thus the second survey covering the 
period from March 2010 to February 2011 corresponds to the situation after GlobalGAP 
adoption. In the remainder of this chapter, we will refer to the first survey interval as 2009 and 
to the second survey interval as 2010. 
In our research area a development program was implemented that supported small-scale 
farmers to obtain GlobalGAP certification. During the preparation phase of the first survey 
round, the project was ongoing and none of the participants had been certified. Hence, we 
divided our study population into four strata (1) program participants who are likely to adopt 
GlobalGAP (N=118), (2) program participants who are not likely to achieve GlobalGAP 
certification (N=237), (3) non-participants in program regions (N=approx. 710), and (4) non-
participants outside program regions (N=approx. 415).  
For the sampling of program participants, we were provided with a complete list of all 
participants, including their location and anticipated adoption status60
                                                          
60 During the preparation phase of the first survey in the beginning of 2010, 118 households were listed as 
prospective adopters by the development project. At this stage, farmers were classified as likely adopters if they 
were in the adoption process and expected to achieve certification in mid 2010, i.e. within the duration of the 
development project. By the end of the project, only 82 of the 118 adopters achieved certification. 




sufficiently large number of adopters for our analysis, we decided to include all prospective 
GlobalGAP adopters in our sample. Of the 118 households listed as prospective adopters, 97 
were available for interviews. In addition, we randomly selected 49 program participants from 
the list of likely non-adopters. 
For the control group complete lists were not available. Therefore, we used the random walk 
method to sample non-participants. For the internal control group, non-participating 
households were sampled in program villages, provided that they produce at least one of the 
products considered for GlobalGAP certification by program participants in the respective 
village61. Since our internal control group is exposed to the activities of the development 
program and thus potentially affected by spillover effects, we additionally sampled non-
participating households outside the program region. For this purpose, we identified ten 
districts that have similar agro-ecological conditions as the program districts and that are also 
major production areas for the products considered for GlobalGAP certification in the 
development program. The selection of these districts was accomplished in close consultation 
with local experts including Thai professors of agriculture and stakeholders of the 
development program. In total, we interviewed 287 farmers in 2010 of which 146 are program 
participants, 85 are non-participants within the program region, and 56 are non-participants 
outside the program region. In the econometric analysis, we use sampling weights62
In the follow-up survey that was carried out in 2011, we were able to reach 76% of the 287 
households that were interviewed in the first survey round. Of the 218 households interviewed 
in the second survey round, 124 are program participants, 56 are non-participants in program 
regions and 34 are non-participants outside program regions. We only include 214 households 
in the analysis, because four of the interviewed households stopped to cultivate fruit and 
vegetables (F&V) during the study period. 
 to 
account for the oversampling of program participants in general and prospective adopters in 
particular. 
There are several reasons for the occurrence of sampling attrition in the second survey round. 
First, for some of the households the contact information given was incorrect or they have 
moved away, and second, some households were not available for interviews. The results of 
                                                          
61 The following products were selected for certification: lychee, durian, mangosteen, papaya, dragon fruit, 
cantaloupe, mango, asparagus, green okra, spring onion, yard long bean, different kinds of herbs and green leafy 
vegetables. 
62 Sampling weights are calculated as the inverse of the sampling fraction, i.e., the total number of households in 




attrition probit tests (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) and pooled tests (Becketti et al., 1988) revealed 
that attrition in our study is nonrandom and significantly influenced by the age of the 
household head, the location of the household and by participation in the development project. 
Therefore, we use inverse probability weights63
 
 that correct for sampling attrition that is based 
on observable characteristics. Inverse probability weights give more weight to individuals 
who are likely to attrit than to households that are likely to remain in the sample (Baulch and 
Quisumbing, 2011). 
4.4. The costs and benefits of GlobalGAP 
An important aspect of the long-term sustainability of GlobalGAP certification among small-
scale farmers in developing countries concerns the economic rewards that farmers derive from 
certification. Farmers will only decide to maintain their certification, if the benefits from 
standard compliance exceed the costs of compliance (Henson et al., 2011). In the following 
section, we first discuss the relevance of recurrent costs for the sustainability of standard 
implementation. Secondly, we examine how farmers’ perceived benefits of certification have 
changed over the study period, i.e., from before to after the initial certification. Finally, we 
present a fixed effects model estimating the impact of GlobalGAP certification on farmers’ 
net household income.  
 
4.4.1. Recurrent costs of compliance 
While the initial investment costs have been identified as one of the main barriers to 
GlobalGAP adoption, the recurrent costs of compliance are discussed to be the most 
important factor determining the long-term viability of standard implementation (Asfaw et al., 
2009b, Graffham et al., 2007b, Chemnitz et al., 2007). Recurrent costs include among others 
the costs for the external audit, the management of the QMS, laboratory analyses, trainings, as 
well as replacement and maintenance costs and have to be incurred on a regular basis. Donor 
interventions usually support farmers’ and exporters’ initial investments necessary to comply 
                                                          
63 Weights are calculated as follows. First, the predicted probabilities of the unrestricted retention probit model 
are estimated using explanatory variables that are observable for both attritor and non-attritor households and 
that might be correlated with the likelihood of attrition. Then the model is re-estimated as a restricted model 
including only those explanatory variables that are not significantly associated with attrition. The inverse 
probability weights are then calculated as the ratio of the restricted to the unrestricted probabilities (Baulch and 




with the GlobalGAP regulations and cover the costs for the operation of the QMS and the 
external audit during the first year (Graffham et al., 2007b, Will, 2010). After the withdrawal 
of donors, however, the recurrent costs of compliance have to be fully borne by producers. 
This is particularly relevant for farmers certified in producer-managed groups, who have to 
bear the total amount of recurrent costs, whereas in exporter-managed certification groups the 
company usually covers a substantial share of the costs (Graffham et al., 2007b, Kersting and 
Wollni, 2012).  
Table 13 presents the average recurrent costs of compliance per farmer for our sample of 72 
GlobalGAP certified producers. Estimates are based on information provided by exporters 
and farmer groups, given that producers did not pay these costs during the first year. We treat 
the recurrent costs of compliance as fixed costs, because except for the maintenance and 
replacement costs, which may vary slightly between smaller and larger producers, the 
remaining costs are fixed. On the average, the recurrent costs per farmer add up to 778 USD. 
For those farmers in our sample organized in exporter-managed groups, a considerable share 
of these costs is absorbed by exporters leaving only 109 USD or 14% of the total recurrent 
costs at the expense of the farmer. These estimates are similar to results presented by 
Graffham, Karehu et al. (2007), who show for the case of Kenya that in exporter-managed 
certification groups the companies paid £ 760 per farmer (86% of the total recurrent costs), 
whereas farmers paid £ 104 (14% of the total recurrent costs) on the average. 
Table 13: Recurrent costs of compliance 
 
Recurrent costs 




Paid by exporter 
(if exporter-
managed) 
Certification and external audit 263 34 %  
Operation  of the QMS, internal inspections & audits 154 20 %  
Annual refresher trainings (farmers and QMS) 129 17 %  
Laboratory analyses (pesticide residue, water and soil 
analyses) 116 15 %  
Health checks for staff working with pesticides 51 7 %  
Maintenance of structures 32 4 %  
Replacement of protective clothing 15 2 %  
Refill first aid kits, disinfectant and soap 11 1 %  
Record keeping forms, replacement of posters & 
signs, plot markers 7 1 %  
Total annual recurrent costs 778 100  
Source: Own data 
If the recurrent costs of compliance account for a large share of farmers’ net income from 
fruit and vegetables, certification is not likely to be economically viable in the long run. Given 




small-scale farmers. We therefore estimate the recurrent costs as a percentage of total net 
F&V income64
Table 14
 by land size quartile of GlobalGAP adopters. Quartiles are based on the 
certified area planted between March 2010 and February 2011, i.e., during the time period 
covered by the second survey round. If plots are cultivated multiple times, the certified area is 
multiplied by the number of harvests.  presents the minimum, maximum and average 
size of the certified area and the average net F&V income for the total sample and for each of 
the quartiles. The certified area ranges from an average of 0.44 ha in the first quartile to 6.39 
ha in the fourth quartile. Moreover, we can see that the net F&V income of the first three 
quartiles is 2784 USD, 3556 USD, and 5606 USD, respectively, which seems substantially 
below the average net F&V income of 28,675 USD in the largest quartile. Using Bonferroni 
tests to compare the differences in means between quartiles, we find that the first three 
quartiles are relatively homogeneous with respect to the size of the certified area and the total 
net income from F&V. The fourth quartile, however, is statistically different from the first 
three quartiles in regard to both indicators. 




















































Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
a Difference statistically significant between first quartile and fourth quartile. 
b Difference statistically significant between second quartile and fourth quartile. 
c Difference statistically significant between third quartile and fourth quartile. 
d Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
Source: Own data 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the recurrent costs as a percentage of net F&V income for the whole 
sample of adopters and for each quartile. Average values are compared between farmers 
organized in producer-managed and exporter-managed certification groups. On the average, 
the recurrent costs account for 8% of net F&V income in the case of farmer-managed 
certification groups and for 1% in the case of exporter-managed groups. However, these 
average figures conceal considerable variation among quartiles of adopters. In the case of 
                                                          




exporter-managed groups, the recurrent costs account for a relatively small share of net F&V 
income in all four quartiles, ranging from 0.4% in the largest quartile to 7% in the smallest 
quartile. Similarly, in producer-managed groups for farmers in the largest quartile, the share 
of 3% is still modest. However, in the smaller quartiles recurrent costs account for 28%, 22%, 
and 14% in the first, second, and third quartile, respectively. Among these small-scale farmers 
organized in producer-managed groups the recurrent costs are likely to represent a non-
negligible burden and thus potentially a barrier to re-certification in the absence of donor 
support. 
Figure 3: Recurrent costs as percentage of net F&V income 
 
Source: Own data 
 
4.4.2. Perceived benefits of GlobalGAP adoption 
To assess what farmers’ perceptions are regarding the benefits of complying with GlobalGAP 
and in how far their initial expectations are met, we collected qualitative information on 
perceived benefits as part of the household survey. During the first survey, i.e., before 
certification, we asked farmers to name the benefits they expect to obtain from GlobalGAP 
certification, while in the second round, i.e., after certification, they were asked to name the 
benefits that they actually experienced as a result of certification. The answers given by the 
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Over the study period, the percentage of farmers perceiving a certain benefit as a result of 
GlobalGAP certification was reduced in all response categories. This indicates that farmers 
had high expectations before certification, which in several cases were not met. In particular, 
farmers’ initial expectations that the adoption of the GlobalGAP standard would lead to a 
decrease in the costs of chemicals and to an increase in the quality of the produce did often 
not materialize. In fact, although GlobalGAP adoption may contribute to a reduction in the 
quantity of chemicals applied, those chemicals that farmers are still allowed to use in 
accordance with GlobalGAP regulations are usually more expensive than regularly available 
chemicals (Asfaw et al., 2009a). Moreover, some of the quality improvements that could 
potentially result from standard-compliant practices, like optimized irrigation and fertilizer 
regimes, may not be directly visible to farmers. 
Still, in the second survey round farmers mentioned several benefits that they perceive to be a 
result of certification. Most of those benefits are related to the marketing of their produce: 
77% of respondents agree with the statement that GlobalGAP makes finding buyers easier, 
58% think that certification increases their access to high-value markets, 56% were able to 
secure a price premium, and 48% benefit from a purchase guarantee. Furthermore, 63% of the 
respondents indicated that they benefit from the use of enhanced management practices 
implemented as requirement of the GlobalGAP standard. Another 61% perceive the improved 
health of family members and farm workers as an important benefit that results from 
following the GlobalGAP regulations on safe handling of pesticides. 
Table 15: Farmers' perceived benefits of GlobalGAP compliance 










Make finding buyers easier 45 78  44 77 
Enhance management practices 46 81  36 63 
Enhance family’s and farm workers’ health 49 86  35 61 
Increase access to high-value markets 41 72  33 58 
Buyer offered a price premium 29 51  32 56 
Buyer offered a purchase guarantee 40 70  26 46 
Decrease costs for chemicals 50 88  23 40 
Increase the quality of the produce 50 88  21 37 
Enhance bargaining power 29 51  21 37 
Note: Farmers were asked to indicate their perceived benefits of GlobalGAP certification. 
Multiple options were possible. 




4.4.3. The impact of GlobalGAP certification on household income 
In the following subchapter, we empirically analyze the impact of GlobalGAP certification on 
farmers’ net household income65
In addition, we analyze the impact of GlobalGAP certification under two different scenarios. 
In the first scenario, we disregard the recurrent costs of compliance since during our survey 
period these did not have to be covered by farmers. During the first year of certification the 
recurrent costs were paid partly by the development program and partly by exporters. In the 
following years, however, farmers will have to bear the recurrent costs themselves, if they 
want to renew their certification. Consequently, the recurrent costs that are relevant for the 
decision to become re-certified are taken into account in the second scenario. In this scenario, 
we deduct the estimated recurrent costs of compliance (see chapter 4.4.1.) from the net 
household income of certified farmers. 
. Previous studies on the impacts of GlobalGAP adoption 
have estimated average treatment effects (Asfaw et al., 2010, Asfaw et al., 2009a, Kariuki et 
al., 2012, Subervie and Vagneron, 2012) - this approach, however, disregards important 
distributional effects of the treatment (Heckman et al., 1997). The impact of GlobalGAP 
certification is likely to be heterogeneous across households and subgroups of adopters. 
Therefore, in addition to estimating the average treatment effect of GlobalGAP adoption, we 
look at mean treatment effects within subgroups of certified farmers. In particular, we are 
interested in estimating subgroup specific treatment effects for farmers certified in different 
types of certification groups (i.e., producer-managed versus exporter-managed groups) and for 
large-scale versus small-scale farmers. 
Table 16 shows simple descriptive statistics of farmers’ net household income in 2009 and 
2010. We find that the overall net income of households in our sample increased by 951 USD 
over the study period. However, non-certified farmers experienced an income decrease of 
1540 USD on the average, whereas certified farmers experienced substantial income increases 
of 5865 USD on the average. Within the sample of adopters, we find that farmers certified in 
producer-managed groups realized slightly higher average income gains than adopters in 
exporter-managed groups. Furthermore, we find considerable differences in the magnitude of 
the income increase between larger and smaller farmers. While the largest 25% of certified 
                                                          
65 Net household income is calculated as net farm income (total farm revenue minus variable costs) plus wages 
and salaries from off-farm employment and net returns from self-employment. Unfortunately, we do not have 
information on the amount of remittances received by households and therefore cannot account for their value in 




farmers were able to increase their income by 17,855 USD, the smallest 75% of certified 
producers increased their income by only 1869 USD on the average. 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics - Net household income (in USD) 
 2009 2010 Δ 2010-2009 
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Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
Source: Own data 
While these simple descriptive statistics may indicate some tendencies in the distribution of 
impacts, they do not control for potential confounding factors, including attrition bias and 
selection bias. In the next section, we address these issues using an econometric model to 
estimate income effects of certification. 
 
4.4.3.1. Econometric approach to analyze income effects 
We specify three panel data models to estimate (1) the average treatment effect of GlobalGAP 
certification, (2) the impact of certification on farmers organized in exporter-managed and 
producer-managed groups and (3) the effect of GlobalGAP on smaller and larger farmers 
certified in different types of certification groups. 
The model to analyze the average treatment effect of GlobalGAP certification on farmers’ net 
household income is specified as follows: 




where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 indicates net household income that varies across individual households i and over 
time t, G𝑖𝑡 is a dummy that is equal to one if farmer i is certified in year t66
GlobalGAP certification can affect household income through various channels. Overall, we 
expect the effect to be positive. Certification can be perceived as a signal informing potential 
buyers in high-value markets that the farmer is a high-quality, safety-compliant producer. 
This may then improve access to high-value markets and lead to price premiums for higher 
quality and compliance with food safety regulations (Fafchamps et al., 2008, Kariuki et al., 
2012). Given better access to high-value markets, farmers may specialize or intensify their 
F&V production resulting in larger quantities sold in the market. On the other hand, there may 
also be negative income effects, if farmers as a result of certification re-allocate their labor or 
other productive resources away from more profitable uses. In particular, GlobalGAP 
adoption may lead to increased labor demand to perform labor-intensive practices such as 
integrated pest management and record keeping and higher expenses for crop protection 
products. Furthermore, high recurrent costs of compliance can offset income increases, if they 
have to be borne by farmers. 
, 𝑿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
explanatory variables, 𝑐𝑖 is the time constant unobserved effect and  𝑢𝑖𝑡 the idiosyncratic 
error. 
In addition to average treatment effects, we are interested in estimating mean treatment effects 
for subgroups of adopters. GlobalGAP certification can be implemented within different 
business models and we hypothesize that impacts differ depending on whether farmers are 
organized in exporter-managed or producer-managed certification groups. To test this 
hypothesis, the following model is specified: 
(2) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐸 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑃 + 𝜹𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝐸  is a dummy that equals one if farmer i is certified in an exporter-managed group in 
year t. The variable 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑃 is defined analogously for farmers certified in producer-managed 
groups. 
                                                          
66 Although six farmers were certified in both time periods, we define all farmers as non-adopters during the first 
survey period. Otherwise, due to the time-demeaning in the fixed effects model, farmers who are certified in 
both 2009 and 2010 are considered non-adopters. We decided to classify these six farmers as adopters, because 





Furthermore, the effects of GlobalGAP certification may be heterogeneous across smaller and 
larger farmers certified in the different types of certification groups. We test these effects with 
the following model specification: 
(3) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽3𝐺 𝑖𝑡
 𝐸 𝑥 𝑆(75%) + 𝛽4𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐸 𝑥 𝐿(25%)+ 𝛽5𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑃 𝑥 𝑆(75%) + 𝛽6𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑃 𝑥 𝐿(25%) 𝜹𝑿𝑖𝑡 +  𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝐺 𝑖𝑡
 𝐸 𝑥 𝑆(75%) is a dummy that equals one if farmer i belongs to the smallest 75% of 
certified farmers and is certified in an exporter managed group in year t. Similarly, 𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝐸 𝑥 𝐿(25%) 
is a dummy that takes on the value one if farmer i belongs to the largest 25% of certified 
farmers and is certified in an exporter-managed group in year t. The variables 𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑃 𝑥 𝑆(75%) and 
𝐺𝑖𝑡
𝑃 𝑥 𝐿(25%) are defined accordingly for farmers certified in producer-managed groups67
We expect that farmers with a larger certified area are able to realize higher net income gains 
than smaller farmers. Larger farmers can exploit scale economies when implementing 
standard requirements and upgrading their production processes. They sell larger volumes of 
certified produce and will therefore benefit from positive price effects to a greater extent. Due 
to their size, they are also likely to have more bargaining power, which may allow them to 
negotiate higher prices and better conditions. Furthermore, the expected income effects of 
certification in the different types of certification groups are not unambiguous a priori. On the 
one hand, farmers certified in exporter-managed groups are expected to experience higher 
income increases, because exporters cover a substantial share of their adjustment and 
compliance costs. On the other hand, for precisely that reason, exporters may not pass on 
higher prices to their suppliers, resulting in smaller expected net income effects for farmers in 
exporter-managed groups. 
. We 
choose a cut-off value of 75% based on our results that the largest quartile of adopters is 
significantly different from the first three quartiles in terms of the average size of the certified 
area and the average net F&V income (see chapter 4.4.1.). To further explore how sensitive 
our results are to changes in the chosen cut-off value, we additionally estimate the model 
using alternative cut-off values of 65% and 85%. 
These effects are expected to be particularly pronounced in our second scenario, where we 
take recurrent costs into account. Since in our sample the recurrent costs of compliance were 
                                                          
67 Farmers with a certified area below or equal to 1.6 ha belong to the smallest 75% of adopters, whereas farmers 
with a certified area above 1.6 ha belong to the group of the largest 25% of adopters. The certified area refers to 
the certified area planted between March 2010 and February 2011. For certified plots that are cultivated multiple 




paid by the development program and by exporters during the first year of standard adoption, 
we do not have information on the level of recurrent costs for each farmer. Based on the 
estimates presented earlier, we assume annual fixed recurrent costs of 778 USD for members 
of farmer-managed certification groups and 109 USD for members of exporter-managed 
certification groups. 
To control for potential self-selection of farmers into GlobalGAP certification and into 
different types of certification groups, we use a fixed effects estimator that accounts for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across households. Results obtained with a random effects 
estimator would be biased, if unobservable characteristics that influence the net household 
income of farmers are correlated with explanatory variables in our model. In particular, the 
variable GlobalGAP adoption is likely to be endogenous. GlobalGAP is a complex and labor-
intensive standard that requires large changes in farm management. Therefore, we expect 
GlobalGAP certification to be influenced by farmer characteristics, such as motivation and 
ability that also influence net earnings. Similarly, farmers who are risk averse are more likely 
not to adopt at all or to be certified in exporter-managed groups because the costs of 
compliance farmers have to incur are lower in these groups than in producer-managed 
certification groups. Furthermore, risk aversion has also been identified to have a negative 
influence on income growth (Shaw, 1996, Elbers et al., 2007). These innate personal 
characteristics are assumed to be constant over time and are captured by the unobserved effect 
𝑐𝑖, which in the fixed effects model is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables. 
The parameter 𝑐𝑖 includes the effects of all variables, unobservable and observable, that are 
time-invariant and differ across individuals. Therefore, we cannot include (roughly) time-
constant variables such as education and farm size in the fixed effects model (Wooldridge, 
2010). 
Time-variant variables that are used as explanatory variables in the three models include the 
cultivated area with F&V, the cultivated area with other crops, the number of household 
members working off-farm, the total number of household members, and a dummy variable 
that equals one if the household is located in a region affected by drought. The northern part 
of Thailand experienced a severe drought in the beginning of 2010, which led to substantial 
harvest losses. We do not account for time fixed effects, because the year dummy and the 
dummy for the drought are closely correlated. As additional controls, we include several 
variables capturing the share of the area cultivated with different products, separately for the 




4.4.3.2. Results of the income analysis 
Table 17 presents the results of the fixed effects models estimating farmers’ net household 
income68
The first model analyzes the average effect of GlobalGAP certification on farmers’ net 
household income. As expected, we find a large and significantly positive effect of 
certification, irrespective of whether the recurrent costs of compliance are accounted for or 
not, indicating that GlobalGAP certification can be highly profitable for Thai fruit and 
vegetable farmers. On the average, certification has led to an income increase of 10,039 USD, 
which corresponds to a 90% rise in net household income for certified farmers. In the second 
scenario, when we deduct the recurrent costs of compliance from farmers’ incomes, the effect 
is slightly reduced to 9478 USD. 
. The first three columns show the estimation results when the recurrent costs of 
compliance are not accounted for. The latter three columns show the results of the same 
model specifications, but for the second scenario, i.e., deducting the recurrent costs from net 
household income. 
The coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are as expected. Column (1) in Table 
17 shows that farmers affected by the drought experienced a large decrease in net household 
income of 4873 USD on the average. Farmers who expanded their area cultivated with fruit 
and vegetables registered an average income increase of 1853 USD per additional hectare. 
The growing importance of off-farm employment activities that account for an increasing 
share of rural incomes in Thailand (Rigg and Nattapoolwat, 2001, Rigg, 2005) is also 
reflected in our data. We find that one additional household member participating in off-farm 
employment increases household income by 8971 USD on the average. This estimate is 
comparable to the net income from crop production per full time family worker, which on the 
average was equal to 8006 USD in 2010. 
The results of the second model specification (see column (2) in Table 17) show that the 
impact of GlobalGAP certification indeed depends on the type of group farmers are certified 
in. Members of producer-managed certification groups are able to reap significant benefits. 
On the average, GlobalGAP increased their net income by 14,678 USD during the first year of 
                                                          
68 To test whether the unobserved effect is correlated with the explanatory variables in our models, we employed 
the Hausman test. In all models, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation, and random effects and 
fixed effects estimates are very similar. However, the existence of unobservable characteristics that are 
correlated with GlobalGAP certification and/or certification in exporter-managed and producer-managed groups 
and that also affect net household income is very likely. We therefore decide to use the fixed effects approach, 




certification. The impact remains highly significant even when the recurrent costs are taken 
into consideration (see column (4)). In contrast, for farmers certified in exporter-managed 
groups the impact of certification on net household income is not significant. 
These differences can be traced back to the marketing conditions of farmers organized in 
producer-managed and exporter-managed groups, respectively. Before certification, the 
majority of farmers certified in producer-managed groups sold to middlemen at the farm gate. 
As a result of certification, they were able to upgrade their marketing relationships selling to a 
domestic supermarket in Thailand, which offered high price premiums for GlobalGAP 
certified produce. In contrast, in the exporter-managed groups marketing relations remained 
stable and most farmers continued to sell to the exporters, which had supported them in the 
certification process. Contrary to expectations, they were not able to increase the share of 
F&V delivered to high-value markets, and thus continue to sell around 25% of their produce 
(mostly off-grade produce) to lower-value domestic markets after certification. In addition, 
they were also not able to secure price premiums for safety-compliance. In qualitative 
interviews exporters stated that they do not receive price premiums from importers for 
GlobalGAP certified produce and that due to their high investments into farm-level upgrading 
they could not afford rewarding their suppliers with higher prices for certified produce.  Thus, 
for farmers certified in exporter-managed groups, certification rather seems to represent a tool 
to retain market access, than a strategy to enter new markets and to capture higher incomes.  
Finally, columns (3) and (6) in Table 17 present results on heterogeneous impacts among 
smaller and larger farmers organized in different types of certification groups. While in 
exporter-managed groups the impact of certification remains insignificant for both larger and 
smaller farmers, we find that in producer-managed groups the impact of GlobalGAP indeed 
varies with land size. The impact on farmers’ net household income is positive and significant 
for all farmers as long as the recurrent costs of compliance are not taken into account. Yet, the 
magnitude of the effect is with 37,732 USD more than eight times larger for the largest 25% 
of certified farmers than for the smallest 75% of certified farmers, who on average gain 4465 
USD from certification. Accordingly, when the recurrent costs of compliance are taken into 
account, the coefficient measuring the impact of GlobalGAP becomes insignificant for the 
smallest 75% of certified farmers in producer-managed groups (see column (6) in Table 17). 
This provides some indication that certification may not be profitable for small-scale farmers 




To further investigate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the cut-off value of 75%, 
we estimate additional models using alternative thresholds of 65% and 85% (results are 
reported in the appendix). Results show that when choosing a cut-off value of 65%, the 
impact of GlobalGAP certification is insignificant for the smallest 65% of famers organized in 
producer-managed groups, even if recurrent costs of compliance are not taken into account. In 
contrast, if the higher cut-off value of 85% is chosen, the impact of GlobalGAP certification is 
positive and significant for smaller and larger farmers in producer-managed certification 
groups under both scenarios, i.e., regardless of whether the recurrent costs are taken into 
account. Thus, our results indicate that certification in producer-managed groups leads to 
significant income effects but only beyond a certain size threshold. In our sample, more than 
half of the GlobalGAP adopters cultivate a certified area of less than one hectare, which 
according to our analysis is too small to generate significant returns from GlobalGAP 





Table 17: Impact of certification on net household income (USD) 
 
Scenario 1: 
Net household income 
 
 Scenario 2: 
Net household income  
– recurrent costs 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
GlobalGAP (0/1)a 10,039*** (3800) - -  
9478*** 
(3791) - - 
GlobalGAP  
(exporter group) (0/1)a - 
373 




(producer group) (0/1)a - 
14,678*** 
(5247) -  - 
13,900*** 
(5247) - 
GlobalGAP (smallest 75% in 
exporter group (0/1)ab - - 
-3963 
(5460)  - - 
-4072 
(5460) 
GlobalGAP (largest 25% in 
exporter group (0/1)ac - - 
16,451 
(12,176)  - - 
16,342 
(12,176) 
GlobalGAP (smallest 75% in 
farmer group (0/1)ab - - 
4465* 
(2732)  - - 
3687 
(2732) 
GlobalGAP (largest 25% in 
farmer group (0/1)ac - - 
37,732*** 
(13,135)  - - 
36,954*** 
(13,135) 








































































Number of observations 428 428 428  428 428 428 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16  0.16 0.16 0.16 
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. Coefficient estimates are shown 
with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables capturing the share of area cultivated with different 
products are included but not shown due to space restrictions. The full model results are shown in Appendix III.  
a The reference group is non-certified farmers.  
b Certified area ranges from 0.16 to 1.6 ha.  
c Certified area ranges from 1.92 to 33.92 ha. 
Source: Own data 
 
4.5. Determinants of continued compliance with GlobalGAP 
During the adoption process farmers had access to support from a development program that 
covered the major part of non-recurrent and recurrent costs of compliance and also provided 
training and technical assistance. The program ended soon after farmers obtained certification 
for the first time in mid 2010. Hence, farmers had no donor support when they had to decide 
on the renewal of their certification one year after initial adoption. 
Of the 214 farmers in our sample, 72 successfully adopted the GlobalGAP standard in 2010. 




abandoned the standard. Since the decision to become re-certified is conditional on having 
adopted the GlobalGAP standard in the previous year, we jointly analyze the determinants of 
initial adoption and continued compliance with the GlobalGAP standard. Both decisions 
depend on farmers’ expected costs and benefits of certification as well as on their capabilities 
to achieve certification (Henson et al., 2011).  
 
4.5.1. Econometric approach to analyze GlobalGAP adoption and continued 
compliance 
We use a bivariate probit model with sample selection for our analysis of the determinants of 
adoption and continued compliance with the GlobalGAP standard. This model provides a 
framework for analyzing two subsequent binary decisions with correlated error terms, when 
the outcome of the second decision is contingent on the outcome of the first decision (Neill 
and Lee, 2001). In our analysis the decision to become re-certified in 2011 is conditional on 
having adopted the GlobalGAP standard in 2010. Therefore, in a first model, we estimate the 
farmers’ probability to adopt the GlobalGAP standard in 2010, and in a second model that 
only includes the subsample of initial adopters, we estimate the probability to obtain a 
renewal of the certification in 2011. Both decisions are likely to be influenced by the same 
unobservable variables, and hence, we expect the error terms of the two equations to be 
correlated. 
For the analysis of initial GlobalGAP adoption data from our baseline survey in 2010 is used, 
which corresponds to the time period before GlobalGAP certification for the adopters in our 
sample. For the analysis of continued compliance, we use data from the follow-up survey, 
which was collected in 2011 shortly before adopters decided whether or not to apply for re-
certification. Exporters and farmer groups provided us with information on which farmers 
obtained a renewal of their certificate after our survey ended. None of the interviewed 
households that were classified as “non-adopters” in the baseline survey received a 




The bivariate probit model, adapted from Greene (2008), can be specified as follows. 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡1∗ =  𝜷1 ′ 𝒙𝑖𝑡1 +∈𝑖𝑡1  𝑦𝑖𝑡1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡1∗ > 0, 𝑦𝑖𝑡1 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡1∗ < 0 
(2) 𝑦𝑖𝑡2∗ =  𝜷2 ′ 𝒙𝑖𝑡2 +∈𝑖𝑡2,𝑦𝑖𝑡2 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡2∗ > 0,𝑦𝑖𝑡2 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡2∗ < 0 
∈𝑖𝑡1,∈𝑖𝑡2 ~ BVN (0, 0, 1, 1, 𝜌), Var [∈𝑖𝑡1] = Var [∈𝑖𝑡2] = 1, 
Cov [∈𝑖𝑡1,∈𝑖𝑡2] = 𝜌 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡2, 𝒙𝑖𝑡2 is observed only when 𝑦𝑖𝑡1 = 1), 
where the 𝛽′𝑠 are parameter vectors to be estimated, 𝒙𝑖𝑡1 and 𝒙𝑖𝑡2 are vectors of observed 
variables explaining the adoption decision in t1 (year 2010) and continued compliance 
decision in t2 (year 2011), and ∈𝑖𝑡1 and ∈𝑖𝑡2 are disturbance terms. The 𝑦𝑖𝑡∗ ′𝑠 are  latent 
variables which represent the utility a farmer receives from (1) adopting GlobalGAP in 2010 
and (2) continuing to comply with GlobalGAP in 2011. We assume that if 𝑦𝑖𝑡∗ > 0, the 
observed choice will be GlobalGAP adoption or continued compliance (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1), and if 
𝑦𝑖𝑡∗ < 0, a farmer will chose not to adopt or to abandon (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0). It is important to note that 
𝑦𝑖𝑡2 is only observed if 𝑦𝑖𝑡1 = 1. The error terms are assumed to follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with zero mean, unit variance and correlation 𝜌. Conveniently, the likelihood ratio 
test on the significance of 𝜌 also provides a test for the existence of selection bias. If we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that 𝜌 = 0, the correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations is not statistically significant, thus allowing us to estimate two separate univariate 
probit models (Greene, 2008). 
Table 18 describes the explanatory variables included in the bivariate probit model. Most of 
the factors are expected to influence both the adoption decision in 2010 and the re-
certification decision in 2011. They can be roughly divided into three broad categories: 
factors related to the support households receive, factors that influence farmers’ ability to 
finance the costs of compliance, and household characteristics that determine the capability of 




Table 18: Variable definition 
Variables Definition Decisions 
Exporter support Dummy = 1 if the farmer received support from an exporter 
(technical assistance, financial support, QMS management) 
Adoption, 
Re-certification 
Donor support Dummy = 1 if the farmer received support from a donor to 
manage the QMS 
Adoption 
Number extension topics Number of topics on which the farmer received technical advice 
and extensiona  
Adoption, 
Re-certification 
Age of the household head Age of the household head (years) Adoption, 
Re-certification 
Number of household 
members 
Number of household members Adoption, 
Re-certification 




Change in net household 
income (1000 USD) 
Change in net household income from 2009 to 2010 (in 1000 
USD) 
Re-certification 
Farm size (ha) Farm size (in ha) Adoption, 
Re-certification 
Share of total land 
certified 
Share of total land that is GlobalGAP certified Re-certification 
Share of cultivated area 
under F&V 
Share of cultivated area under fruit and vegetables Adoption 
Share F&V area with 
sprinkler or drip irrigation 
Share of area under fruit and vegetables that is irrigated with 
sprinkler or drip irrigation systems 
Adoption 
Q-GAP certified Dummy = 1 if farm is Q-GAP certified Adoption 
a This includes advice and extension offered by donors. 
Source: own illustration 
The support that households receive varies greatly between the different certification models 
implemented by the development program. If farmers are certified in producer-managed 
groups they have at best assistance from the donor in running the QMS. However, this support 
ceases with the withdrawal of the development project. If farmers can count on the support of 
an exporter, this support is more likely to be available in the long run and thus relevant for the 
re-certification decision as well. Thus, in the adoption model, we include a dummy that equals 
one if the farmer received support from the donor in running the QMS, and another dummy 
that equals one if the farmer is supported by an exporter. The latter variable is also included in 
the re-certification model. External support by either the donor or the exporter is expected to 
be critical to help farmers overcome the barriers to initial adoption. Regarding the re-
certification decision, we expect that farmers who are linked to an exporter are more likely to 
renew their certificate than farmers in producer-managed groups who lack external support 
after the withdrawal of donors. On the other hand, our previous analysis showed that 
certification of farmers in exporter-managed groups did not result in significant income 
increases, which may lower their incentives to get re-certified. Finally, we include a variable 




access to support and information that may also be relevant for the adoption and re-
certification decisions. 
Regarding the factors that influence farmers’ ability to finance the costs of compliance, we 
include different variables related to land size. Since the costs of compliance are to a large 
extent fixed costs, we expect larger farmers who can exploit scale economies to be more 
likely to adopt and continue to comply with GlobalGAP. In addition, farm size is often 
considered a proxy for household wealth and access to credit, which would also improve 
farmers’ ability to finance investments. 
Finally, household characteristics that determine the capability of households to comply with 
GlobalGAP requirements, such as age, education, and access to family labor, are included in 
both the adoption and the re-certification model. In particular, the availability of family labor 
is expected to have a positive influence not only on initial adoption but also on continued 
compliance, because standard-related tasks, such as record keeping and integrated pest 
management, require constantly high levels of labor input. Similarly, the educational level of 
farmers is critical for the adoption of knowledge-intensive practices that need to be 
implemented to achieve certification. And in fact, education is likely to be even more relevant 
for the re-certification decision after donor support is withdrawn and farmers have to manage 
tasks like the QMS in the absence of external support. 
Furthermore, there are some factors like the availability of an efficient irrigation system and 
previous experience with food safety-related certification schemes that are likely to influence 
only the initial adoption decision. Therefore, in the adoption model, we include a variable on 
the share of the area with F&V that is irrigated with sprinkler and drip irrigation69
                                                          
69 The GlobalGAP Smallholder Guide for the Soil and Water Module (FoodPLUS, 2010b) identifies sprinkler 
and drip irrigation as the most efficient irrigation systems. 
. Given that 
the implementation of the most efficient irrigation system is a requirement of GlobalGAP, 
farmers already using these advanced technologies are likely to have a competitive advantage 
in achieving initial certification. However, after initial certification, all farmers should have 
installed such irrigation systems on their plots, and therefore, we do not include this variable 
in the re-certification model. Similarly, we include a dummy variable that equals one if the 
farmer has been previously awarded the Thai public standard for good agricultural practices 
(Q-GAP) in the adoption model. The experience gained during the implementation of the Q-




certification. However, given that Q-GAP is a basic minimum standard that can be easily 
obtained and that does not specify stringent requirements (Sardsud, 2007), these positive 
effects are not likely to last beyond initial certification with GlobalGAP. 
As regards continued compliance, this decision is likely to fundamentally depend on farmers’ 
experience with certification during the first year. Farmers who experienced no or only a very 
small increase in their income as a result of certification are likely to have less incentive and 
motivation to renew their certification in the next year. To capture this we include a variable 
on the change in household income between 2009 and 2010 in the re-certification model. 
 
4.5.2. Probit model results 
Table 19 presents the results of the bivariate probit model analyzing the determinants of 
GlobalGAP adoption in 2010 and of continued compliance with GlobalGAP in 2011. The 
results reveal that the error terms of the two equations on GlobalGAP adoption and re-
certification are not significantly correlated, i.e., we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
𝜌 = 0. Therefore, the marginal effects for the re-certification decision presented in Table 19 
are calculated based on univariate probit estimates. 
With respect to the initial adoption decision our findings largely confirm our expectations and 
the results of previous studies on the adoption of the GlobalGAP standard. We find that 
external support is crucial for farmers to overcome the barriers to initial GlobalGAP adoption. 
Farmers who are supported by an exporter or a donor in the management of the QMS and 
farmers with better access to extension services are more likely to become certified. 
Moreover, the educational attainment of the household, the availability of sprinkler and drip 
irrigation systems, and experience with the Q-GAP certificate have a positive influence on 
standard adoption, indicating that more progressive farmers and farmers who are better 
prepared for the implementation of GlobalGAP have an advantage in the adoption process. 
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a significant impact of farm size on the 
probability to adopt, and the share of cultivated area under fruit and vegetables is negatively 
associated with certification. This indicates that smaller farmers are not systematically 
excluded from certification in 2010 and partly reflects the aim of the development program to 





In fact, we find that with respect to the re-certification decision, external support is still the 
most critical factor. Support from an exporter increases the probability to become re-certified 
by 85 percentage points. This finding confirms that farmers depend on external support not 
only to overcome the initial barriers to standard adoption, but also to continuously comply 
with the GlobalGAP standard. We further find that for the re-certification decision scale 
economies play an important role. Although smaller farmers were not systematically excluded 
from the initial certification decision, we find that larger farmers are more likely to renew 
their certificate after donor support ends. Our results show that a one hectare increase in farm 
size and a 10% increase in the share of land that is initially certified raise the probability to 
become re-certified by three and five percentage points, respectively.   
In contrast to our expectations, the change in net household income from 2009 to 2010 is not 
significant. This indicates that the net monetary benefits derived from certification are not the 
most decisive factor for the renewal of the certification. In fact, even if farmers derive 
significant benefits, as was the case for certified farmers organized in producer-managed 
groups in our sample, they may not succeed to renew their certificate in the absence of donor 
support. As the results of the income analysis revealed, it was predominantly the largest 
quartile of adopters who were able to achieve significant income increases. Our model may 
thus suffer from multicollinearity if we include both the farm size and the change in income. 
When we exclude farm size-related variables from the re-certification equation, the 
coefficient on the change in net household income turns significant (see Appendix IV). 
However, the effect is rather small: a rise in the income change of 1000 USD increases the 
likelihood of re-certification by 0.5 percentage points. 
As opposed to the initial certification decision, education is no longer significant in the re-
certification equation. While a high level of education may still be advantageous to achieve 
continued compliance with the GlobalGAP standard, it is indeed the case that the least 
educated farmers drop out already at the initial adoption stage. Therefore, when we estimate 
the influence of education on re-certification conditional on initial certification in 2010, the 
variation in educational achievement in the sample is greatly reduced. 
Our results provide important insights into the sustainability of development programs that 
support small-scale farmers to achieve GlobalGAP certification. We find evidence that donor 
support enables small-scale farmers to overcome the barriers to standard adoption, but that 




development program. This confirms Graffham, Karehu et al. (2007), who claim that donor 
support may facilitate certification that is not sustainable in the long run, because farmers lack 
the capacity to bear recurrent costs after donor support ends. In our sample, it is those farmers 
who can count on continuous support from downstream actors of the value chain, who are 
most likely to achieve a renewal of their certificate. To achieve sustainability of donor-
assisted standard adoption, it is therefore of paramount importance to pay sufficient attention 
to value chain linkages and business models that provide long-term support to smallholder 
farmers. 
Table 19: Bivariate probit model estimating GlobalGAP adoption in 2010 and continued 








Explanatory variables Coefficient  Coefficient Marginal effects 





Donor support (0/1)a 1.59*** (0.41) 
 0.08 
(0.09) - 




















Change in net household income (1000 USD) -  0.01 (0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 





Share of total land certified -  2.67*** (1.01) 
0.46*** 
(0.15) 
Share of cultivated area under F&V -1.32** (0.58) 
 - - 
Share F&V area with sprinkler/drip irrigation 1.19*** (0.40) 





 - - 
Constant -1.51 (1.03) 
 -5.05*** 
(1.58) - 
Correlation rho -0.34 (0.49) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -141.0583 
Wald chi2 30.11 
Prob > chi2    0.00 
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. The marginal effects are calculated at the means of the variables. For dummy variables, the 
marginal effect is calculated for a discrete change from 0 to 1. 
a The reference group is farmers that did not receive support to manage the QMS. 







In this study, we evaluate the impact of GlobalGAP certification on farmers’ net household 
income and analyze the factors influencing continued compliance with GlobalGAP. We 
extend the existing literature on the implications of private food safety and quality standards 
for small-scale farmers in several ways. First of all, in addition to estimating average 
treatment effects of certification on net household income, we also look at subgroup-specific 
mean treatment effects of GlobalGAP adoption. Moreover, while previous studies have relied 
on cross-sectional data sets, we use a unique panel data set of Thai fruit and vegetable farmers 
that allows us to control for non-random selection into GlobalGAP certification that is based 
on unobservable time-invariant characteristics. Finally, to the best of our knowledge this is the 
first empirical study that analyzes the factors influencing GlobalGAP re-certification after the 
withdrawal of donor programs. 
Our results show that on the average GlobalGAP certification has a highly positive and 
significant impact on farmers’ net household incomes. However, the large average effect 
conceals the existence of considerable heterogeneity among subgroups of adopters. While 
GlobalGAP certification in producer-managed groups positively influences net household 
incomes, certification in exporter-managed groups does not result in significant income 
effects. However, we are only looking at short-term effects and in the long run members of 
exporter-managed groups might also realize significant income increases. For example, if 
GlobalGAP certified produce is in high demand, farmers may increase their incomes by 
extending the area cultivated with certified crops and by selling higher volumes. If we further 
explore heterogeneous effects between larger and smaller certified farmers, it becomes 
evident that the positive impact of certification in producer-managed groups is subject to size 
effects. GlobalGAP certification has a large positive and significant effect on the household 
income of the largest quartile of adopters, while the smallest 75% of adopters only benefit 
from certification, if recurrent costs do not have to be paid by farmers. During the first year of 
certification, the recurrent costs of compliance are often covered by donor programs that 
support the GlobalGAP certification of smallholder farmers, which was also true in our 
research area. After the withdrawal of donors, however, farmers will have to incur the full 
amount of recurrent costs, as long as they are not supported by an exporter or other 
downstream actor of the value chain. Since the recurrent costs are to a large extent fixed costs, 
they can add up to a significant share of farmers’ total net F&V income, and thus represent a 




Consistence with these results the estimates of the bivariate probit model show that, in the 
absence of donor support, GlobalGAP re-certification is significantly influenced by farm size 
and the share of total land that is certified. This indicates that larger farmers are able to realize 
economies of scale and thus have fewer difficulties in financing the recurrent costs of 
compliance. Yet, in contrast to our expectations based on results of the income analysis, it is 
not the farmers in producer-managed certification groups, but those organized in exporter-
managed groups who are more likely to become re-certified. The support by an exporter is 
critical and increases the probability to obtain a renewal of the GlobalGAP certificate by 85 
percentage points. This finding indicates that compliance with GlobalGAP remains 
challenging after initial adoption, and that small-scale farmers are usually not able to become 
re-certified if they do not have access to external support. 
Based on these results, we conclude that public-private partnerships between donors and 
exporters that support the certification of small-scale farmers in exporter outgrower schemes 
offer the opportunity to make donor supported GlobalGAP adoption sustainable. Moreover, 
the initial support of a relatively low number of farmers in exporter-managed groups could 
result in a larger number of certified farmers when exporters extend their certification groups, 
following an initial trial period where only a small share of suppliers is certified. However, 
certification of farmers in exporter-managed groups is also likely to be unsustainable if 
exporters do not benefit from certification, or if supported exporters are too small to offer 
substantial support to farmers and do not have well qualified outgrower management teams 
that continuously monitor and support the compliance of farmers with the GlobalGAP 
standard (Graffham et al., 2007b). 
Moreover, our analyses show that not only GlobalGAP adoption but also continued 
compliance with the standard is challenging for small-scale farmers. Our results also mirror 
the overall development in Thailand, where the number of certified producers decreased from 
923 in 2009 to 263 in 2011 (FoodPLUS, 2011a, FoodPLUS, 2009b). To date, the number of 
GlobalGAP certified producers in developing countries is still low and in 2011 only 4% of 
GlobalGAP certified producers were based in Africa and 9% in Asia. This suggests that 
GlobalGAP certification is not a viable option for the majority of small-scale farmers in 
developing countries in the near future. Moreover, only a small share of farmers in developing 
countries is involved in the high-value horticultural export sector, where the GlobalGAP 
standard is a requirement, while the majority serves domestic markets or lower value export 




standard requirements are much lower (Jaffee et al., 2011). Therefore, by supporting the 
implementation of lower level food safety and quality standards that are more adapted to the 
situation of small-scale farmers developing countries, and by investing into extension services 
and training programs that aim to disseminate the widespread use of good agricultural 
practices, donor programs are more likely to achieve positive long term impacts on rural 





5.1. Summary of findings 
Increased participation of small-scale farmers in the growing market for high-value 
agricultural products can contribute to alleviate poverty in developing countries. In particular, 
several studies have shown that small-scale farmers have a comparative advantage in the 
production of fruit and vegetables, and that diversification into horticulture can increase rural 
incomes and employment levels. However, the market access of smallholders to high-value 
supply chains is increasingly threatened by a tightening and proliferation of public and private 
food safety and quality standards. While public standards have long been recognized as an 
important barrier to exports from developing to developed countries, private standards, 
although voluntary, are becoming a requirement to access high-value markets worldwide. The 
GlobalGAP standard, which we focused on in this study, is the most widely implemented 
private pre-farm gate standard today. 
This study aimed to contribute to the growing literature on the implications of private food 
safety and quality standards for small-scale farmers in developing countries. Previous studies 
have shown that compliance with GlobalGAP is especially challenging for small-scale 
farmers due to the high costs of compliance and the high technical and managerial 
requirements of the standard. However, certification with GlobalGAP is also discussed to lead 
to higher and more stable incomes, and thus to a reduction of poverty and vulnerability. 
Therefore, the main aim of this study was to identify mechanisms that enable small-scale 
farmers to sustainably adopt the GlobalGAP standard and to benefit from certification. More 
specifically, three research objectives were addressed. First, we identified the factors that 
influence GlobalGAP adoption. Second, we assessed the average and subgroup-specific mean 
impacts of the GlobalGAP standard on producer prices and on farmers’ net household income 
and third, we analyzed the determinants of continued compliance with GlobalGAP following 
the withdrawal of donor support. 
Based on a cross-sectional data set of Thai fruit and vegetable farmers collected in 2010, we 
compare different institutional arrangements that can be formed under GlobalGAP group 
certification and identify the factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption. We contribute to the 
existing literature by for the first time taking the role of support by donors and exporters in the 
compliance process into account. In our research area, the increasing demand for GlobalGAP 




exporters and farmers to facilitate GlobalGAP adoption by smallholders. Farmers 
participating in a development program were organized in certification groups with either a 
donor-managed, farmer-managed or exporter-managed QMS. Results of a probit model 
estimating the factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption show that the support by donors and 
exporters is crucial to enable small-scale farmers with limited human, social and physical 
capital to adopt the GlobalGAP standard. In the groups with a donor-managed QMS, almost 
all responsibility for GlobalGAP implementation was taken over by the donor and we find 
that a donor-managed QMS increases the probability to adopt by 88 percentage points. In the 
exporter-managed groups, the QMS management was taken over by the companies, and 
farmers received financial, technical and managerial support during the implementation 
process, leading to a 48 percentage points higher probability of farmers in these groups to 
adopt the standard. In addition, we find that the educational attainment of households, 
household wealth, the availability of family labor, the use of efficient irrigation systems and 
previous involvement in high-value supply chains are important factors influencing the 
likelihood to adopt the GlobalGAP standard. 
Furthermore, to assess whether farmers benefit from GlobalGAP adoption, we analyze the 
impacts of GlobalGAP certification on producer prices and farmers’ net household income. 
Previous studies have analyzed average treatment effects of GlobalGAP certification which, 
however, may conceal important heterogeneous effects of certification across subgroups of 
adopters. We hypothesize that the effects of certification differ depending on whether farmers 
are certified in exporter-managed or producer-managed groups. Moreover, while previous 
studies rely on cross-sectional data sets, this study is based on a unique panel data set of 218 
Thai fruit and vegetable farmers. The availability of panel data allows us to estimate a fixed 
effects model to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across households. Our 
results show that certification can be highly profitable for small-scale farmers. On the average 
GlobalGAP certification results in 43% higher prices and 10,039 USD higher net household 
incomes. However, the high average effect is driven by large significant impacts in the 
producer-managed groups. Farmers certified in producer-managed groups increased the share 
of produce sold to high-value markets following GlobalGAP adoption, and certification 
resulted in 68% higher prices and 14,678 USD higher net household incomes. In contrast, we 
cannot identify a significant impact of certification on prices and net household income for 
farmers certified in exporter-managed groups. Farmers organized in exporter-managed 
certification groups sold to the contracting exporter as the main buyer before and after 




premium prices for certified produce due to the high costs of supporting farmers in the 
compliance process with GlobalGAP. However, our analysis represents short term impacts of 
certification and in the long run farmers in exporter-managed groups may also benefit from 
certification. GlobalGAP implementation is associated with knowledge gains and improved 
farming practices which may lead to higher product quality and thus indirectly to higher 
prices. Moreover, farmers may benefit from more stable and higher demand for their products 
in the long run. 
The analysis of income effects described above does not take the annually recurring costs of 
compliance into account (e.g., the costs for operating the QMS, laboratory analyses, trainings 
and certification fees) because these were paid by the development program and by exporters 
during the first year of compliance. However, these costs are relevant for the decision to 
become re-certified and following the withdrawal of donor support, farmers and exporters 
have to incur the recurrent costs of compliance on their own. Deducting the recurrent costs of 
compliance from F&V revenues, we find that the impact of GlobalGAP certification on 
farmers’ net household income is only positive and significant for larger farmers certified in 
producer-managed groups. Similar to the investment costs associated with GlobalGAP 
adoption, the recurrent costs of compliance are to a large extent fixed costs and thus 
disadvantage small-scale farmers. 
The results of the income analysis raise the question whether certification will be sustainable 
in the long run. The decision to become re-certified depends on the expected costs and 
benefits of continued compliance with GlobalGAP and on a farmer’s capabilities. In exporter-
managed certification groups, the companies offer continuous support to farmers to enable 
them to comply with GlobalGAP in the long run, but we find that certification does not have a 
significantly positive impact on the net household income of farmers certified in exporter-
managed groups. In contrast, in the producer-managed certification groups external support is 
no longer available after the end of the development program, but we identify a positive effect 
of certification on net household income, which may positively influence farmers’ decision to 
become re-certified. 
Consistent with our findings of the income analysis, the results of the probit model estimating 
continued compliance with GlobalGAP show that GlobalGAP re-certification is influenced by 
farm size and the share of area that is certified. This indicates that larger farms can realize 
economies of scale and have fewer difficulties in financing the recurrent costs of compliance. 




managed certification groups who are more likely to continue to comply with GlobalGAP. 
Support by an exporter increases the probability to become re-certified by 85 percentage 
points and is thus the most important factor explaining the sustainability of GlobalGAP 
adoption. Our findings indicate that complying with GlobalGAP remains challenging after 
initial adoption and that resource-poor small-scale farmer need to rely on external support to 
be able to continually comply with GlobalGAP. 
 
5.2. Policy recommendations 
Based on the results of our study, several recommendations can be made that are relevant for 
future donor policies related to private food safety and quality standards in developing 
countries. 
Our analyses have shown that donor support is critical to enable small-scale farmers to adopt 
the GlobalGAP standard. Although we found that farmers organized in groups with a donor-
managed QMS are more likely to adopt GlobalGAP than farmers organized in exporter-
managed groups, we suggest that public-private partnerships between exporters and donors 
are the preferable mechanism to facilitate GlobalGAP certification by smallholders. In 
particular, these schemes have been shown to be much more sustainable in the long run than 
donor supported certification of small-scale farmers in producer-managed groups. 
However, we have also shown that GlobalGAP certification in producer-managed groups can 
lead to significantly higher net household incomes, while we did not identify a positive impact 
of certification on the net income of farmers in exporter-managed groups. This result suggests 
that the highest gains in terms of increasing rural incomes and alleviating poverty can be 
achieved by facilitating certification of farmers in producer-managed groups. However, to 
increase farmers’ income in the long term, programs supporting the adoption of standards by 
independent producer groups need to be sustainable. 
Different reasons can be identified for the lack of sustainability of donor-facilitated standard 
adoption. First, complying with GlobalGAP is often perceived as a one-time challenge that is 
overcome with initial certification, rather than a long-term challenge for farmers. Donors tend 
to emphasize the barrier that the start-up costs represent for standard adoption, while the 
importance of the annually recurring costs of compliance is often neglected. Since these costs 




smallholders in the long run (Graffham et al., 2007b, Humphrey, 2008). Second, more 
emphasis needs to be put on the development of functioning and efficient Quality 
Management Systems that form the basis for continued standard certification (Humphrey, 
2008). In particular, independent farmer groups are usually not capable to operate the QMS 
on their own, because their members are not well educated and time constrained. The 
qualification requirements for positions on the QMS are high (e.g., a post high-school degree 
in horticulture, trainings in HACCP and GAP) and running the QMS is costly and 
administratively challenging. Therefore, to make GlobalGAP adoption by producer-managed 
groups more sustainable, one option is to link them to exporters or processors who run the 
QMS for farmers and provide technical, financial and managerial support. Moreover, public 
extension services and the private sector in developing countries have to be strengthened to 
provide information on food safety and quality standards, affordable assistance and trainings 
to farmers and farmer groups. 
In addition, the dependency of small-scale farmers on donor support to adopt the GlobalGAP 
standard as well as the still very low number of GlobalGAP certified producers in developing 
countries70
 
 suggest that GlobalGAP is not a viable option for the majority of small-scale 
farmers in developing countries in the near future. Moreover, our results show that, even if 
access to donor support is available, it is the wealthier and more educated small-scale farmers 
who adopt the GlobalGAP standard, indicating that the poorest segment of smallholders has 
not benefited from donor interventions. In addition, the vast majority of smallholders serve 
domestic markets or lower value export markets where GlobalGAP is not a requirement. In 
these markets, however, opportunities for product differentiation equally exist and food safety 
and quality standard gain in relevance (Jaffee et al., 2011). Therefore, donor programs, which 
invest in gradually upgrading food safety systems in developing countries, and in facilitating 
the adoption of lower level standards by small-scale farmers may reach a higher number of 
farmers and thus have a higher impact on overall rural development. Moreover, increasing 
food safety and disseminating good agricultural practices in developing countries is also 
highly relevant to increase local consumers’ health. Food-borne illnesses from biological or 
chemical contamination continue to remain one of the main health problems in many 
developing countries. 
                                                          
70 For example, in 2011 only 1070 producers were certified in Kenya, 27 in Zimbabwe, 433 in Brazil, 808 in 




5.3. Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
The results of this study contribute to a better understanding of the implications of private 
food safety and quality standards for small-scale farmers in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the scope of this study is limited and many areas for future research remain. 
First, our study is limited to the analysis of short term effects of GlobalGAP certification. We 
assessed the impacts of GlobalGAP certification for a one-year period following the adoption 
of the standard. However, some of the potential impacts of certification may only occur in the 
long run. For example, implementing GlobalGAP is a long-term process and involves a 
learning effect, which is not completed with obtaining the certificate for the first time. Over 
time farmers may build up good and accurate knowledge about fertilizer and pesticide usage, 
integrated pest management and irrigation management, which may lead to higher 
productivity and higher product quality. Furthermore, our analysis has shown that GlobalGAP 
certification of farmers in producer-managed groups is often not sustainable. Yet, we cannot 
evaluate whether the positive effects of GlobalGAP adoption persist in following years 
although the certificate is not renewed. Farmers who have gained access to new remunerative 
markets may be able to maintain these value chain linkages even in the absence of a formal 
certification. Therefore, the collection of long-term panel data could be a useful extension to 
explain the impacts of GlobalGAP certification that occur in the long run. In addition, this 
study is limited to price and income effects of GlobalGAP certification, but implementing 
GlobalGAP may also have a positive impact on the environment (e.g., prevention of soil 
erosion, more efficient use of irrigation water) and on farm workers’ welfare (e.g., health, 
working conditions, housing conditions). To evaluate the overall impact of the GlobalGAP 
standard, it is important to also address these effects in future studies. Moreover, this study 
has evaluated subgroup-specific mean treatment effects of GlobalGAP certification. 
Nevertheless, this may not capture the full extent of heterogeneity in treatment effects across 
individuals. The impact of GlobalGAP certification is likely not to be constant within 
subgroups of adopters and, e.g., impacts may differ depending on farm size, wealth and 
educational level of adopters. Therefore, studies using distributional measures, such as 
quantile treatment effects, could shed further light on the impact heterogeneity of GlobalGAP 
certification. 
Finally, this study is limited to the GlobalGAP standard, which is primarily relevant for 
suppliers of high-value export markets. The majority of small-scale farmers in developing 




these markets private standards are also gaining in relevance and offer opportunities for 
product differentiation but are less challenging to comply with than GlobalGAP. To date, 
there are only few studies exploring the opportunities and challenges of low and medium level 
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Appendix I: Sampling provinces and districts 
 
Table A1: Sampling provinces and districts 
Province District Number of farmers interviewed in 2010 
Number of farmers 
interviewed in 2011 
Ayuttayah Ladbualuang 4 2 
 Bang Pa-in 1 1 
Chachoengsao Sanam Chai Khet 1 1 
 Tha Takiap 7 4 
Chiang Mai Fang 14 14 
Chumporn Lamae 3 0 
 Lang Suan 16 13 
 Mueang Chumporn 19 15 
 Phato 12 6 
 Sawi 3 2 
 Thung Tako 2 2 
 Pathio 1 1 
Kanchanaburi Tha Maka 1 1 
 Tha Muang 1 1 
 Bo Phloi 5 4 
 Mueang Kanchanaburi 1 0 
Nakhon Pathom Kamphaeng Saen 38 23 
 Mueang Nakhon Pathom 5 3 
 Sam Phran 6 6 
 Bang Len 10 7 
 Don Tum 1 0 
Pathum Thani Lat Lum Kaeo 1 0 
Phayao Mae Chai 73 63 
Phichit Sak Lek 6 4 
Prachin Buri Si Maha Phot 6 4 
Ratchaburi Ban Pong 2 2 
 Mueang Ratchaburi 13 12 
Sa Kaew Wang Sombun 20 15 
Samut Sakhorn Ban Phaeo 13 10 
Saraburi  Nong Khae 2 2 





Appendix II: Analysis of sample attrition 
 
 
Table A2: Attrition probit test for net household income 
Variables (2009 values) Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 
North Thailand (0/1) -0.46 0.23 -1.94 0.05 
South Thailand (0/1) 0.18 0.27 0.66 0.51 
East Thailand (0/1) 0.04 0.31 0.14 0.89 
Number of household members 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.97 
Share of adults that are male (0/1) 0.22 0.62 0.36 0.72 
Share of adults that are female (0/1) 0.17 0.68 0.25 0.80 
Age of the household head -0.02 0.01 -2.04 0.04 
Years of education (household head) -0.04 0.03 -1.31 0.19 
Off-farm employment (0/1) -0.12 0.21 -0.59 0.56 
Household head's main occupation is agriculture (0/1) -0.02 0.25 -0.08 0.94 
Wealth index 0.03 0.08 0.36 0.72 
Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.32 
Net household income (THB) 0.00 0.00 -0.42 0.67 
Development program participation (0/1) -0.76 0.24 -3.22 0.00 
Internal control group (0/1) -0.21 0.23 -0.89 0.37 
Constant 0.88 0.88 1.00 0.32 
Number of observations: 287 
 Log likelihood: -147.22999 
 Pseudo R-squared: 0.0954 
 Note: The dependent variable is ‘Attrition’. 
Source: Own data 
 
As a result of the attrition probit test, we find that the variables ‘North Thailand’, ‘age of the 
household head’ and ‘development program participation’ are significant predictors of sample 
attrition. A Wald test is performed to see whether these variables are jointly equal to zero. The 
Chi-squared statistic (19.00) shows that the variables are jointly statistically different from 






Table A3: Pooling test for net household income 
Variables (2009 values) Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 
South Thailand (0/1) -0.51 0.08 -6.59 0.00 
East Thailand (0/1) -0.46 0.09 -4.84 0.00 
Number of household members -0.09 0.02 -4.47 0.00 
Share of adults that are male (0/1) -0.13 0.17 -0.75 0.45 
Share of adults that are female (0/1) -0.05 0.19 -0.23 0.82 
Age of the household head 0.00 0.00 1.48 0.14 
Years of education (household head) -0.01 0.01 -1.57 0.12 
Off-farm employment (0/1) -0.01 0.06 -0.14 0.89 
Household head's main occupation is agriculture (0/1) 0.04 0.07 0.63 0.53 
Wealth index -0.06 0.02 -2.60 0.01 
Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.17 
Net household income (THB) 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.32 
Development program participation (0/1) 0.13 0.07 1.79 0.08 
Internal control group (0/1) -0.03 0.08 -0.36 0.72 
Attrition (0/1) -0.68 0.57 -1.20 0.23 
Attrition (0/1) * North Thailand (0/1) 1.00 0.14 6.95 0.00 
Attrition (0/1) * South Thailand (0/1) 0.51 0.16 3.21 0.00 
Attrition (0/1) * East Thailand (0/1) 0.46 0.19 2.41 0.02 
Attrition (0/1) * Number of household members 0.09 0.04 2.31 0.02 
Attrition (0/1) * Share of adults that are male (0/1) 0.13 0.40 0.32 0.75 
Attrition (0/1) * Share of adults that are female (0/1) 0.05 0.43 0.11 0.92 
Attrition (0/1) * Years of education (household head) 0.00 0.01 -0.82 0.41 
Attrition (0/1) * Age of the household head 0.01 0.02 0.73 0.47 
Attrition (0/1) * Off-farm employment (0/1) 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.94 
Attrition (0/1) * Household head's main  
occupation is agriculture (0/1) -0.04 0.15 -0.30 0.76 
Attrition (0/1) * Wealth index 0.06 0.05 1.17 0.24 
Attrition (0/1) * Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 -0.72 0.47 
Attrition (0/1) * Net household income (THB) 0.00 0.00 -0.94 0.35 
Attrition (0/1) * Development program  
participation (0/1) -0.13 0.15 -0.90 0.37 
Attrition (0/1) * Internal control group (0/1) 0.03 0.13 0.22 0.83 
Constant 0.68 0.24 2.81 0.01 
Note: The dependent variable is ‘North Thailand’. 
Source: Own data 
 
An F-test of the joint significance of the attrition dummy and the variables interacted with the 
attrition dummy is used to find out whether the coefficients from the explanatory variables 
differ between households who remain in the panel and households who attrit. The F-statistic 








Table A4: Attrition probit test for mean F&V prices 
Variables (2009 values) Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 
North Thailand (0/1) -0.25 0.23 -1.11 0.27 
South Thailand (0/1) -0.01 0.28 -0.04 0.97 
East Thailand (0/1) -0.29 0.33 -0.89 0.37 
Number of household members -0.02 0.07 -0.31 0.76 
Share of adults that are male (0/1) 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.99 
Share of adults that are female (0/1) 0.13 0.67 0.20 0.84 
Age of the household head -0.02 0.01 -1.63 0.10 
Years of education (household head) -0.04 0.03 -1.21 0.23 
Off-farm employment (0/1) -0.14 0.21 -0.69 0.49 
Household head's main occupation is agriculture (0/1) -0.18 0.25 -0.73 0.47 
Wealth index 0.06 0.08 0.84 0.40 
Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.15 
Mean F&V price (THB) -0.02 0.01 -2.14 0.03 
Development program participation (0/1) -0.88 0.24 -3.72 0.00 
Internal control group (0/1) -0.29 0.23 -1.24 0.22 
Constant 1.53 0.88 1.75 0.08 
Number of observations 
    Log likelihood 
    Pseudo R-squared 
    Note: The dependent variable is ‘Attrition’. 
Source: Own data 
 
As a result of the attrition probit test, we find that the variables ‘age of the household head’, 
‘mean F&V price’ and ‘development program participation’ are significant predictors of 
sample attrition. A Wald test is performed to see whether these variables are jointly equal to 
zero. The Chi-squared statistic (25.09) shows that the variables are jointly statistically 
different from zero (P-value 0.00). Thus, we can conclude that the three variables are 





 Table A5: Pooling test for mean F&V price  
Variables (2009 values) Coefficient Standard error z P>|z| 
South Thailand (0/1) -0.47 0.07 -6.42 0.00 
East Thailand (0/1) -0.55 0.09 -5.89 0.00 
Number of household members -0.07 0.02 -3.69 0.00 
Share of adults that are male (0/1) -0.05 0.16 -0.29 0.77 
Share of adults that are female (0/1) 0.06 0.18 0.33 0.74 
Age of the household head 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.31 
Years of education (household head) -0.01 0.01 -1.09 0.28 
Off-farm employment (0/1) 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.98 
Household head's main occupation is agriculture (0/1) 0.08 0.07 1.13 0.26 
Wealth index -0.04 0.02 -1.78 0.08 
Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.23 
Net household income (THB) -0.01 0.00 -4.60 0.00 
Development program participation (0/1) 0.28 0.08 3.69 0.00 
Internal control group (0/1) 0.13 0.08 1.55 0.12 
Attrition (0/1) -0.61 0.50 -1.22 0.22 
Attrition (0/1) * North Thailand (0/1) 1.00 0.11 9.06 0.00 
Attrition (0/1) * South Thailand (0/1) 0.47 0.16 3.01 0.00 
Attrition (0/1) * East Thailand (0/1) 0.55 0.19 2.91 0.00 
Attrition (0/1) * Number of household members 0.07 0.03 2.03 0.04 
Attrition (0/1) * Share of adults that are male (0/1) 0.05 0.35 0.14 0.89 
Attrition (0/1) * Share of adults that are female (0/1) -0.06 0.38 -0.16 0.87 
Attrition (0/1) * Years of education (household head) 0.00 0.00 -0.61 0.54 
Attrition (0/1) * Age of the household head 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.59 
Attrition (0/1) * Off-farm employment (0/1) 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.99 
Attrition (0/1) * Household head's main  
occupation is agriculture (0/1) -0.08 0.13 -0.59 0.55 
Attrition (0/1) * Wealth index 0.04 0.04 0.84 0.40 
Attrition (0/1) * Farm size (rai) 0.00 0.00 -0.72 0.47 
Attrition (0/1) * Net household income (THB) 0.01 0.00 1.85 0.07 
Attrition (0/1) * Development program  
participation (0/1) -0.28 0.13 -2.16 0.03 
Attrition (0/1) * Internal control group (0/1) -0.13 0.12 -1.03 0.31 
Constant 0.61 0.23 2.59 0.01 
Note: The dependent variable is ‘North Thailand’. 
Source: Own data 
 
An F-test of the joint significance of the attrition dummy and the variables interacted with the 
attrition dummy is used to find out whether the coefficients from the explanatory variables 
differ between households who remain in the panel and households who attrit. The F-statistic 





Appendix III:  Impact of GlobalGAP certification – full models 
 
Table A6: Determinants of F&V producer prices (full model) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






GlobalGAP certified  






GlobalGAP certified  


































































































































































































































































































































































Number of observations 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.55 
Hausman test 1.61** 1.49** 1.51** 1.33* 
Notes: The dependent variable is log mean F&V price. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. 
a The reference group is non-certified farmers. 
b The reference year is 2009. 
c Included are lemon, rose apple, salacca, grape. 
d
Source: Own data 
 Included are lemon grass, garlic chives, pigeon pea, pumpkin, wild betel leaf, spinach, tomato, Chinese kale, 







Table A7: Determinants of net household income (USD) (full model) 
 Total effect of GlobalGAP 
certification 
 Per hectare effect of 
GlobalGAP certification 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 







GlobalGAP certified (exporter group) 0/1)a - 373 (5071)  - 2343 (3311) 
GlobalGAP certified  

















Cultivated area other products (ha) 1346 (983) 1392 (993)  1250 (951) 1254 (954) 









No. of household members -1086 (1757) -1135 (1762)  -1145 (1755) -1149 (1758) 




































































































































































































































































































Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 









Share of cultivated area with crops (except 


















Number of observations 428 428  428 428 
R-squared 0.16 0.16  0.17 0.17 
Hausman test 0.50 0.50  0.46 0.45 
Notes: The dependent variable is net household income in USD. Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) 
and 10% (*) levels. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. a The 
reference group is non-certified farmers. b Lemon, rose apple, salacca, grape.c Lemon grass, garlic chives, pigeon 
pea, pumpkin, wild betel leaf, spinach, tomato, Chinese kale, red leaf lettuce, parkia speciosa, houttuynia.  




Table A8: Impact of certification on net household income (USD) (full model) 
 
Scenario 1: 
Net household income 
 
 Scenario 2: 
Net household income  
– recurrent costs 













-  - 264 (5071) - 
GlobalGAP  








GlobalGAP (smallest 75% in 




 - - 
-4072 
(5460) 
GlobalGAP (largest 25% in 




 - - 
16,342 
(12,176) 
GlobalGAP (smallest 75% in 




 - - 
3687 (2732) 
GlobalGAP (largest 25% in 




 - - 
36,954*** 
(13,135) 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 

















Share of cultivated area with crops 














Share of cultivated area with crops 




























Number of observations 428 428 428  428 428 428 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16  0.16 0.16 0.16 
Hausman test 0.50 0.50 0.47  0.50 0.50 0.47 
Notes: The dependent variable is net household income in USD. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels. 
a The reference group is non-certified farmers.  
b Certified area ranges from 0.16 to 1.6 ha.  
c Certified area ranges from 1.92 to 33.92 ha. 
d Included are lemon, rose apple, salacca, grape. 
e Included are lemon grass, garlic chives, pigeon pea, pumpkin, wild betel leaf, spinach, tomato, Chinese kale, 
red leaf lettuce, parkia speciosa, houttuynia.  
f
Source: Own data 





Table A9: Impact of certification on net household income (USD) (full model) 
 
Scenario 1: 
Net household income 
 Scenario 2: 
Net household income 
– recurrent costs 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Share of cultivated area with crops (except F&V) 










Share of cultivated area with crops (except F&V) 










Share of cultivated area with crops (except F&V) 
























Share of cultivated area with crops (except F&V) 










Share of cultivated area with crops (except F&V) 




















Number of observations 428 428  428 428 
R-squared 0.16 0.16  0.16 0.16 
Hausman test 0.47 0.47  0.47 0.47 
Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Coefficient estimates are shown with cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  
a The reference group is non-certified farmers. 
b Certified area ranges from 0.16 - 2.64 ha. 
c Certified area ranges from 3.16 - 33.92 ha. 
d 
 
Certified area ranges from 0.16 - 1.44 ha 
e Certified area ranges from 1.6 - 33.92 ha. 
f Included are lemon, rose apple, salacca, grape. 
g Included are lemon grass, garlic chives, pigeon pea, pumpkin, wild betel leaf, spinach, tomato, Chinese kale, 
red leaf lettuce, parkia speciosa, houttuynia. 
h
Source: Own data 
 Included are atrium flower, jasmine flower, orchid, bamboo, eucalyptus. 
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Appendix IV: Bivariate probit model results 
 
Table A10: Bivariate probit model estimating GlobalGAP adoption in 2010 and 






 N=214 N=72 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Coefficient Marginal effects 





Donor support (0/1)a 2.05*** (0.33) 
0.10 
(0.09) - 




















Change in net household income (1000 USD) - 0.02* (0.01) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
Farm size (ha) - - - 
Share of total land certified - - - 
Share of cultivated area under F&V - - - 
Share F&V area with sprinkler/drip irrigation 1.09*** (0.39) - - 
Q-GAP certified (0/1) 0.67** (0.28) - - 
Constant -3.11*** (0.85) 
-3.71*** 
(1.23) - 
Correlation rho -0.05 (0.46) 
Log pseudo-likelihood -149.6753 
Wald chi2 38.8 
Prob > chi2    0.00 
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Coefficient estimates are shown with 
cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. 
a The reference group is farmers that did not receive support to manage the QMS. 






Appendix V: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A11: Descriptive statistics – continued compliance with GlobalGAP 
 2010 
 2009 
 GlobalGAP certified (N=72) 











Exporter support in % (0/1) 77.78*** 16.67 
 
31.94*** 13.38 
Donor support in % (0/1) n/a n/a 55.56*** 8.45 







College graduate in the household  
(0/1) in % 61.11 40.74 43.06 32.39 





(13,792) n/a n/a 





















Share of total land that is certified 0.43 (0.36) 
0.44 
(0.32) n/a n/a 
Share of cultivated area under F&V n/a n/a 0.65 (0.35) 
0.85 
(0.26) 
Share of cultivated area with F&V that is 





Q-GAP certified in % (0/1) n/a n/a 91.67*** 38.03 
Notes: Statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Standard deviations are shown in 
parentheses. 






Appendix VI: Questionnaire 
 





Date of the survey  
Name of the enumerator  
Household code (put this number on top of every page)  
 
A1. Of which group is this household a member? 
 GTZ project 
participant 
Control group for 
GTZ project 
External control group 
for GTZ project 
C.O. Suansrakaew          
Safety Farm          
Shine Forth Co. Ltd.           
Chatchawan Import Export and 
Packaging Ltd. 
         
Chatchawan Orchid Co. Ltd.          
Siam Export Mart Co. Ltd.          
Cantaloupe Grower Group Pachee          
PDI Trading          
Fruit Producer Chumporn Group of 
Export Quality 
         
Phol Intergrower Co. Ltd.          
KC Eastern Fruit Group          
 
 
A2. Please give your name, address and telephone number 
Respondents name  




Telephone number  
 
                                                          
71 The questionnaire presented here is the questionnaire that was used during the second survey round in 2011. The 





B. Information on the household 
B1. Please give some information about the household members, starting with the head of the household. (Note: Members of a household are all people who usually eat from the 
same pot and sleep under the same roof. Include also members who were absent for less than two month during the last 12 months). 
 
B2. Member ID of the interviewee:                                      B3. Member ID of the person that is mainly responsible for agricultural decisions within the household:  
 
Code 1:  Code 2:  Code 3:  Code 4:  
1 Household head 
2 Spouse household head 
3 Son or daughter 
4 Father or mother 
5 Grandchild 
6 Grandparents 
7 Son- and daughter-in-law 
8 Sister or brother 
9 Sister or brother in-law 
10 Other relative 
11 Other non-relative 
0 No formal education 
1 Primary school grade 4 
2 Primary school grade 6 
3 Lower secondary school 
4 Upper secondary school 
5 Certificate in Vocational Education 
6 Technical Diploma  
7 Bachelor degree 
8 Master degree 
9 Doctoral degree 
10 Other 
0 Does not work in agriculture 
1 Full time 
2 Half time 
3 Only at harvest time 
4 Weekends and holidays only 
5 Helping sometimes 
6 Other, please specify 
1 Collector/middleman  
2 Self-employed in agriculture 
3 Self-employed in non-farm enterprise 
4 Government employee 
5 Casual worker non-agriculture 
6 Day laborer in agriculture 
7 Salaried worker in agriculture 
8 Salaried worker in non-agriculture 
9 Domestic worker 





















still go to 
school? 








If the person works on the 





0 = No  
1 = Yes  















How often does 
the person work 
off-farm?  












1                   
2                   
3                   
4                   
5                   
6                   
7                   
8                   
9                   
10                   





C. Information on the farm, agricultural production and marketing 
  
C1. In which year did this farm business start?  
 
C2. What is the size of your farm in rai? 
 
C3. How far is the farm from the following? 
 
From km 
How do you usually go there? 
1 = by foot/ 2 = by bicycle/ 3 = by motorbike/ 4 = by car /5  = by public 
transport 
1   Nearest town   
2   Next paved road   
3   Homestead   
 
C4. Do you deliver produce to a collection centre?  0 No  1 Yes 
 




How do you usually go there? 
1 = by foot/ 2 = by bicycle/ 3 = by motorbike/ 4 = by car / 5  = by public 
transport 
   
   
   
   
 
C5. Please draw a map of all plots you owned and rented in time period March 2010 to the end of February 2011. Please 
draw in the area of each plot, the product which is produced and the numbers of the plots. If you rotate crops, always 






























































Is there a 
land title for 
this plot? 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 
If there is a 
land title, 
specify type 























1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
7             
8             
9             
10             
11             
 
Code 1: Read 
choices out loud 
Code 2: Read choices out loud Code 3: Read choices out loud Code 4: Read choices out loud 








4 Owned by a relative and given to the household for cultivation 
5 Owned by a friend and given to the household for cultivation 
6 Owned by the government and given to the household for 
cultivation 
7 Other, please specify 
1 Chanot Thi Din - No So Si 
Cho  
2 Sor Por Kor (S. P. K.) / So Po 
Go (S. P. G.) 
3 Po Bo Tor 5 
4 No Pa Go 
5 Other, please specify 
1 First-degree relative 
2 Other relative 
3 Neighbor (but not relative) 
4 Friend (but not relative) 





C7. Please tell me about your irrigation system and your water use in the time period March 2010 to the end of February 2011.  
Use the same numbers for the plots as in table C6. 






















Month during which 
the crop is irrigated 
How often do you irrigate this plot (not for flooding)? 
At which time of 
the day do you 
irrigate? 
Hot season  
(March-May) 



















            
            
2 
 
            
            
3 
 
            
            
4 
 
            
            
5 
 
            
            
6 
 
            
            
7 
 
            
             
8 
 
            
            
  
Code 1: Let the farmer answer and select the code. If necessary read choices out 
loud 
Code 2: Let the farmer answer and select the code. If necessary read choices out loud 
0 No, I don’t irrigate this plot 
1 Manual irrigation, please specify 
2 Flooding 
3 Furrow irrigation 
4 Drip irrigation 
5 Sprinkler irrigation 
6 Other (specify) 
1 Underground or well water (include shallow wells and deep wells) 
2 ON-FARM lakes, rivers, creeks or streams, ponds or dugouts i.e. direct access (surface 
water) 
3 Water from a rain collection system (e.g., cistern or rain barrel) 
4 OFF-FARM water transported TO THE FARM e.g., via pipeline, canal system or vehicle 






































              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              





C9. Please give information on agricultural production on your farm in the time period March 2010 to the end of February 2011. (Note: First list only one plot, then list the main 
product produced on this plot and fill out the other columns. If there has been more than one harvest on this plot in the last 12 months, please use one line per harvest. If there is 

















Size of the 





























              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              













How much of the 
harvest were you 





Of the harvest sold: 
Quantity sold/ 
harvest/buyer 
What are the grades 




Price received by 
buyer/grade/ 








in THB in % in kg in % in kg in % in kg 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
 
Code 1: (Let the farmer answer and select the code. If necessary, read the choices out loud. When you sell to two (or more) different buyers in the same buyer category, please list the 
category twice (or more) 
1 Middlemen/collector in the village 
2 Farmer group/co-op, please specify 
3 Wholesale market, please specify 
4 Supplier of a supermarket/retailer, please specify 
supermarket/retailer 
5 Supermarket/retailer, please specify 
6 Middleman/broker supplying an exporter enterprise, 
please specify  exporter 
7 I sell it directly to an exporter enterprise, please specify   
8 I sell it to a processor, please specify 
9 Rice mill 
10 Farmer sells by him/herself 





C11. Do you grow crops for export?  0 No 1 Yes 
  
C12. For how many years have you grown for export? Differentiate according to the products that are exported (product codes). 
Product Years Product Years Product Years Product Years Product Years Product Years Product Years Product 
               
 
C13. Please give information about your buyers and the agreements with your buyers. For codes see extra sheet agreements with buyer codes.  
Always specify the choice if indicated by the codes! 
Buyer 
ID 
Please list all the 
buyers you sold to 
in the time period 
March 2010 the end 
of February 2011. 


















exists: Which time 
period does the 
arrangement 
between you and 
the buyer cover? 






0 = No / 











0 = No 






















you in the 
field to give 
advice and 
services? 
0 No / 1 Yes 
1             
2             
3             
4             
5             
6             
 
C14. If you have a written or oral agreement with a buyer, what are the requirements of the buyer for delivered produce? 
 Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
1 I must deliver the whole harvest of in-grade produce to the buyer                   
2 Use of only those crop protection products which are approved by the buyer                   
3 I must keep detailed records about the use of crop protection products and fertilizer                   
4 I needed to have a Q-GAP certificate                   
5 I needed to be certified against a standard (other than Q-GAP), please specify                   





C15. If you have a written or oral agreement with a buyer, which of the following have you agreed upon before the 
exchange took place? 
 Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
Buyer ID:       
Product 
code(s): 
1 Grading of product                
2 Prices                
3 Timing of delivery of the product                
4 Amount of product to be delivered                
5 Other, please specify 
                
 
C16. Do farm advisors/agronomists of the buyer visit you in the field and which services are provided? Please use one 
line per service provider and per service.  
Who visits you in the fields? Ask for the buyers in Table 
C13. and for exporters/companies who send farm 
advisors or provide services (no input dealers!) 
How often are 
you visited in the 
fields?  
Code 1 
What type of advise/service is given? 
Code 2 
Buyer ID:   
Buyer ID:   
Buyer ID:   
Name of exporter/company:   
Name of exporter/company:   
 
Code 1 (Let the farmer answer and select the code) 
1 More than once a week 
2 Once a week 
3 Every two to three weeks 
4 Once a month 
5 Every two months 
6 Every three months 
7 Two to three times a year 
8 Once a year 
9 Less than once a year 
10 Other 
 
Code 2 (Read the choices out loud and list applicable) 
1 Monitoring 
2 Calibration of: 
a) pesticide application machinery 
b) fertilizer application machinery 
3 Application of chemicals 
4 Recommendations: 
a) when to water the crop 
b) when to weed 
c) when to rotate the crops 
d) on quantity and type of fertilizer to be used 
e) on quantity and types of chemicals to be used 
5 Collection of samples for laboratory analysis 
a) Pesticide residue analysis 
b) Water analysis 
c) Soil analysis 
6 Q-GAP 
7 GLOBALGAP 
8 Other standard (specify) 







C17. Please estimate the total quantity of the following variable inputs you used for your production in the time period 







How often do 
you apply this 
input per 
season? 
How often do 
you apply this 







per rai per 
time 
Amount 
used per plot 
per time 
Price/ 
unit in Baht 
1 Seeds/trees 
etc. 
      
a)        
b)        
c)        
2 Insecticides       
a)        
b)        
c)        
d)        
3 Fungicides       
a)        
b)        
c)        
4 Herbicides       
a)        
b)        
c)        
5 Biocides       
a)        
b)        
c)        
6 Hormones       
a)        
b)        
7 Chemical 
fertilizer 
      
a)        
b)        
8 Organic 
fertilizer 
      
a)        
b)        
9 Other 
(specify) 
      
a)        





C18. Please list all insecticides, fungicides, herbicides used and fill out the information about the pre-harvest interval. The 
pre-harvest interval is the time between the last chemical application and harvest of the treated crop. 
Type of chemical 
Treated crop 
(product codes) 
Do you keep the pre-harvest 
interval? 
0 Never / 1 Sometimes /  
2 Always 
If yes, how many days do 
have to  
wait between the last 
application and harvesting 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
C19. Please estimate the total quantity of the following variable inputs you used for your total agricultural production in 
the time period March 2010 until the end of February 2011. 
 Value per time 
Always indicate the 
unit used such as per 
day/week/month etc. 
Times per year Total value in Baht 
1 Fuel for    
a)  transporting produce    
b) water pump    
c) applying chemicals    
d) tractor    
e) other, please specify    
2 Tractor (if rented)    
3 Hand tractor (if rented)    
4 Baskets, paper etc.    
5 Water    
6 Electricity    
7 Stationary/Record keeping forms    
8 Other, please specify 
 
   
9 Other, please specify 
 






C20. Please tell me about your fixed costs for your total agricultural production. Please only list those items which are 
used for farming activities or the marketing of produce. 








1 Mechanical chemical sprayer     
2 Manual chemical sprayer     
3 Groundwater pumping     
4 Irrigation pump     
5 Irrigation pipes and sprinkler heads     
6 Water hose     
7 Water tank     
8 Farm pond     
9 Grading shed and produce handling and storage 
area 
    
10 Equipment storage     
11 Pesticide storage     
12 Fertilizer storage     
13 Living quarters of workers     
14 Pick-up truck     
15 Motorbike     
16 Tractor     
17 Hand tractor     
18 Other, specify     
19 Other, specify     
20 Other, specify     
 
C21. Do you employ full time hired labor on your farm?   0 No  1 Yes 
 
C22. Please give some information about hired laborers who work full time on your farm. 
 Male full time laborers Female full time laborers 




























C23. Please give information about last years (i.e., from March 2010 to the end of February 2011) crop management 







How often was 
the activity 
conducted 
during the last 
year? 













         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
Code 1 (Please go through the activities one by one) 













11 Post-harvest activities 
12 Other, please specify 
 
C24. Did you own any livestock in the time period March 2010 to the end of February 2011?  0 No 1 Yes 
 
C25. If yes, what livestock did you own in the time period March 2010 to the end of February 2011, what was your 

























































     Meat:  Meat:   
3 Cattle      Meat: Meat:   
Milk: Milk: 
4 Fish          
5 Crocodile          
6 Buffalo          
7 Duck          
8 Other          





D. Farming practices and chemical management 
 
D1. How do you determine when to apply chemicals/when would you spray chemicals?  
(Note: read out loud and encircle all that apply) 
0 I don’t use chemicals 
1 Whenever I see a 
pest/weeds/fungus disease 
2 Depending on the severity of the 
pest/weeds/fungus disease 
3 Using spray calendar/program 
4 When advised by input dealer 
5 When advised by technical staff. 
Please specify who 
6 When a neighbor sprays 
7 When advised by other farmers 
8 Buyer comes to apply chemicals 
9 Other, please specify 
 
D2. Who usually mixes chemicals at the farm?  
1 Household members. Please list the HHIDs of all members mixing chemicals 
2 Hired labor, please tick if male or female: 0 male  1 female 
3 Technical staff from                                                   ,please tick if male or female:  0 male   1 female 
4 Other, specify  
 
D3. How does the mixer determine the amount of chemical used for mixing chemicals?  
(Note: read out loud and encircle all that apply) 
1 Extension recommendations 3 Following the 
labels 
5 From own experience 7 Other, please specify 
 
2 Instructions by technical staff 
from 
4 Recommendation 
from other farmers 




D4. What container does the mixer use for mixing chemicals? (Please read out loud and encircle all that apply). 
1 Sprayer tank 
2 Special container for mixing 
chemicals 
3 Bucket 
4 Cooking pot 
5 Bathing basin/trough 
6 Boat 
7 Other, please specify 
 
D5. Who usually applies chemicals at the farm?  
1 Household members. Please list the HHIDs of all members mixing chemicals 
2 Hired labor, please tick if male or female:  0 male  1 female 
3 Technical staff from                                                    ,please tick if male or female:  0 male   1 female 
4 Other, specify  
 
D6. Who usually applies fertilizer at the farm?  
1 Household members. Please list the HHIDs of all members mixing chemicals 
2 Hired labor, please tick if male or female: 0 male  1 female 
3 Technical staff from                                                   ,please tick if male or female: 0 male  1 female 
4 Other, specify  
 
D7. Which of the following clothing does the person applying chemicals wear? 
Types of protective clothing worn   
(Note: please go through the items one by one) 
How often is the item used?  
0 = never/ 1 = sometimes/ 2 = always 
1 Rubber boots  
2 Rubber gloves  
3 Face mask  
4 Goggle  
5 Long protective overall  
6 Hat/head scarf  







D8. What do you do with empty chemical containers/bottles? (Note: Read the choices out loud and encircle applicable) 
1 Sell it to somebody to recycle 
2 Bury in the ground 
3 Destroy and burn 
4 Wash and use for other purposes, please specify 
 
5 Containers are collected by the government 
6 Store it in a bag/box and give to somebody else to 
dispose of it (e.g. middleman/exporter) 
7 Other, please specify 
 
 
D9. Do you have a pit/specific area for disposing leftover chemicals?  0 No    1 Yes 
 
D10. If yes, please indicate which of the following apply (Note: Read out loud and encircle all that apply) 
1 A warning sign is postered on it 
2 It is covered with logs/timber 
3 It is fenced 
4 It is open 
5 Other, please specify 
 
D11. Do you have chemical storage?  0 No 1 Yes 
 
D12. If yes,  
a) When did you build it?  
b) Did you build it to comply with a standard?  0 No  1 Yes, please specify (standard codes) 
c) Indicate if any of the following applies to your storage (Note: Read out loud and circle all that apply) 
1 Has a sign indicating chemical 
storage on the door 
2 Remains locked if not used 
3 Has a hazard sign on it 
4 Has “no admission” on the door 
5 Nothing 
6 Other, please specify 
 
D13. Where do you store your chemicals? (Note: Read out loud and circle applicable) 
1 Equipment storage 
2 Pesticide storage 
3 Shed next to the house 
4 Pesticide storage of a farmer group/village 
5 Hanging above the hay in a plastic bag 
6 Living room 
7 Bedroom 
8 Food storage area 
9 Kitchen 
10 Animal stall 
11 Grading shed 
12 Cattle feed storage 
13 Beneath the house 
14 Box with a lock 
15 Old broken fridge 
16 Bathroom 
17 Other, please specify 
 
 
D14. Do you have a place to wash hands next to where you store your chemicals?  0 No   1 Yes 
 
D15. If no, how and where can you/farm workers wash your/their hands after handling chemicals?  
 
 
D16. Do you/farm workers wash hands with soap every time you/they come from the chemical storage or handle 
chemicals?  
1 Never 2 Sometimes 3 Always 
 
D17. Are the following analyses regularly conducted at your farm? 
a) Pesticide residue analyses?    0 No      1 Yes 
b) Soil analysis?     0 No 1 Yes  
c) Irrigation water analysis?    0 No  1 Yes 






D18. If yes: (Note: go through the types of analyses one by one) 




Who pays for 
the analysis? 
Code 2 
Costs per analysis if 
the farmer pays 
him/herself 
Who collects the 
samples? 
Code 2 
Pesticide residue analysis     
Soil analysis     
Irrigation water analysis     
Water used for post-harvest washing     
 
Code 1 (Let the farmer answer and list applicable. If necessary read the choices out loud) 
1 Less than once a year 
2 Once  a year 
3 Twice a year 
4 Every 2-3 months 
5 Once a month 
6 Every 1-2 weeks 
7 Other, please specify 
 
Code 2 (Let the farmer answer and list applicable. If necessary read the choices out loud) 
1 Myself 
2 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
3 Collector/middleman 
4 DOA/DOAE 
5 Farmer group/co-op (specify) 
6 University (specify) 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
8 Department of Land Development 
9 Other , please specify 
  
D19. Do you apply IPM at your farm?  Please explain IPM to farmers.  0 No    1 Yes 
 
D20. If yes, please list the IPM techniques which you apply at your farm.  
1 Scouting 
2 Studying the life cycle 
of insects 
3 Maintain plant vigor 
4 Use of row covers/fruit 
covers 
5 Trap cropping 
6 Intercropping 
7 Use of insect traps 
8 Use of parasites and 
predators 
9 Handpicking 
10 Use of biocides 
11 Other (specify) 
 
D21. Do you use/apply any of the following practices/measures? Please encircle. 
1 Crop rotation  6 Planting along contour lines  
2 Terraces /Stone barriers 7 Drainage ditches  
3 Living barriers 8 Cover crops  
4 Minimum or zero tillage  9 Mulching/ Covering the field with crop residues  
5 Trees or hedges/agro forest 10 Other, please specify 
 
D22. Do workers handling chemicals regularly go to health checks?    0 No    1 Yes 
If yes,  
How many workers go? How often do they go? 
Code 1 
Who pays for the health 
check? Code2 
Costs/time/worker 
    
 
Code 1 (Let the farmer answer and list applicable. If necessary read the choices out loud) 
1 Less than 
every 2 years 
2 Every 2 
years 
3 Once a 
year 





6 Every month 7 Other (specify) 
 







5 Farmer group/co-op 
(specify) 
6 University (specify) 
 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
 
8 30 Baht program 
9 Ministry of Public 
Health 
10 Other, please specify 
 
 





D24. Please indicate how frequently someone in your family experiences the following acute symptoms after handling or 
applying chemicals? (Note: go through the symptoms one by one) 
Symptom Never Sometimes Often 
1 Dizziness          
2 Vomiting          
3 Nausea          
4 Nose bleeding          
5 Blurred vision          
6 Common colds          
7 Headache          
8 Eye irritation          
9 Skin irritation          
10 Stomach irritation          
11 Other (specify) 
 
         
   
D25. Is there a toilet accessible for the farm workers at your farm or at least 500m from your farm?     
0 No  
1 Yes. If yes, please specify what kind of toilet can be used: 
a) Toilet in the farmer’s private home 
b) Neighbor’s toilet 
c) Separate toilet on the plot 
d) Other, please specify  
 
D26. Are all plots marked with a plot sign?    0 No 1 Yes 
 
D27. If yes, what is indicated on the plot marker? (Note: read out loud and encircle all that apply) 
1 Plot name 
2 Size of the plot 
3 Type of plants 
4 Code 
5 Planting date 
6 Harvesting date 
7 Chemicals used on the plot 
8 Pre-harvest interval 
9 Name of the plot owner 
10 Other /specify 
 
D28. Do you keep records?  0 No  1 Yes 
 
D29. If yes, please fill out the following table (Note: go through the items one by one) 
Do you keep records about? 0=No  
1 = Yes 
Since when do you keep these 
records? 
1     Crop rotation   
2 Growing and harvesting calendar   
3 Chemical and fertilizer stocks   
4 Calibration of chemical equipment   
5 Chemical application records   
6 Fertilizer application records   
7 Water application records   
8 Hygiene and cleaning records   
9 Sales records   
10 Other, please specify   






D30. Who keeps the records? Please encircle all that apply 
1 Household members. Please list the HHIDs of all members keeping records 
2 Hired labor, please tick if male or female:   0 male  1 female 
3 Technical staff from                                                 ,please tick if male or female:   0 male  1 female 
4 Other, specify  
 
D31. How many times during one month are records filled out? 
 




E. Compliance with standards 
 
E1. Do you know GAP  0 No  1 Yes 
 
E2. If yes, who advises you on GAP/where do you get information on GAP? 
1 Extension officer from DOA/DOAE 
2 Kaset Tambon/Amphoe/Dschangwat 
3 University farm advisors(specify) 
4 NGO/donor (specify) 
5 Exporter/manufacturer (specify) 
6 Collector/middleman 
7 Adviser from the Ministry of Public Health 
8 Other farmers 
9 Farmers meeting (farmer group/co-op) 
10 Village head 
11 Radio/TV 
12 Newspaper/magazine 
13 Royal  project 
14 Chiang Rai Horticultural Research Centre 
15 BAAC 
16 Other (specify) 
 
E3. Do you know any GAP standards?   0 No  1 Yes 
 
E4. If yes, which standards do you know? 
1 Q-GAP (GAPThai, from DOA) 4 Carrefour Quality Line Organic Vegetable (CQL) 
2 GLOBALGAP 5 Field & Fork (Marks & Spencer) 
3 Tesco Nature’s Choice (TNC) 6 Other (specify) 
 
E5. Have you ever been trained by Kasetsart University about Western GAP, KU GAP, KU TG or any other GAP 
standards?   
0 No  1 Yes 
 
E5.1 If yes, have you implemented the KU GAP requirements on your farm? 0 No  1 Yes 
 
E5.2 If yes, do you still practice the KU GAP requirements on your farm?  0 No  1 Yes 
 
E6. Do you know organic production?  0 No  1 Yes 
 
E7. If yes, who advises you on organic production/where do you get information on organic production?  
Please read choices out loud. 
1 Extension officer from DOA/DOAE 
2 Kaset Tambon/Amphoe/Dschangwat 
3 University farm advisors(specify) 
4 NGO/donor (specify) 
5 Exporter/manufacturer (specify) 
6 Collector/middleman 
7 Adviser from the Ministry of Public Health 
8 Other farmers 
9 Farmers meeting (farmer group/co-op) 
10 Village head 
11 Radio/TV 
12 Newspaper/magazine 
13 Royal  project 
14 Chiang Rai Horticultural Research Centre 
15 BAAC 





E8. Do you know any organic production standards?   0 No  1 Yes 
 
E9. If yes, which standards do you know? Please encircle all standards you know 
1 National Organic Program (NOP) Thailand 4 IFOAM's Organic Guarantee System 
(OGS) 
7 Other, please 
specify 
2 Organic Agriculture Certification Thailand (ACT) 5 EU organic standard 
3 Japanese Agricultural Standard (JAS) 6 National Organic Program (USDA) 
 
E10. Are you certified against a standard? 0 No  1 Yes 
 





Are you certified  
1= individually 














implementation at your 
farm? Code 1 
      
      
      
 
Code 1 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
0 Nobody 
1 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
2 Collector/middleman 
3 DOA/DOAE 
4 Kaset tambon/amphoe 
5 University (specify) 
6 Farmer group/co-op 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
8 Royal Project 
9 Chiang Rai Horticultural 
Research Centre 
10 Other (specify) 
 
E12. Are you in the process of certification against a standard?   0 No  1 Yes 
  (Note: the farmer has started implementing a standard on his/her farm and plans to get a certificate soon) 
 





Do you plan to 
become certified 
1= individually 
or 2= in a group? 





products do you 
plan to become 
certified? 
Product codes 
Size of the 







      
      
      
 
Code 1 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
0 Nobody 
1 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
2 Collector/middleman 
3 DOA/DOAE 
4 Kaset tambon/amphoe 
5 University (specify) 
6 Farmer group/co-op 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
8 Royal Project 
9 Chiang Rai Horticultural Research 
Centre 






E14. If you are certified against a standard or in the process of certification, why did you/do you want to have a 
certificate? (Note: read the choices out loud and encircle all that apply.  If the farmer has more than one standard, ask 
for the standard which is not Q-GAP). 
Standard:  
 
1 Buyer asked me to implement it. Please specify which 
buyer 
2 I wanted to increase the quality of the product. 
3 The buyer frequently rejected my produce due to food 
safety issues and I wanted to decrease the rate of 
rejection. 
4 Buyer offered a purchase guarantee for certified 
produce. 
5 Buyer offered a price premium for certified produce. 
6 I expected that I could increase my sales to high-value 
markets where price premiums are paid. 
7 I wanted to decrease the costs for chemicals. 
8 I wanted to enhance my reputation. 
9 I wanted to enhance my bargaining power. 
10 I expected that finding buyers is much easier when I am 
certified. 
11 I expected better management practices which might 
increase the profitability. 
12 I wanted to implement the standard because it is good 
for my family’s and farm workers’ health. 
13 I wanted to increase my knowledge on chemical use. 
14 Other, please specify 
 
E15. Have you ever tried to implement a standard at your farm with the goal to become certified but not completed the 
implementation process?   0 No       1 Yes 
 









When did you try to 
implement the 
standard? 
Why didn’t you 
complete standard 
implementation at your 
farm (Code 1) 
Who supported standard 
implementation at your 
farm? (Code 2) 
     
     
     
 
Code 1 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
1 The investment costs were too high. 
2 The additional workload was too high. 
3 I didn’t understand many of the standard requirements. 
4 Record keeping was too difficult. 
5 I wanted to implement the standard and become 
certified, but my buyer/advisor decided I am not ready 
yet. Please specify who decided. 
6 There wasn’t enough support available. 
7 First, I was supported by                                       , 
      but then they stopped to support me. 
8 There are no price premiums for certified produce. 
9 I changed my buyer and the new buyer doesn’t need the 
standard. 




Code 2 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
0 Nobody 
1 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
2 Collector/middleman 
3 DOA/DOAE 
4 Kaset tambon/amphoe 
5 University (specify) 
6 Farmer group/co-op 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
8 Royal Project 
9 Chiang Rai Horticultural Research 
Centre 
10 Other (specify) 
 










































        
        
        
        
 
Code 1 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
0 Nobody 
1 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
2 Collector/middleman 
3 DOA/DOAE 
4 Kaset tambon/amphoe 
5 University (specify) 
6 Farmer group/co-op 
7 NGO/donor (specify) 
8 Royal Project 
9 Chiang Rai Horticultural Research 
Centre 
10 Other (specify) 
 
Code 2 (Note: Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
1 High costs 
2 Absence of a price premium 
3 The price premium was too 
low to cover the additional 
costs 
4 Absence of support 
5 Discontinuation of support 
6 Difficulties in record keeping 
7 High additional workload 
8 I didn’t need it anymore 
9 I changed my buyer and the new 
buyer didn't need the standard 
10 I changed the crop 
11 My farm is too small for the standard to 
be economically  







Note: Only ask this section if the farmer is certified against a standard, in the process of certification or has disadopted a 
standard. Otherwise continue with question E21. 
E19. Did you have any investment costs for standard implementation at your farm or did somebody provide farm 
infrastructure and farm equipment for you to adopt a standard?   0 No  1 Yes 
 






Investment items Was the item paid 
for/provided by others? 
0 No / 1 Yes 








have to take 
out a loan 
for the 
investment? 
0 = No / 
1 = Yes 
If you had to 
take out a loan, 
where did you 
obtain the loan? 
Code 2 
 1 Building/upgrading of 
pesticide storage 
    
 2 Building/upgrading of 
fertilizer storage 
    
 3 Building/upgrading living 
quarters of workers and 
resting area for workers 
    
 4 Toilet and hand washing 
facilities 
    
 5 Sprayer equipment     
 6 Chemical mixing area and 
disposal site 
    
 7 Separate storage for empty 
chemical containers 
    
 8 Protective Clothing     
 9 Separate storage for all 
protective clothing 
    
 10 Collection point     
 11 Grading shed/area     
 12 First aid kit     
 13 Plot markers     
 14 Signs and poster     
 15 Waste bins     
 16 Training fees      
 17 Other, specify     
 18 Other, specify     
 
Code 1 (Let the farmer answer and 
select the code. If necessary, read the 
choices out loud) 
Code 2 (Let the farmer answer and select the code. If necessary, read the 
choices out loud) 
1 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
2 Collector/middleman 
3 DOA/DOAE 
4 Farmer group/co-op (specify) 
5 University (specify) 
6 NGO/donor (specify) 
7 Other, please specify 
1 Bank for agriculture and 
agricultural cooperatives (BAAC) 
2 Other banks/Financial institute 
3 Cooperative/Farmer's group 
4 Village and city fund 
5 Exporter/processor enterprise 
(specify) 
6 Middleman/collector 
7 Money lender 
8 Neighbor/relative/friend 





E21. Do you plan to adopt a standard in the future?  0 No (please continue with E24) 1 Yes  
 (Note: answer this question only for standards for which you are not yet in the process of standard implementation)
    
E22.  If yes, please specify standard (standard codes)?  
 














F. Access to information and services 
 
F1. Are you or another household member a member of a farmer group, cooperative or any other organization?   
0 No    1 Yes 
 
F2. If yes, please fill out the following table 
Type of group 
1  Farmer group 
2  Co-op 
3  Other 
(specify) 





year is the 
person a 
member? 




How often did the 
member participate in 
meetings of the 
organization in the time 
period March 2010 to 
February 2011? 
Does the member hold 
any position in the 
organization? 
0 No / 1 Yes 
 If yes, please specify 
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
Code 1 (Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
1 Provision of inputs 
2 Provision of credits 
3 Provision of saving accounts 
4 Renting out of farmers 
equipment 
5 Marketing of farmers produce (specify 
products) 
6 Certification against a standard (specify) 
 
7 Information on market prices 
8 Water user group 
9 Produce fertilizer/biocides 
10 Processing product, specify 
 






F3. Do you have access to extension services?   0 No  1 Yes 
 
F4. If yes, what kind of information is provided and how often? 
Service provider  Which kind of information is 
provided? Code 1 
How often do you meet? 
Code2 
1 Farm advisor from DOAE /DOA   
2 Farm advisor from Kaset 
Tambon/Amphoe/Dschangwat 
  
3 University extension  agent , please specify   
4 Farm advisor from a farmer group/co-op   
5 Royal project   
6 Land Development Department   
7 Chemical shop   
8 NGO/donor   
9 BAAC   
10 Other, please specify   
11 Other, please specify   
  
Code 1 (Read the choices out loud and list all that apply) 
1 Information on chemicals and 
chemical use 
5 Information on prices, buyers and 
marketing 
9 Soil conservation 
2 Information on Integrated Pest 
Management 
6 Information on Q-GAP 10 Water conservation 
3 Information on fertilizer use 7 Information on other standards 11 Other, please specify 
4 Information on production techniques 8 Organic production techniques  
 
Code 2 (Let the farmer answer and select the code) 
1 Less than once a year 
2 Once a year 
3 Two to three times a year 
4 Every three months 
5 Every two months 
6 Once a month 
7 Every two to three weeks 
8 Once a week 
9 More than once a 
week 





F5.  How often did you or any other household member or hired laborers participate in trainings in the last 3 years? 













          
 
F6. In which of the following trainings subjects did you, other household members, hired laborers took part? 
Type of training 
 
Who provided 
the training?  
Code 1 




(member I.D) and the 
no. of hired laborers 
Did you/others 
receive a license 
or certificate? 
0 = No / 
1=Yes 
1 General regulations of Q-GAP    
2 General regulations of GLOBALGAP    
3 Organic farming      
4 Management of Crop Protection Products    
5 Agricultural chemicals application    
6 Integrated Pest Management    
7 Management of Excess Spray Mix    
8 Management of Protective Clothing    
9 Equipment calibration    
10 Management of Fertilizers    
11 Management of Traceability    
12 Personal and product hygiene    
13 Housekeeping and cleaning    
14 Record keeping    
15 First aid    
16 Management of Product Handling - Post Harvest    
17 Management of Post-Harvest Chemicals    
18 Waste, Pollution & Environmental Management    
19 Water and Product Sampling for Testing Purposes    
20 Soil conservation    
21 Water conservation    
22 Other, please specify    
23 Other, please specify    




2 Kaset Tambon/ 
Amphoe/Dschangwat 
3 University (specify) 
 
4 Exporter/buyer (specify) 
 
5 NGO/donor (specify) 
 
6 Farmer group/co-op 
7 Land Development 
Department 
8 Chemical shop 
9 BAAC 
10 Other (specify) 
 
F7. If you had to borrow money for example to buy a pick-up truck, a motorcycle or to pay a hospital bill, would 






F8. If yes, where could you obtain credit? Please encircle 
 1      I could obtain formal credit from 2    I could obtain informal credit from 
a) Bank for agriculture and agricultural 
cooperatives  
a)  Exporter/processor enterprise (specify) 
b) Other banks/Financial institute b) Middleman/collector 
c) Cooperative/Farmer's group c) Money lender 
d) Village and city fund d) Neighbor/relative/friend 
e)  Other, please specify e) Other, please specify 
 
F9. Do you use the internet?      0 No     1 Yes, since       (year) 
 
F10. If yes, for what purpose do you use the internet?  
1 To contact buyers 
2 To contact extension services 
3 To inform myself about market prices 
4 For banking and payments 
5 Other, specify  
 
 
F11. Do you own a mobile phone?    0 No      1 Yes, since                      (year)     
 
F12. If yes, for which purposes do you use the mobile phone? 
1 To contact buyers 
2 To contact extension services 
3 To inform myself about market prices 
4 For banking and payments 




G. Assets and dwelling related indicators 
 
G1. Which of the following assets does the household own?  
 No. owned Asset No. owned 
1 Cars (except pick-up trucks)  8 Telephone  
2 TV  9 Mobile phone  
3 Radios  10 Air con  
4 CD Player  11 Refrigerator  
5 DVD Player  12 Gas stove  
6 Satellite dish  13 Microwave  
7 Washing machine  14 Other  
 
 
Note: Information should be collected about the dwelling in which the family currently resides. 
G2. What is the ownership status of dwelling? The status is owned if any member who lives in the household is the 
owner.  
1 Owned (with title) 
2 Owned (without title) 
3 Given by relative or other to use 
4 Rented 
5 Other (specify) 
 
G3. What type of roofing material is used in main house?  
1 Brick or stone 
2 Corrugated iron 
3 Bamboo 
4 Straw 
5 Clay bricks 
6 Concrete 
7 Tiles 
8 Other (specify) 
 





5 Other (specify) 
 
G5. What type of flooring does the dwelling have? 
1 Earth 3 Bamboo 5 Wood 7   Stones 






H. Household expenditure on food and food consumption 
 
H1. How much of the following items did you consume in the last seven days in your household?  First ask for quantity 
and market price. Only if the farmer cannot answer, ask for the value of the consumed products. Please stress out that 






















Rice and other 
staple 
   Oil, fish 
sauce, etc 
   
Meals bought 
outside 
   Tobacco    
Fresh fruits  
 
  Sweets    
Vegetables    Non-
alcoholic 
beverages  
   
Fresh Meat and 
Fish 
   Alcoholic 
beverages  
   
Dairy Products 
and Eggs 
   Other 
(specify) 
   
Preserved food, 
esp. fish 
   Other 
(specify) 
   
Herbs and 
spices 
   Other 
(specify) 
   
 
H2. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household in the last 12 months? Please encircle 
1 Enough of the kinds of food (I/we) want to eat 
2 Enough, but not always the kinds of food (I/we) want 
3 Enough, but not always the quality of the food (I/we) want 
4 Sometimes not enough to eat 
5 Often not enough to eat 
 
H3. Please indicate how frequently someone in your family experiences the following symptoms after eating.   
(Note: go through the symptoms one by one) 
Symptom Never Sometimes Often 
1 Diarrhea          
2 Crampy stomach pain          
3 Vomiting          
4 Nausea          
5 Fever          







Codes for standards 
1 Q-GAP 7 Organic Agriculture Certification Thailand (ACT) 
2 GLOBALGAP 8 Japanese Agricultural Standard (JAS) 
3 Tesco Nature’s Choice (TNC) 9 IFOAM's Organic Guarantee System (OGS) 
4 Carrefour Quality Line Organic Vegetable (CQL) 10 EU organic standard 
5 Marks & Spencer Field and Fork 11 National Organic Program (USDA) 






4 Para rubber 
5 Oil palm 
6 Spring onion 
7 Sweet basil 
8 Holy basil 
9 Hairy basil 
10 Coriander 
11 Egg plant 
12 Baby corn 
13 Celery 
14 Yard long bean 
15 Chinese 
convolvus 
16 Green okra 
17 Chili 
18 Asparagus 
19 Chinese kale 
20 Wattle 
21 Sugar cane 
22 Papaya 














37 Acacia pennata  
(cha om) 
38 Houttuynia (giap) 
39 Red leaf lettuce 
40 Taro 
41 Coffee 
42 Betel nut 
43 Fingerroot 
44 Marian plum 
45 Lemon 
46 Santol tropical 
fruit 
47 Rose apple 








54 Lemon grass 
55 Other (specify) 
 
 
Agreements with buyers (C13): 
Code 1: Agreements 
0 No fixed agreement: no fixed agreement exists if the farmer and the buyer do not agree about details e.g. concerning 
the production process, the amount sold, prices etc. before the exchange is made. 
1 Oral agreement: An oral agreement exists if the farmer and buyer have agreed verbally about details e.g.  concerning 
the production process, the amount sold, prices etc. before the exchange is made. 
2 Written agreement: A written agreement exists if the farmer and buyer have agreed in a written contract about details 
e.g. concerning the production process, the amount sold, prices etc. before the exchange is made. 
 
Code 2 (Let the farmer answer and choose the code yourself. If necessary, read the choices out loud) 
1 Arrangement lasts one season 
2 Arrangement lasts 1 year 
3 Arrangement lasts 2 years 
4 Arrangement lasts 3 years 
5 Arrangement lasts until buyer or I end it 
6 Other, please specify 
 
Code 3 (Read the choices out loud and list applicable) 
1 He pays the whole amount in cash before/at harvest 
2 He pays the whole amount in cash when I deliver the 
product 
3 He pays the whole amount in cash after I delivered the 
product, please specify how long after 
delivery______________ 
4 The buyer pays every …… days 
5 The buyer pays every …… weeks 
6 He pays in cash and splits up the payment in several 
times 
7 He pays the whole amount in kind 
8 Other, please specify 
 
Code 4 (Read the choices out loud and list applicable) 
0 No, he doesn’t deliver anything 
1 Yes, he delivers chemicals 
2 Yes, he delivers fertilizer 
3 Yes, he delivers seeds. Please specify 
4 Yes, he delivers, please specify 
5 Other, please specify 
 
Code 5 (Read the choices out loud and list applicable)  
1 Payback in cash when inputs are given 
2 Payback in cash at time of harvest/delivery 
3 Payback in kind at time of harvest/delivery 
4 Other, please specify 
 
Code 6 (Read the choices out loud and list applicable) 
1 The buyer comes to harvest 
2 Harvested and packed in wholesale units 
3 Harvested, washed and packed in wholesale units 
4 Harvested and packed in retail units 
5 Harvested, washed and packed in retail units 
6 Harvested, washed, sliced and packed in retail units 
7 Other, please specify 
 
